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Civil Litigation - Frivolous and Vexatious (4). Teper v. IPC
In Teper v. IPC (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismissed a self-presenting JR on R2.1 ['frivolous and vexatious'] grounds, here on 'prematurity' in a 'gate-keeping' context. The simple facts were:[2] Mr. Teper seeks to judicially review a letter of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC) dated January 3, 2024. In the letter, the IPC advised Mr. Teper that an appeal he had filed with the IPC (under file number MA24-00002) would be placed on hold due to an administrative practice that an individual may only have two appeals actively proceeding at any one time. The court reasoned as follows:[9] Rule 2.1.01 allows the court to stay or dismiss a proceeding where it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The application of r. 2.1 is “limited to the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, [2015] O.J. No. 5692, at para. 8; Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2023 ONCA 598, [2023] O.J. No. 3997, at para. 6.
[10] The rule “must be interpreted robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process”: Scaduto, at para. 8; Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690, at para. 8.
[11] In this case, Mr. Teper’s application is patently premature. The letter issued by the IPC is an administrative direction to control the processing of the proposed appeal. It is not a final decision. This court has repeatedly emphasized the longstanding principle that it will not intervene in administrative proceedings unless there are exceptional circumstances. Fragmentation causes delay and disruptions in administrative proceedings. It is preferable to allow administrative proceedings to run their full course and then consider legal issues arising from the proceeding at their conclusion: Isaac v. Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 10 (CanLII), 2021 ONSC, at para. 10.
[12] I do not agree with Mr. Teper’s submission that the letter was not interlocutory because the Notice of Appeal was not issued. The letter formed part of the IPC’s administrative management of the appeal. It was directed at a particular appeal, regardless of whether the Notice of Appeal was issued. To the extent it represents a more general administrative practice, such a practice would not be the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review.
[13] I do not accept that there are exceptional circumstances that would justify interfering in the IPC’s process in this case. The reason Mr. Teper is facing the delay in his appeal is because he has filed multiple appeals. The IPC, like all administrative tribunals, has limited resources. The IPC has told Mr. Teper he can choose which of his appeals to activate next. If there are issues he considers more time-sensitive in this appeal, it remains open to him to prioritize it. If the delay in processing this appeal becomes undue in a manner that causes prejudice, it will remain open to Mr. Teper to raise that allegation when the appeal is heard. Doing so would allow the IPC to assess the allegation of procedural unfairness in the context of the case including the degree of any prejudice to Mr. Teper. In any event, raising an allegation of procedural unfairness does not on its own constitute an exceptional circumstance that would justify fragmenting an administrative proceeding. The circumstances here do not mandate early intervention by this court.
[14] In dismissing this application under r. 2.1.01, Mr. Teper is not foreclosed from recourse to the court. If by the conclusion of the IPC appeal he believes the process was procedurally unfair, it will remain open to him to seek judicial review. . Yan v. Pritchard-Sobhani
In Yan v. Pritchard-Sobhani (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a R2.1.01 ['frivolous and vexatious'] appeal:[5] The appellant submits that the motion judge erred in dismissing the action without “substantial support” and this did not afford her an opportunity to explain why her claims should not be dismissed.
[6] We do not accept this submission. Rule 2.1.01(3) gives the court authority to stay or dismiss an action without written submissions: Amikwabi v. Pope Francis, 2022 ONCA 236, at para. 3. Because the claim, on its face was frivolous and devoid of merit, written submissions would not have changed the result. . Argiloff v. O’Brien et al
In Argiloff v. O’Brien et al (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court reviewed the RCP 2.1 'frivolous/vexatious/abusive' provisions:Legislative framework:
[7] Rule 2.1.02 is a streamlined procedure for disposing of motions that are, on their face, frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process. The rule is not intended to supplant the established procedure of responding to a motion: Simpson v. Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806, 5 C.P.C. (8th) 280, at para. 43.
[8] Its purpose is “nipping in the bud actions which are frivolous and vexatious in order to protect the parties opposite from inappropriate costs and to protect the court from misallocation of scarce resources”: Markowa v. Adamson Cosmetic Facial Surgery Inc., 2014 ONSC 6664, at para. 3.
