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Charter - s.8 - 'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy' (3). R. v. Singer [meaning of 'search']
In R. v. Singer (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against a Saskatchewan CA decision which "acquitted him of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample".
Here the court considers what constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of Charter s.8 ['search and seizure']:A. Did Any of the Police Conduct Constitute a “Search” Under Section 8 of the Charter?
[35] Section 8 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” The purpose of this guarantee is “to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy” (Hunter v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 160).
[36] Whether a claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy is assessed based on the “totality of the circumstances” (R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, at para. 10). The inquiry is both content-neutral and normative, driven by s. 8’s purpose of protecting individuals from unjustified state intrusions onto their privacy, no matter what evidence may be uncovered as a result (Hunter, at p. 160; see also R. v. Campbell, 2024 SCC 42, at para. 47; R. v. Mulligan (2000), 2000 CanLII 5625 (ON CA), 142 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34). Section 8 is concerned with preventing state intrusions on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, not with validating them after the fact.
[37] The common law traditionally viewed privacy in territorial terms. It recognized that a person has a high expectation of privacy in their home, exemplified in the famous statement in Semayne’s Case (1604), 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 E.R. 194, at p. 195, that “the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress” (cited in Eccles v. Bourque, 1974 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739, at pp. 742-43; see also R. v. Stairs, 2022 SCC 11, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 169, at para. 49). The idea of territorial privacy has since developed “into a more nuanced hierarchy” that protects privacy in the home as the most protected area, but also protects in “diluted measure” the perimeter space around the home (R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 22). In addition, an individual has a reasonable, though diminished, expectation of privacy in a private motor vehicle (R. v. Wise, 1992 CanLII 125 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, at p. 533; R. v. Mellenthin, 1992 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615; Tessling, at para. 22). Thus, an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home, its perimeter, and in a vehicle in the driveway of their property.
[38] It is also settled that “not every investigatory technique used by the police is a ‘search’ within the meaning of s. 8” (Evans, at para. 10). A police investigatory technique is a search only if it intrudes upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy (para. 11; Tessling, at para. 18). . R. v. Singer [vehicular searches]
In R. v. Singer (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against a Saskatchewan CA decision which "acquitted him of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample".
Here the court considers expectation of privacy wrt a private vehicle:(2) The Police Did Conduct a Search by Opening the Door to Mr. Singer’s Truck
[84] Despite my conclusion that the police were lawfully present on Mr. Singer’s driveway under the implied licence, I would find that the implied licence extended only to the door of Mr. Singer’s truck, just as it would have extended only to the door of his home. An individual has a reduced but still reasonable expectation of privacy in a private vehicle, as compared to a private residence (Mellenthin; Wise). The police exceeded the terms of the implied licence when they opened the door to Mr. Singer’s truck and intruded on his reasonable expectation of privacy inside the truck. The police otherwise had no access to the information inside Mr. Singer’s truck, including the smell of alcohol on his breath. In this respect, this case is like MacDonald, where the police conducted a search by pushing open the front door to a residence where they were lawfully present under the implied licence. As a result, the police conduct of opening the truck door was a search under s. 8 of the Charter. . R. v. Singer
In R. v. Singer (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against a Saskatchewan CA decision which "acquitted him of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample".
Here the court summarizes this search and seizure case [Charter s.8], which focusses on whether there is an 'implied license' to enter onto property for the purpose of communicating with the occupants:[1] Thirty years ago, in R. v. Evans, 1996 CanLII 248 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, this Court affirmed that “the common law has long recognized an implied licence for all members of the public, including police, to approach the door of a residence and knock” (para. 13, per Sopinka J.). Under the implied licence doctrine, a police officer who has lawful business with the occupant of a dwelling may proceed from the street to the door of a house to communicate with the occupant (para. 15). The issue on this appeal is whether the police likewise possess an implied licence to step onto a private driveway to investigate a complaint of impaired driving when they observe, in plain view, a running vehicle matching the description in the complaint.
