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Charter - Presumption of Statutory Conformity. R. v. Kloubakov
In R. v. Kloubakov (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed a criminal appeal, this from an Alberta CA ruling that allowed a Crown appeal against an Alberta QB decision in which "the trial judge held that these offences [SS: 'receiving a material benefit from sexual services and of procuring': CCC 286.2 and 286.3] prohibited the safety measures contemplated in Bedford [SS: Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford (SCC, 2013)] and therefore infringed s. 7 of the Charter".
Here the court explains the presumption of statutory conformity with the Charter:(1) Principles of Statutory Interpretation
[61] Statutory interpretation is conducted in accordance with the modern principle, under which “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21, quoting E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 117). The modern principle requires courts to interpret legislation “according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole” (Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at para. 10; R. v. Downes, 2023 SCC 6, at para. 24).
[62] Supplementing the modern principle is “the presumption that Parliament intended to enact legislation in conformity with the Charter” (Sharpe, at para. 33). This presumption, sometimes called the presumption of compliance, requires courts to adopt “[a] posture of respect towards Parliament”, such that “if legislation is amenable to two interpretations, a court should choose the interpretation that upholds the legislation as constitutional” (R. v. Mills, 1999 CanLII 637 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 56; Sharpe, at para. 33; J.J., at para. 18; La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22, at para. 24; R. Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes (7th ed. 2022), at §§ 16.01[2] and 16.02). Courts should “strive, where possible, to give effect to” Parliament’s presumed intention to comply with the Charter (Mills, at para. 56; J.J., at para. 18).
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(5) Conclusion on Statutory Interpretation
[133] Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation, neither the material benefit offence nor the procuring offence prohibits the safety measures contemplated in Bedford. Because both offences are unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the presumption that Parliament intended to comply with the Charter. . Waterhen Lake First Nation v. Canada
In Waterhen Lake First Nation v. Canada (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a JR, here challenging the striking of a Specific Claims Tribunal claim dealing with 'traditional harvesting'.
Here, in obiter, the court comments on the statutory "presumption of conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms":[116] The Tribunal’s approach is also supported by the recent decision of this Court in Little Black Bear First Nation v. Kawacatoose First Nation, 2024 FCA 119 at para. 80, leave to appeal to SCC pending, Court File 41458, 2024 CarswellNat 5015, which upheld as reasonable the Tribunal’s interpretation of an Order in Council creating a fishing reserve under Treaty 4, including its finding that, in the absence of genuine ambiguity, the Nowegijick principle had no application. After pointing to the passage from Osoyoos cited above, this Court noted that the Supreme Court of Canada had confirmed that courts need resort to external interpretive aids, like the principle of strict construction of penal laws or the presumption of conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, only where a provision gives rise to a genuine or real ambiguity. This will occur if "“its words can reasonably be interpreted in more than one way after due consideration of the context in which they appear and of the purpose of the provision”" or, in other words, "“if differing readings of the same provision cannot be decisively resolved”" through the modern approach to statutory interpretation: LaPresse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22 at para. 24, 485 D.L.R. (4th) 652. The Tribunal found no genuine ambiguity in the jurisdiction-conferring provisions of the Act. The Applicant has not established that this conclusion was unreasonable.
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