[9] Rule 2.1 is to be applied only in clear cases of abuse and is not for “close calls”: Raji v. Ladner, 2015 ONSC 801, at para. 9. See also Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6100, 37 C.L.R. (4th) 1, additional reasons at 2014 ONSC 6497, 61 C.P.C. (7th) 153 (“Gao (2)”).
[10] In Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 81 C.P.C. (7th) 258, the Court of Appeal affirmed and endorsed Myers J.’s narrow approach to the procedure, stating at para. 9:We fully endorse that case law and the guidance that has been provided by [Myers J.] in the interpretation and operation of r. 2.1. This approach is summarized in Raji, at paras. 8-9, as follows:[R]ule 2.1 is not for close calls. Its availability is predicated on the abusive nature of the proceeding being apparent on the face of the pleadings themselves. No evidence is submitted on the motion…. [T]here are two conditions generally required for rule 2.1 to be applied. First, the frivolous, vexatious, or abusive nature of the proceeding should be apparent on the face of the pleading as required by the rule. Second, there should generally be a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process of rule 2.1…. This second requirement is not in the rule and is not a fixed requirement. It strikes me as a guideline that reminds the court that there are other rules available for the same subject-matter and that resort to the attenuated process in rule 2.1 should be justified in each case. [11] A vexatious litigant can have a legitimate complaint. It is not uncommon for there to be a real issue at the heart of a vexatious litigant's case. The problem is often that the litigant either cannot properly communicate the concern or, more typically, cannot accept that the law may not provide the remedy sought despite the unfairness felt by the litigant. While r. 2.1 should be applied robustly to bring an early end to vexatious proceedings, the matters should not be considered lightly or dismissively. Care should be taken to allow generously for drafting deficiencies and recognizing that there may be a core complaint which is quite properly recognized as legitimate, even if the proceeding itself is frivolously brought or carried out and ought to be dismissed: Gao (2), at para. 18.
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Frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process:
[41] A classic hallmark of an abusive proceeding is the existence of a multitude of other proceedings involving the same litigants: Markowa, at para. 11. Other common attributes of a vexatious litigant include rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings to repeat and supplement them in later proceedings, including bringing proceedings against counsel who have acted for or against them, a failure to pay costs awards, and the persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals: Gao (2), at para. 14. I find that all these attributes are present in the case before me. . Ash v. Ontario (Chief Medical Officer)
In Ash v. Ontario (Chief Medical Officer) (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal sets out a definition of 'frivolous':[21] As noted in Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board (2003), 2003 CanLII 7815 (ON CA), 233 D.L.R. (4th) 657, 179 O.A.C. 67, at para. 14 (Ont. C.A.), “frivolous” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful”. A proceeding has been held to be frivolous and vexatious when it is instituted without any reasonable ground, or when it seeks the determination of an issue that has already been adjudicated: Currie, at para. 15, citing Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 1979 CanLII 1631 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.) at 226.
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[23] The appellant relies on Collins v. Ontario, 2017 ONCA 317, at para. 19, which held that “[a]bsence of merit on its own … is not sufficient to justify dismissal under r. 2.1”. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that r. 2.1 is not a shortcut or substitution for a motion to strike or dismiss. But a mere lack of merit is not the basis on which Corbett J. dismissed the appellant’s motion to set aside. He effectively found that the motion was frivolous and vexatious on its face. This is a proper basis for dismissal under r. 2.1. The first ground of appeal accordingly has no merit.
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[25] Having considered all relevant factors, I conclude that the overall justice of the case does not require that the motion be granted. As Roberts J.A. found in Hill v. Cambridge (City), 2023 ONCA 164, at para. 13, this is “one of those occasions where the lack of merit in these proposed appeals is so clear-cut that, having regard to this factor on its own, and when considered in combination with the other factors that I have just considered, leave to extend the time for appealing should not be granted”. . Hart v. Balice
In Hart v. Balice (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal notes that, for purposes of a CJA s.140 'frivolous and vexatious' order that bars the commencement of civil proceedings, 'proceedings' includes appeals:[2] By order dated June 13, 2023, Ms. Hart was declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation v. Hart, 2023 ONSC 3544 at para. 41. The order prohibits Ms. Hart from commencing or continuing any proceedings in any court, except with leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice. The order also applies to appeals to this court: Kallaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA), 265 D.L.R. (4th) 320, at para. 26, citing Varma v. Rozenberg, [1998] O.J. No. 4183 (C.A.), at para. 5.