[2] Two RCMP officers were investigating a recent complaint of impaired driving made against the respondent, Wayne Singer, in a small Saskatchewan First Nations community. After investigating for about an hour, at around midnight, the officers saw a truck matching the description in the complaint in a residential driveway on the community territory. The truck was running with its lights on. The officers stepped onto the driveway to approach the truck and saw a man sleeping or passed out in the driver’s seat. The officers spent a few minutes knocking on the truck window, but the occupant, Mr. Singer, did not respond. When the officers opened the truck door to rouse Mr. Singer, they smelled a strong odour of alcohol coming from his breath. He seemed tired and had bloodshot eyes. At the officers’ request, Mr. Singer provided a roadside breath sample, which registered as a “fail”. He was then arrested and taken into custody, where he refused to provide a further breath sample. He was charged with impaired driving and refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.
[3] At trial before the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, the only issue was whether the implied licence authorized the police to enter onto Mr. Singer’s driveway. Mr. Singer argued that the police breached his right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by entering his driveway without permission or a search warrant. In response, the Crown relied on this Court’s decision in Evans to claim that the police had an implied licence to step onto the driveway to investigate the impaired driving complaint. The trial judge agreed with the Crown, found no s. 8 breach, and entered a conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.
[4] The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan set aside the conviction. The court ruled that there is no implied licence to enter a driveway “for the purpose of conversing with and observing the occupant to gather evidence that they are impaired” (2023 SKCA 123, 431 C.C.C. (3d) 364, at paras. 43 and 64-66). In the court’s view, the police infringed Mr. Singer’s s. 8 Charter rights and were trespassers from the moment they set foot on the driveway. The court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and entered an acquittal.
[5] Before this Court, the Crown argued that the police were authorized to enter the driveway and to open Mr. Singer’s truck door under the implied licence doctrine or, alternatively, under a new ancillary police power to protect public safety in the context of an impaired driving investigation.
[6] I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remit the case to the Court of Appeal to determine the outstanding ground of appeal that it did not address. In my view, the police had an implied licence at common law to step onto Mr. Singer’s driveway, approach his truck, and knock on the truck window. The police were entitled to do so on legitimate business: to investigate a recent impaired driving complaint. This police conduct did not, on its own, constitute a “search” under s. 8 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal’s decision on this point was wrongly decided, and, as noted by the learned authors of Drug Offences in Canada, “the weight of authority [is] to the contrary” (B. A. MacFarlane, R. J. Frater and C. Michaelson, Drug Offences in Canada (4th ed. (loose-leaf)), at § 25:21).
[7] At the same time, the implied licence to enter the driveway and knock ended at the door of the truck. The police intruded onto Mr. Singer’s reasonable expectation of privacy and conducted a search when they opened the truck door.
[8] In this case, there is no need to recognize a new ancillary police power to provide potential authority to open the truck door. This Court’s decision in R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 37, already recognizes the common law power of the police to conduct a “safety search” when they have reasonable grounds to believe that the search “is reasonably necessary to eliminate an imminent threat to the safety of the public or the police” (para. 40). A safety search “will generally be conducted by the police as a reactionary measure” and “will generally be unplanned”, since it is “carried out in response to dangerous situations created by individuals, to which the police must react ‘on the sudden’” (para. 32).
[9] Here, there arguably were objective grounds to believe that the search was reasonably necessary to protect public safety. During the impaired driving investigation, the police found Mr. Singer asleep and unresponsive late at night in a running truck matching the description in the complaint. A running vehicle associated with an impaired driving complaint is effectively a weapon that can — and all too often does — kill both the impaired driver and innocent members of the public.
[10] However, there was no direct evidence that the officers were subjectively concerned for public safety when they encountered Mr. Singer asleep or passed out in the truck, as this issue was not raised at trial. Because the Crown bears the burden of justifying a warrantless search, and no such evidence was led, in the particular circumstances of this case I would conclude that the police breached s. 8 of the Charter by opening the truck door.
