Simon's Legal Resources

Civil Contempt - Rules of Civil Procedure

. Newell v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company

In Newell v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered R60.11(1) ['Motion for Contempt Order'] where contempt orders are expressly exempted from use to enforce "the payment of money", despite efforts to recast it otherwise:

[13] The appeal cannot succeed for several reasons. Most fundamentally, and as Smith J. found, r. 60.11 is clear that a contempt order cannot be obtained in relation to the payment of money. The Rule provides in full:

A contempt order to enforce an order requiring a person to do an act, other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing an act, may be obtained only on motion to a judge in the proceeding in which the order to be enforced was made. [Emphasis added].

[14] Inescapably, Mr. Newell’s action represents exactly what is specifically carved out of r. 60.11. Mr. Newell argues that the act about which he complains was not “the payment of money” but rather was an “act to release funds by the trustee (Respondent)”. We cannot accept that submission. The fundamental allegation by the appellant is that BNS failed to distribute funds. We see no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that such a claim is specifically excepted from r. 60.11. The Rule is clear on its face.

. Astley v Verdun

In Astley v Verdun (Ont CA, 2015) the Court of Appeal stated that a court can have reference to the Criminal Code for guidance in contempt proceedings (here in imposing a conditional sentence), but the Criminal Code provisions are not binding:

[3] This process started as a civil contempt process and retains that character. The discretion of a judge in civil contempt is governed by rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. A judge is free to use s. 742 of the Criminal Code for guidance in imposing a conditional sentence as penalty for a contempt. However, that does not subject the judge to the constraints of s. 742. It was open to the motion judge to levy a new penalty for the appellant’s breach of the sentencing order for the first contempt regardless of the requirements of s. 742 in the context of criminal contempt.