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[5] In addition, as there is a vexatious litigant order in effect barring Ms. Hart from instituting or continuing any proceedings in any court without leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice, court staff are directed not to accept any further filings from Ms. Hart – in this proceeding or in any other civil proceeding – unless she has obtained leave from a judge of the Superior Court of Justice, or the June 13, 2023 order is set aside. . Rebello v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Rebello v. Canada (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal canvassed basic remedial provisions of RCP 2.1.01 ['Stay, Dismissal of Frivolous, Vexatious, Abusive Proceeding - Order to Stay, Dismiss Proceeding']:[7] The appellant submits that the motion judge erred in ruling that the application be dismissed on r. 2.1.01 without a hearing. Further, she submits that she was denied procedural fairness, because she was not allowed to respond to the r. 2.1.01 request. We do not agree. Rule 2.1.01 provides:The court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. [8] The rule sets out a summary procedure, and the court has the power to proceed without submissions: see e.g., Ahmed v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 ONCA 427, at para. 7. Subrule 2.1.01(3) specifically states that an order shall be made on written submissions “unless the court orders otherwise.” Given the multiple cases referred to by the motion judge, she did not err in exercising her discretion to proceed without submissions. Her discretionary decision is entitled to deference.
[9] The appellant further submits that the motion judge erred in dismissing the application against Canada, because it did not request the dismissal or file a notice of appearance. We do not agree. Although a party may request an order, the court has the power “on its own initiative” to stay or dismiss the proceeding under the rule.
[10] The procedure authorized under r. 2.1.01 is clear, the motion judge followed it, and we see no error or reason to interfere with her discretion. . Mehedi v. Tamlin
In Mehedi v. Tamlin (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers (and grants) it's own R2.1 frivolous dismissal, here in the novel circumstances of a motion for leave to appeal (of a case management procedural order):[2] On November 14, 2023, I directed that the Registrar send out notice to the moving party advising that this Court was considering dismissing his motion for leave to appeal under r. 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”), as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process because the motion for leave to appeal pertains to a procedural case management direction.
[3] On November 28, 2023, the moving party provided a written submission that mainly addresses the merits of his action, as opposed to the merits of his motion for leave to appeal, among other extraneous matters. I have reviewed Mr. Mehedi’s written submission and am satisfied that the motion for leave to appeal should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.02.
[4] Under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules, this court may stay or dismiss an appeal if it appears to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. In addition, Rule 2.1.02 provides that the court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a motion if the motion appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Under Rule 2.1.02(2), subrules 2.1.01(2) to (7) apply, with necessary modifications, to the making of an order under subrule (1).
[5] In Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690, at para. 8, the Court of Appeal for Ontario indicated that one of the principles to be applied by the courts in considering whether to dismiss a proceeding pursuant to Rule 2.1 is as follows:Rule 2.1 must be “interpreted and applied robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488. The Rule is not for close calls — it may be used only in “the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto, at paras. 8-9; Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320 (“Khan”), at para. 6, leave to appeal to S.C.C. requested, 39321. . Robson v. Law Society of Ontario
In Robson v. Law Society of Ontario (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered (and dismissed) an LSO-brought R2.1 frivolous and vexatious motion to dismiss a set aside motion of an earlier order to deny an extension of time to commence a leave to appeal motion. In these quotes the court addresses the material to be provided on such an R2.1 motion:[3] It is well-established that r. 2.1 is not for close calls. Rather, it to be used robustly for the purpose of weeding out litigation that is frivolous, vexatious or abusive on its face and where there is a basis in the pleadings for resort to this rule: Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at paras. 8-9.