[11] Even so, I would not exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. The Charter-infringing state conduct was not so serious that the Court must dissociate itself from it. Nor did it have more than a moderate impact on Mr. Singer’s Charter-protected interests. In the circumstances, these factors are outweighed by society’s strong interest in prosecuting the serious offence of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample. . R. v. Nguyen
In R. v. Nguyen (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a defendant's criminal appeal, here from convictions for "possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and of possessing the proceeds of crime".
The court considered a Charter s.8 'reasonable expectation of privacy' issue, here regarding videotaping in common areas of apartment buildings:[25] There is a substantial body of case law on the reasonable expectation of privacy in shared areas of multi-unit dwellings. In R. v. Saciragic, 2017 ONCA 91, at paras. 32-34, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 106, this court concluded that the accused had no reasonable expectation that his movements to and from his unit – located in a relatively large apartment building equipped with video surveillance – would not be observed by others, including the police. In R. v. Yu, 2019 ONCA 942, 151 O.R. (3d) 244, leave to appeal refused, [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 38, when addressing an underground condominium parking garage, this court held at para. 79: “to put it in terms of the factors set out in [R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 375 D.L.R. (4th) 255], unit owners could not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a garage shared with so many other owners and over which they had very little control”. And in R. v. Salmon, 2024 ONCA 697, 443 C.C.C. (3d) 110, at para. 39, this court reaffirmed the general principle that underground parking garages are common areas where a resident’s right to a reasonable expectation of privacy would not ordinarily attach.
[26] In line with this jurisprudence, and after applying the guiding principles to the facts as he found them, the application judge concluded that 1) anyone could access the public parking area, and 2) from there, anyone could see into the residential parking area. There is nothing unique about this case that sets it apart from Salmon and Yu.
[27] In my view, we must resist the appellant’s attempt to broaden the subject matter of this search to include intimate details of what was happening inside his apartment. The application judge found that the officers’ objective in making observations from the public parking area was to confirm the appellant’s presence at that location, his movements to and from that place, and who he was associating with. The police were not pursuing more intimate details, nor would what they were pursuing tend to reveal any.
[28] The appellant contends that observations in the parking area could reveal what was happening inside his home, and that the police specifically sought to determine whether his unit was being used as a stash house. While s. 8 requires us to consider what the subject matter of the search “tends to reveal” (Bykovets, at para. 53; Spencer, at para. 27), the analysis cannot rely on speculative inferences. In this case, it is difficult to see how observations in the underground parking area could be used to infer what goes on in an at-the-time unknown unit a considerable distance away. This court noted in Saciragic, at para. 30, that the use of an elevator did not yield any information about the nature of the activities inside a unit. Similarly, in this case, the use of an underground parking garage could not be expected to reveal much. I reject the appellant’s suggestion that this appeal is analogous to R. v. White, 2015 ONCA 508, 127 O.R. (3d) 32, where the police attempted to eavesdrop by hiding in the stairwell near a unit: see also R. v. Roy, 2020 ONCA 18, 386 C.C.C. (3d) 183, at paras. 15-16.
[29] I also reject appellant counsel’s characterization of the police activities in this case as “intensive scrutiny”, “extensive surveillance”, and “prolonged” tracking. The police activities did not reach this level. It appears as though the entire investigation lasted about six hours; of those six hours the appellant only appeared around the last two hours; and the video recordings were less than two minutes in total. As a comparison, in R. v. Hoang, 2024 ONCA 361, when confronted with a situation where the police recorded “everyone who came and went at all times of the day for a period of 8 days” (at para. 41), this court held that:As a general proposition, it may well be that police camera surveillance could give rise to an objective expectation of privacy over the subject matter of the recording within the s. 8 Charter analysis, based on its duration, the scope and nature of its surveillance, the basis for its placement or because of other contextual or technological factors. This general proposition stems from the broad and functional view of the subject matter of such a recording, which could potentially capture information about an accused’s comings and goings as well as who they associate with and what activities they take part in. In the circumstances of this case, however, where the pole camera captured only the public space that an individual police investigator would have seen from the same distance, without any additional capture of sound or close-up camera angles, and for a limited period of time, such broader concerns do not arise. [Emphasis added.] [30] The act of video recording does not create an expectation of privacy where one does not already exist and many of the cases the appellant relies upon in this regard are not helpful. For example, in both R. v. Duarte (1990), 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), 71 O.R. (2d) 575 (S.C.C.), and R. v. Wong (1990), 1990 CanLII 56 (SCC), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.), where the Supreme Court held that the recording of private communications and activities was more intrusive than just listening or watching, the recordings engaged s. 8 because the communications and actions in question were private. Here, the investigators did not observe or record anything that was private. The appellant was simply observed walking back and forth between an elevator and his car in a parking lot and loading bags into vehicles.
