Civil Litigation - SLAPP - Pointes Protection - General. 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association
In 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association (SCC, 2020), the leading case on Ontario's SLAPP laws, the Supreme Court of Canada sets out the legal context:
 Freedom of expression is a fundamental right and value; the ability to express oneself and engage in the interchange of ideas fosters a pluralistic and healthy democracy by generating fruitful public discourse and corresponding public participation in civil society. This case is about what happens when individuals and organizations use litigation as a tool to quell such expression, which, in turn, quells participation and engagement in matters of public interest. More specifically, this Court is being asked to decide whether an action brought by 1704604 Ontario Limited (“170 Ontario”) against the Pointes Protection Association and six of its members (collectively “Pointes Protection”) can proceed, or whether it must be dismissed under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”). For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that 170 Ontario’s lawsuit must be dismissed. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal before this Court.
 Strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPPs”) are a phenomenon used to describe exactly what the acronym refers to: lawsuits initiated against individuals or organizations that speak out or take a position on an issue of public interest. SLAPPs are generally initiated by plaintiffs who engage the court process and use litigation not as a direct tool to vindicate a bona fide claim, but as an indirect tool to limit the expression of others. In a SLAPP, the claim is merely a façade for the plaintiff, who is in fact manipulating the judicial system in order to limit the effectiveness of the opposing party’s speech and deter that party, or other potential interested parties, from participating in public affairs.
 In light of the increased proliferation of SLAPPs, provincial legislatures (in Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec) have enacted laws to mitigate their harmful effects. These laws are occasionally referred to as “anti-SLAPP” legislation (2018 ONCA 685, 142 O.R. (3d) 161; Galloway v. A.B., 2019 BCCA 385, 30 B.C.L.R. (6th) 245; Klepper v. Lulham, 2017 QCCA 2069 (CanLII); B. Sheldrick, Blocking Public Participation: The Use of Strategic Litigation to Silence Political Expression (2014)).
 In November 2015, Ontario brought into force Bill 52, Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015, 1st Sess., 41st Leg., 2015, which, as noted above, amended the CJA by introducing ss. 137.1 to 137.5. The purposes of those provisions were specified in the legislation itself, in s. 137.1(1) of the CJA:
137.1 (1) The purposes of this section and sections 137.2 to 137.5 are,  This was prompted by the APR, which stated that the “legislation should include a purpose clause for the benefit of judicial interpretation” (Summary of Recommendations, para. 2). While legislative purpose bears on the exercise of statutory interpretation regardless of whether a purpose clause exists, the fact that the APR explicitly urged legislators to include such a clause for the benefit of judicial interpretation, and that legislators consciously obliged, demonstrates that the purpose clause in s. 137.1(1) commands considerable interpretative authority.
(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest;
(b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest;
(c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and
(d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action.
 Further indications of legislative intention can be gleaned from the debates in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario. At second reading of the bill, the Attorney General of Ontario at the time, the Hon. Madeleine Meilleur, stated the following:
If passed, this legislation will allow courts to quickly identify and deal with strategic lawsuits, minimizing the emotional and financial strain on defendants, as well as the waste of court resources. Ultimately, the legislative debates preceding the passage of the Act echoed the same concerns expressed by the Panel in the APR. Indeed, parliamentarians acknowledged as much: “[t]his bill came forward as a result of a report from 2010” (p. 1975 (Ms. Sylvia Jones)); “a made-in-Ontario approach to address the issue of strategic lawsuits based on consensus, recommendations of an expert advisory panel and extensive stakeholder consultation” (p. 1975 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur)). Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the final test adopted in the legislation was very similar substantively to the test proposed in the APR. This makes it clear that the APR had a considerable influence on the legislation which was enacted and which is now at issue before this Court.
. . .
Our proposed legislation strikes a balance that will help ensure abusive litigation is stopped, but legitimate action can continue.
This proposed legislation is about preventing strategic lawsuits. Anyone who has a legitimate claim of libel or slander should not be discouraged by this legislation.
(Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 41A, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., December 10, 2014, at p. 1975)
 For this reason, the Panel and its APR are persuasive authority for the purposes of statutory interpretation. It must be remembered that “[l]egislative history includes material relating to the conception, preparation and passage of the enactment”, and this “may often be [an] important par[t] of the context to be examined as part of the modern approach to statutory interpretation” (Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53,  3 S.C.R. 471, at para. 43 (“CHRC”)). Indeed, the late Peter W. Hogg defined legislative history as including the following:
1. [T]he report of a royal commission or law reform commission or parliamentary committee recommending that a statute be enacted;While reports like the APR are generally “admissible for any purpose the court thinks appropriate”, the weight accorded to them depends on the circumstances (R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6th ed. 2014), at p. 685; see also R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26,  1 S.C.R. 575, at para. 51). As I have explained, the APR was the clear impetus for the legislation, and was relied upon heavily by the legislature in drafting s. 137.1 of the CJA. Accordingly, it is a persuasive source that “provide[s] helpful information about the background and purpose of the legislation” (CHRC, at para. 44).
. . .
3. a report or study produced outside government which existed at the time of the enactment of the statute and was relied upon by the government that introduced the legislation . . . .
(Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Supp. (loose-leaf)), vol. 2, at pp. 60-1 to 60-2)
 As indicated above, s. 137.1 is the provision in the CJA that is meant to function as a mechanism to screen out lawsuits that unduly limit expression on matters of public interest through the identification and pre-trial dismissal of such actions. The final statutory language adopted makes it clear how the APR and the legislative debates informed the drafting of the provision: there is an invocation of the need for the expression to relate to a matter of public interest; the underlying proceeding must have substantial merit (beyond “technical validity”, as the APR noted, at para. 37); and the public interest in protecting the expression must be weighed against the public interest in permitting the underlying proceeding to continue (echoing the importance of balance repeatedly noted in the APR and the legislative debates).
 The relevant portions of s. 137.1 are reproduced below:
(3) On motion by a person against whom a proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest. In brief, s. 137.1 places an initial burden on the moving party — the defendant in a lawsuit — to satisfy the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression relating to a matter of public interest. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the responding party — the plaintiff — to satisfy the motion judge that there are grounds to believe the proceeding has substantial merit and the moving party has no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. If the responding party cannot satisfy the motion judge that it has met its burden, then the s. 137.1 motion will be granted and the underlying proceeding will be consequently dismissed. It is important to recognize that the final weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b) is the fundamental crux of the analysis: as noted repeatedly above, the APR and the legislative debates emphasized balancing and proportionality between the public interest in allowing meritorious lawsuits to proceed and the public interest in protecting expression on matters of public interest. Section 137.1(4)(b) is intended to optimize that balance.
(4) A judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that,
(a) there are grounds to believe that,
(i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and
(ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and
(b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.