[4] To assist with its task, the court should be provided with a bound volume of any relevant background documents, such as prior issued and entered orders and the reasons for such orders, as well as relevant pleadings or other related documents: Simpson v. Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806, at paras. 45 and 47.
[5] Other than the submissions in its letters of October 25 and November 21, 2023, and a copy of the motion judge’s October 24, 2023 decision, the LSO has not provided any other documents, such as the appellant’s motion materials before the motion judge or even his proposed notice of motion for leave to appeal.
[6] We are therefore unable to determine, on the basis of the submissions filed and the motion judge’s reasons, that the appellant’s motion to review the motion judge’s order is, on its face, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process and, therefore, whether r. 2.1 should be invoked in this case. . South Junction Triangle Grows Neighbourhood Association v. 1423 Bloor Street West Inc. et al.
In South Junction Triangle Grows Neighbourhood Association v. 1423 Bloor Street West Inc. et al. (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers the R2.1 'frivolous and vexatious' provision:[5] Rule 2.1 is an “extremely blunt instrument”: Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, 138 O.R. (3d) 581, at para. 12. It should only be used in the clearest of cases: Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2023 ONCA 598, at para. 6; Hart v. Balice, 2022 ONCA 787, at para. 7, citing Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 343 O.A.C. 87, at para. 8, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488. A decision made under r. 2.1 is a discretionary decision: Sumner v. Ottawa (Police Services), 2023 ONCA 140, at para. 6, and its use should be limited to cases “where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto, at para. 8.
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[8] I agree that the statute’s appeal mechanism does not foreclose judicial review in rare cases. But there is no prospect that this is one of those cases. This court will dismiss cases under r. 2.1 where the proceeding seeks to litigate issues that have already been decided: Segura Mosquera v. Child and Family Services Review Board, 2023 ONSC 3277, at para. 15. Here, the grounds for the application for judicial review are almost identical to grounds found in the notice of motion for leave to appeal. This is an attempt to relitigate the same issues. . Deokaran v. Law Society Tribunal and Law Society of Ontario
In Deokaran v. Law Society Tribunal and Law Society of Ontario (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered the test for a court's R2.1.01 frivolous and vexatious motion:[10] Rule 2.1.01 allows the court, on its own initiative, to stay or dismiss a proceeding where it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The application of r. 2.1 is “limited to the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, [2015] O.J. No. 5692, at para. 8; Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2023 ONCA 598, [2023] O.J. No. 3997, at para. 6. . 9383859 Canada Ltd. v. The Court of Appeal for Ontario
In 9383859 Canada Ltd. v. The Court of Appeal for Ontario (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered a R2.1 frivolous and vexatious issue, here where the applicant sought to JR "a decision by the Executive Legal Officer (“ELO”) of the Court of Appeal delisting the applicant’s appeal":[7] The dismissal of a proceeding under Rule 2.1.01 is a blunt instrument, which should not be used lightly. It is reserved for the “clearest of cases, where the hallmarks of frivolous, vexatious or abusive litigation are plainly evident on the face of the pleading”: Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625 at para. 12. A “frivolous” proceeding is one “lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful”: Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 CanLII 7815 (ON CA) at para. 14. . Mohammad v. McMaster University
In Mohammad v. McMaster University (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal revoked fee waivers
where a finding of frivolous and vexatious behaviour was upheld on appeal:[2] On June 29, 2023, the court issued notices to the appellant that the court is considering staying or dismissing two of his motions and one of his appeals pursuant to r. 2.1.02 and r. 2.1.01 respectively. The court also issued a notice to the appellant that is it considering making an order revoking the appellant’s fee waivers in all three proceedings pursuant to s. 4.10 of the Administration of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.6.
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[14] The appellant’s submissions in response to the notices given under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 4.10 of the Administration of Justice Act are also disjointed and non-responsive. The bulk of the submissions are bald and allege conspiracies between the various respondents and multiple other individuals. The submissions contain over 100 pages of irrelevant attachments and multiple video and audio clips.
