Simon's Legal Resources

Criminal - Appeal - Unreasonable Verdict (2)

. R. v. Gibson

In R. v. Gibson (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considers the appellate criminal doctrine of 'unreasonable verdict':

[29] Under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, a court of appeal may allow an appeal against conviction where it is of the opinion that the verdict was unreasonable.

[30] The well-established test for an unreasonable verdict is as follows: considering the evidence as a whole, is the verdict one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered? See R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at pp. 185-86; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at paras. 36-42; and R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 180, at para. 26. The reviewing court must ask not only whether there is evidence in the record to support the verdict but also whether the jury’s conclusion conflicts with “the bulk of judicial experience”: W.H., at para. 28. In Biniaris, at para. 41, the Supreme Court noted the following examples as illustrative of what “the bulk of judicial experience” means:

There are many illustrations from the case law of verdicts having been found unreasonable essentially on the strength of accumulated judicial experience. Concerns about various aspects of the frailty of identification evidence have been a recurrent basis, by itself or together with other considerations, for overturning verdicts as unreasonable. Judicial experience has also been relied upon to question the reasonableness of verdicts in cases of sexual misconduct presenting troubling features such as allegations of sexual touching of a bizarre nature, or the possibility of collusion between witnesses. Finally, the experience of the courts has occasionally been brought to bear, although not always explicitly, on the assessment of verdicts rejecting a defence with respect to which there may be unjustified skepticism or even prejudice because those relying on such justifications or excuses may be viewed as simply trying to avoid responsibility for their actions. [Citations omitted.]

[31] The appellate court’s assessment requires a limited weighing of the evidence and the examination of the weight of the evidence rather than its bare sufficiency. However, it is not the function of the appellate court to act as the “thirteenth juror”: Biniaris, at para. 40. In conducting this review, the appellate court must assume that there are no errors in the jury charge: Biniaris, at para. 38. I note that the appellant takes no issue with the jury charge.

[32] This court, in R. v. Holley, 2007 ONCA 682, 229 O.A.C. 263, at para. 61, explained the ambit of appellate review of the evidence permitted by s. 686(1)(a)(i):

A review under section 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code is not so narrow as to be confined to a determination of whether there was any evidence to support the conviction, or so expansive as to permit a de novo assessment of the evidence. The provision operates as a protection against perverse or unsafe convictions. It is not a licence to be used by appellate courts as a means of bringing trial verdicts or decisions in line with the appellate court’s estimations of the merits of individual cases.

[33] In determining what verdict a properly instructed jury could judicially have reached, an appellate court reviews, analyzes and, “within the limits of appellate disadvantage”, weighs the evidence: Holley, at para. 62, citing to Biniaris, at para. 36.

. R. v. Gurhan

In R. v. Gurhan (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considers the appellate doctrine of 'unreasonable verdict':

[24] Section 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 gives an appellate court the power to set aside a conviction that is “unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence”. This requires the court to assess the totality of the evidence. A verdict is unreasonable if it is one that no properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered: R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 186; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36; R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 180, at para. 26; and R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128, 149 O.R. (3d) 273, at para. 30. The same test applies whether the trier of fact is a judge or a jury: Biniaris, at para. 37. To decide whether a verdict was unreasonable, an appellate court must review, analyze, and, within the limits of appellate disadvantage, weigh the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the evidence, considered as a whole, is reasonably capable of supporting the verdict rendered: Lights, at para. 30.

[25] When an appellant challenges a verdict as unreasonable on the basis that the trier of fact could not have reasonably rendered the guilty verdict given the evidence, an appellate court is entitled to consider that the accused did not testify or adduce other evidence at trial to support any other reasonable inference consistent with innocence: Lights, at para. 33; R. v. Daye, 2022 ONCA 675, 518 C.R.R. (2d) 63, at para. 24.

. R. v. Al-Qaysi

In R. v. Al-Qaysi (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here brought against a conviction for "second degree murder".

Here the court considers 'unreasonable verdict' doctrine:

3. Was there a Beaudry error?

[33] There are two avenues to a successful unreasonable verdict appeal.

[34] First, “[a] verdict is unreasonable if it is one that no properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered”: R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128, 149 O.R.(3d) 273, at para. 30; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36. Mr. Al-Qaysi does not argue that this avenue is available to him, so I will say no more about it.

[35] Second, and alternatively, a verdict will be unreasonable if the reasons for it are “illogical on their face, or contrary to the evidence”: Beaudry, at para. 97. This is the unreasonable verdict path that Mr. Al-Qaysi takes before us, arguing that the driver error led to “fundamental flaws” in the trial judge’s reasoning that rendered the verdict unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

[36] In my view, this line of argument adds nothing to the analysis. The “fundamental flaws” that Mr. Al-Qaysi relies upon are the same alleged errors I have just discussed: the misapprehension and the Villaroman error. The Beaudry branch of the unreasonable verdict doctrine was not meant to reach these kinds of alleged reasoning errors. It was meant to address situations where judges draw inferences about guilt that are contradicted by the very evidence relied on for those inferences, or which are inconsistent with evidence that has not been contradicted or rejected: see e.g., R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 29; Lights, at para. 31. Beaudry therefore addresses those errors in logic that render a verdict unreasonable, but it does not provide a catch-all doctrine that applies to all reasoning errors. In my view, whether misapprehensions of the evidence amount to reversible reasoning errors should be addressed by the body of authority that addresses material misapprehensions, and Villaroman errors should be assessed using that branch of the law. In any event, I have explained why these alleged “reasoning errors” do not give rise to a basis for reversal under the law dedicated to addressing them. In my view, neither do they do so under the Beaudry line of authority. I would not find that any errors that were made amounted to a Beaudry error and resulted in an unreasonable verdict.