[31] Finally, the appellant places undue emphasis on the fact the police did not pay for a parking ticket. I accept that, by not paying for and displaying a parking ticket, the officers were likely trespassing. In this regard, the application judge erred by finding that the police had “an implied licence … to be on private property for investigative purposes where the public has a general invitation to be present.” The general invitation to the public was conditioned on the payment of a parking ticket, which the officers did not comply with. Nor does the doctrine of implied licence apply: The purpose of the officers’ entry onto the premises was not to communicate with, or to protect the interests of, the owner or the occupant; rather, it was to surveil one of the occupants: White, at paras. 56-57; R. v. Mulligan (2000), 2000 CanLII 5625 (ON CA), 142 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 24.
[32] Nevertheless, the police conduct did not result in a s. 8 breach. Although the requirement to purchase a ticket and the limited use of the space for parking could reduce foot traffic and the length of anyone’s stay, the garage was shared with other buildings in a busy area of Toronto, with around 50 public parking spots on the same level. Given the nature of the space and the manner of the surveillance, what the officers observed while in the parking area could be observed by anyone who happened to be in the parking garage: see Roy, at paras. 15-18.
[33] In these circumstances, whether the observations were made after paying for a parking ticket or not has no material bearing on the reasonableness of the appellant’s expectation of privacy. What is important at this stage of the analysis is not whether the police were trespassing on common property, but their access to the appellant’s private activities and communications. Viewed in context, the physical intrusion or trespass by the police was peripheral to the s. 8 analysis: White, at para. 16; R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, at paras. 41-45.
[34] I see no error in the application judge’s ultimate conclusion that the appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when in the multi-condominium parking garage; a finding that sits comfortably with this court’s and the Supreme Court’s guidance on how to assess the reasonableness of a subjective expectation of privacy in similar locations. . R. v. Campbell [text messages]
In R. v. Campbell (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed a criminal appeal, this from a dismissal of an Ontario Court of Appeal, and that from a trial judge's finding that convicted the defendant "of trafficking and possession offences under the CDSA and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment".
Here the engages in a Charter s.8 'reasonable expectation of privacy' inquiry:(2) Application
[40] I agree with the Crown that this Court has held that there is no “automatic” rule of standing for text messages. As McLachlin C.J. recognized in Marakah, text message conversations “can, in some circumstances, attract a reasonable expectation of privacy”, but this “does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that an exchange of electronic messages will always attract a reasonable expectation of privacy” (para. 5 (emphasis in original)). Whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a text message conversation must be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances in each case.
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(a) What Was the Subject Matter of the Alleged Search?
[42] When the state examines text messages, the subject matter of the alleged search is properly characterized as “the electronic conversation between two or more people” (Marakah, at para. 19; see also Jones, at para. 14; R. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 5). As noted in Marakah, “[t]his includes the existence of the conversation, the identities of the participants, the information shared, and any inferences about associations and activities that can be drawn from that information” (para. 20).
[43] Here, the subject matter of the alleged search was Mr. Campbell’s text message conversation with who he believed was Mr. Gammie.
(b) Did Mr. Campbell Have a Direct Interest in the Subject Matter?
[44] The Crown does not dispute that Mr. Campbell had a direct interest in his text message conversation. He participated in the conversation and wrote several of the texts at issue (see Marakah, at para. 21; Jones, at para. 15).
(c) Did Mr. Campbell Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in the Subject Matter?