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[17] For the same reasons, it is also appropriate for the court to revoke the appellant’s fee waivers for the three proceedings and to order that the appellant not make any further requests for a fee waiver under the Administration of Justice Act with respect to these proceedings or any related proceedings, without permission from a judge. . Guillaume v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
In Guillaume v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered an R2.1.01 frivolous and vexatious motion, here to quash a JR:[14] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has repeatedly highlighted that the dismissal of a proceeding as abusive under r. 2.1.01 is a blunt instrument, reserved for the “clearest of cases”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8; Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320, 446 D.L.R. (4th) 575, at para. 6; Hart v. Balice, 2022 ONCA 787, at para. 7.
[15] An application for judicial review should be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of process if it cannot possibly succeed or be of any benefit to the applicant: Awada v. Allstate, 2021 ONSC 8108 (Div. Ct.), at para. 6. . Williams v. Tuck
In Williams v. Tuck (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the law that no common law 'frivolous and vexatious' jurisdiction existed, here where a judge initiated CJA s.140 [vexatious proceedings] without jurisdiction. That is, only a party could initiate s.140 - as opposed to R2.1.01 where the court and parties could initiate such proceedings, but R2.1.01 wasn't used:[14] Any interested person, pursuant to s. 140(1) of the CJA, can bring an application for an order that no further proceeding be instituted by a person without leave of a judge of the Superior Court: Balanyk v. Dutton Brock LLP, 2014 ONCA 122. As this court has held, the process is not optional. It must be by way of application, meaning an originating process as defined in the statute: Lukezic v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2012 ONCA 350, 350 D.L.R. (4th) 111. This provides the subject of the proceeding with procedural fairness: the subject is provided with written notice that the order will be sought, the facts thought to justify the order, an opportunity to make written submissions, notice of an oral hearing, and an opportunity to make oral submissions at the hearing.
[15] In this case, there was no such application, although the defendants could have brought one. The application judge approximated the process under s. 140, providing the appellant with all of the procedural protections he would have received had the matter proceeded by a third-party application. The application judge referred to both s. 140 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction for the authority to do so.
[16] The problem is this. There is longstanding, binding authority from this court that there is no inherent, common law authority to make a vexatious litigant order, and s. 140 does not authorize the judge-initiated process employed here: see Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 1979 CanLII 1631 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 342n; Kallaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA), 207 O.A.C. 60, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 144; Lukezic. This can be contrasted with r. 2.1.01, which clearly provides the court with the authority to stay or dismiss a frivolous or vexatious proceeding “on its own initiative”.
[17] Section 140(5), which specifically provides that nothing in s. 140 “limits the authority of a court to stay or dismiss a proceeding as an abuse of process or on any other ground” does not assist. The order appealed from is not from the stay or dismissal of a proceeding. The order under appeal is both a declaration of a status – “vexatious litigant” – and a restriction on that litigant’s civil right of access to the courts for all proceedings. It is “aimed at the litigant and not at the litigation”: Kallaba, at para. 122 (per Lang J.A., dissenting, but not on this point). Nor is this a question of the scope of the court’s broad jurisdiction to make appropriate orders in the context of a proper s. 140 application, as discussed in Peoples Trust Company v. Atas, 2019 ONCA 359, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 427.
[18] Where no third party steps up to bring the requisite application, the actions can only be dealt with on a case-by-case basis under r. 2.1.01. There may well be good reason for this given the extraordinarily broad nature of the s. 140 remedy: see the discussion of the competing considerations at play in Gerrard J. Kennedy, “Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure: Responding to Vexatious Litigation While Advancing Access to Justice?” (2018) 35 Windsor YB Access Just 243, at p. 248. In any event, there is currently no means for a judge to combine a r. 2.1.01 order with a vexatious litigant order on the judge’s own motion and have that order filed in every registry in Ontario. As Lang J.A. noted in Kallaba, at para. 116 – nearly two decades ago – a vexatious litigant order is a creature of statute. Any gaps in the legislation are for the legislature to fill.
[19] It is with reluctance that we allow the appeal and vacate the vexatious litigant order. For greater clarity, nothing in these reasons disturbs the orders made by the application judge under rule 2.1.01 dismissing the underlying action. Nor should anything in these reasons be read as an endorsement of the appellant’s conduct of this litigation, or an impediment to any future application under s. 140 of the CJA.
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