[45] A claimant’s burden of establishing a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the alleged search “is not ‘a high hurdle’” (Marakah, at para. 22, quoting R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, at para. 37; see also Jones, at para. 20). The necessary evidentiary foundation is “modest”, reflecting how “s. 8’s normative import transcends an individual claimant’s subjective expectations” (Jones, at para. 21). “A subjective expectation of privacy can be presumed or inferred in the circumstances in the absence of the claimant’s testimony or admission at the voir dire” (para. 21).
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(d) Was Mr. Campbell’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy Objectively Reasonable?
[47] In determining whether a subjective expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, courts must employ an approach that is both normative and content-neutral. Several interveners urge this Court to affirm these basic postulates of the s. 8 analysis. I agree that it is useful to do so.
(i) Section 8 Requires a Normative Approach
[48] Whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy “is not a purely factual inquiry”; the inquiry “is normative rather than simply descriptive” (Spencer, at para. 18; see also Tessling, at para. 42). Although the inquiry must be sensitive to the factual context, it is inevitably laden with value judgments about the sort of free and democratic society that reasonable and informed Canadians expect to live in, based on concerns about the long-term consequences of tolerating state intrusion into individual privacy (Spencer, at para. 18; Patrick, at para. 27; Bykovets, at para. 52; see also H. Stewart, “Normative Foundations for Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 335, at pp. 342-47; S. Penney, V. Rondinelli and J. Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada (3rd ed. 2022), at ¶3.38).
[49] The normative approach to s. 8 “demands we take a broad, functional approach to the subject matter of the search and that we focus on its potential to reveal personal or biographical core information” (Bykovets, at para. 7 (emphasis in original), citing Marakah, at para. 32; see also R. v. Reeves, 2018 SCC 56, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 531, at para. 28; Tessling, at para. 42; Spencer, at para. 18; Stewart, at pp. 335 and 342-43).
(ii) The Approach to Section 8 Must Also Be Content-Neutral
[50] It is also settled that “the s. 8 analysis must be content-neutral” (Marakah, at para. 48). Thus, “the fruits of a search cannot be used to justify an unreasonable privacy violation” (para. 48). This Court’s precedents on the content-neutral approach hold that people do not deserve lesser privacy protection under s. 8 of the Charter because they were engaged in criminal activity at the time of the search or seizure.
[51] A leading authority on the content-neutral approach to s. 8 is R. v. Wong, 1990 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36. This Court held that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room in which the police had installed a video camera without judicial authorization during an investigation of a “floating” gaming house. The Court emphasized that whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy “must be framed in broad and neutral terms” (p. 50). The question is not “whether persons who engage in illegal activity behind the locked door of a hotel room have a reasonable expectation of privacy” (a content-driven approach), but rather “whether in a society such as ours persons who retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have a reasonable expectation of privacy” (a content-neutral approach) (p. 50).
[52] Under the content-neutral approach to s. 8, the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy does not turn on “the legal or illegal nature of the items sought” (Spencer, at para. 36; see also Reeves, at para. 28; Patrick, at para. 32; R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, at para. 39; D. Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (7th ed. 2018), at p. 307; Penney, Rondinelli and Stribopoulos, at ¶3.37). The question under s. 8 “is not whether the claimant broke the law, but rather whether the police exceeded the limits of the state’s authority” (Reeves, at para. 2).
(iii) Mr. Campbell’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy Was Objectively Reasonable
[53] There is no closed or definitive list of factors relevant to whether a claimant’s subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter of a search is objectively reasonable (Bykovets, at para. 45; Cole, at para. 45; Marakah, at para. 24). The relevant factors include, but are not limited to:(i) whether the information would tend to reveal intimate or biographical details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual subject to the alleged search;
(ii) the place where the alleged search took place;
(iii) whether the subject matter of the alleged search was in public view;
(iv) whether the subject matter had been abandoned;
(v) whether the information was already in the hands of third parties, and if so, whether it was subject to an obligation of confidentiality;
(vi) whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the privacy interest;
(vii) whether the individual was present at the time of the alleged search;
(viii) the possession, control, ownership, and historical use of the property or place said to have been searched; and
(ix) the ability to regulate access to the place of the search, including the right to admit or exclude others from the place (Plant, at p. 293; Tessling, at para. 32; Edwards, at para. 45). [54] The parties focussed their submissions before this Court on three factors: (1) the private nature of the subject matter; (2) the intrusiveness of the police technique in relation to the privacy interest; and (3) the level of control over the information.
1. The Private Nature of the Subject Matter
[55] The private nature of the subject matter is a critical factor in establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy. The purpose of s. 8 is “to protect a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state” (Plant, at p. 293; see also Marakah, at para. 31; Bykovets, at para. 51). As this Court has recognized, “all information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit” (Dyment, at p. 429, quoting the Task Force established jointly by the Department of Communications/Department of Justice, Privacy and Computers (1972), at p. 13; see also Spencer, at para. 40; Jones, at para. 39; Tessling, at para. 23). In this vein, s. 8 of the Charter has been described as protecting “informational self-determination” (Jones, at para. 39).
[56] In keeping with the normative, content-neutral approach to s. 8, a court must focus on “‘whether people generally have a privacy interest’ in the subject matter of the state’s search” (Bykovets, at para. 53, quoting Patrick, at para. 32). The question is whether the subject matter of the search at issue has the potential or tendency to reveal private information about the claimant (Marakah, at para. 31).
[57] With respect to text messages in particular, “the focus is not on the actual contents of the messages the police have seized, but rather on the potential of a given electronic conversation to reveal personal or biographical information”; the focus is on whether the participants in the conversation “have a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents, whatever they may be” (Marakah, at para. 32). The protection of s. 8 includes “information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual” (para. 32, quoting Plant, at p. 293).
[58] This Court has recognized that few if any types of conversation or communication can “promis[e] more privacy than text messaging. There is no more discreet form of correspondence” (Marakah, at para. 35; see also TELUS Communications, at para. 1). “Electronic conversations can allow people to communicate details about their activities, their relationships, and even their identities that they would never reveal to the world at large, and to enjoy portable privacy in doing so” (Marakah, at para. 36).
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2. Intrusiveness of the Police Technique in Relation to the Privacy Interest
[62] The intrusiveness of the police technique in relation to the privacy interest at issue can be important in assessing whether a claimant’s subjective expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable (Tessling, at paras. 32 and 50; Plant, at p. 295). This is a distinct consideration from whether the police acted lawfully, which is relevant to whether the state conduct was “unreasonable” at the second stage of the s. 8 inquiry (Edwards, at para. 33).
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3. Control Over the Information
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[66] .... As McLachlin C.J. emphasized in Marakah, “control is not an absolute indicator of a reasonable expectation of privacy, nor is lack of control fatal to a privacy interest” (para. 38; see also Reeves, at para. 37). “[A] person does not lose control of information for the purposes of s. 8 simply because another person possesses it or can access it” (Marakah, at para. 41; see also para. 68). Sharing control of the information at issue may diminish without necessarily eliminating a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. As a result, text message conversations may be protected by a “zone of privacy” that extends beyond one’s own mobile device to the recipient of the message, even when “one shares private information with others” (para. 37).
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[68] The relevant question under s. 8 is not whether the individual reasonably expected the subject matter of the search to remain private from just anybody; what matters is whether they reasonably expected it would remain private from state intrusion (R. v. Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 46; Wong, at pp. 43-44 and 47-48; Plant, at p. 291; Tessling, at para. 18; Marakah, at paras. 40-45). The “zone of privacy” protected by s. 8 of the Charter involves the right to keep “personal information . . . safe from state intrusion” (Marakah, at para. 37). In my view, in all the circumstances, Mr. Campbell had a reasonable expectation of privacy from state intrusion into his text message conversation.
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[78] .... In my view, Marakah remains the governing authority on when a text message conversation attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8. It is thus not necessary to decide whether Mills is properly characterized as creating an “exception” to Marakah or as departing from the content‑neutral approach to s. 8 of the Charter.
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