. R. v. Fitzpatrick

In R. v. Fitzpatrick (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed two criminal appeals, one against a first-degree murder conviction and the other against a manslaughter conviction.

Here the court considered the appellate remedy of a new trial - which it holds can only be justified if the jury verdict was 'unreasonable':

[69] As the Supreme Court observed in R. v. S. (P.L.), 1991 CanLII 103 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 909, at p. 916, an error of law necessitates a new trial only “if there is legally admissible evidence on which a conviction could reasonably be based”. Accordingly, I must apply the well-established test for determining whether a verdict is unreasonable, which asks “whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered”: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para. 34. The application of the test is not an opportunity for an appellate court to simply retry the case. The entirety of the evidence is reviewed “to determine not whether the appellate court would have convicted the appellant, but whether a reasonable trier-of-fact properly instructed and acting judicially could have convicted”: R. v. Mars (2006), 2006 CanLII 3460 (ON CA), 205 C.C.C. (3d) 376 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 3; R. v. Marrone, 2023 ONCA 742, 431 C.C.C. (3d) 330, at para. 30.

....

[71] This evidence is entirely circumstantial. Thus, the question to be answered is “could a trier-of-fact acting judicially be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence?”: Mars, at para. 4.

[72] When a court assesses the reasonableness of a verdict based on forensic evidence, it must consider two questions: first, whether the whole of the evidence permits the inference that the forensic evidence was deposited in connection with the offence and not at some other time or place; and second, whether it would be open to the jury to conclude that the appellant’s guilt is the only rational conclusion available on the totality of the evidence or lack of evidence: R. v. Browne, 2021 ONCA 836, at para. 32.

. R. v. Bauman

In R. v. Bauman (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here brought against convictions in "two counts of first degree murder".

Here the court contrasts the tactical advantage of defence arguing for a directed verdict, as opposed to arguing 'unreasonable verdict':

[152] A final observation about this ground of appeal. Although the appellant sought directed verdicts of acquittal at trial, he does not contend on appeal that the jury’s verdicts are unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence: Criminal Code, s. 686(1)(a)(i). The latter is a more probing inquiry. Contrasting s. 686(1)(a)(i) with a directed verdict application, the court in R. v. Phillips, 2018 ONCA 651, 364 C.C.C. (3d) 220, at para. 67, said: “This determination necessarily involves assessing the evidence, not merely identifying its existence.”

[153] It is more often the case on appeal that an unreasonable verdict submission is made in the absence of a prior directed verdict application. A directed verdict application is not a formal pre-condition to advancing on appeal that the verdict was unreasonable: see R. v. Ali, 2023 ONCA 411, 89 C.R. (7th) 384, at para. 18. However, it would be a curious result if a conviction were set aside on appeal based on directed verdict principles concerning inferences that could be drawn when the inferences that a jury evidently did draw are not under attack as unreasonable.

. R. v. Oloko

In R. v. Oloko (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a criminal appeal, here brought against a conviction "of one count of sexual assault. The complainant was a 47-year-old woman with Down syndrome who communicates through words and gestures, but not full sentences. At the time of the alleged sexual assault, the complainant lived in a group home where the appellant worked occasional night shifts."

Here the court considers when deciding an 'unreasonable verdict' argument should be avoided:

Issue 3: Was the verdict unreasonable?

[69] The appellant’s argument that the verdict was unreasonable is tied to his position that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay evidence. He submits that, in the absence of the complainant’s hearsay evidence, the verdict is unreasonable. I agree that, without the hearsay evidence, there is no basis for the appellant’s conviction. However, it is unhelpful to apply an unreasonable verdict analysis that is predicated on the exclusion of inadmissible evidence. The unreasonable verdict test inquires whether “the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury could not reasonably have rendered,” an inquiry that is conducted based on all of the evidence before them: R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22 (CanLII), [2013] 2 S.C.R. 180, at para. 25. In this case, if the trial judge had not committed the procedural error that she did, the hearsay evidence may well have been admissible and the verdict entirely reasonable. When an argument that a verdict is unreasonable depends upon a legal error in admitting evidence, the better approach is to avoid inquiring into the reasonableness of the verdict on the assumption that the evidence had not been admitted and to find the error and order a new trial: see R. v. Calnen, 2019 SCC 6 (CanLII), [2019] 1 S.C.R. 301, at para. 170.

. R. v. Jaggernauth [judge-only trial]

In R. v. Jaggernauth (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a defendant's criminal appeal, this from convictions for "attempted murder and counselling to commit murder" on circumstantial evidence.

The court considers an appeal argument of 'unreasonable verdict' in this judge-only trial:

[72] A verdict will be unreasonable when no properly instructed trier of fact, acting judicially, could have rendered it: R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 185; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36. When the Crown’s case is circumstantial, a verdict is reasonable if the trier of fact “was entitled to find that the circumstantial evidence in light of human experience, when considered as a whole, and the absence of evidence, could exclude all reasonable inferences other than guilt”: R. v. Anderson, 2020 ONCA 780, at para. 30, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 103; see also Villaroman, at paras. 30, 36 and 69.

. R. v. Smoke

In R. v. Smoke (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed appeals from second degree murder convictions on two defendants.

Here the court considers an 'unreasonable verdict' argument:

[54] This court has held that, when considering whether a verdict is unreasonable, “an appellate court may consider the failure of an accused to testify as indicative of the absence of an exculpatory explanation”: R. v. Grant, 2022 ONCA 337, 413 C.C.C. (3d) 491, at para. 108. See also Lights, at para. 33 and R. v. Alvarez, 2021 ONCA 851, 159 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 173. Eric did not testify. There was no exculpatory explanation.

[55] Even though there was some exculpatory evidence adduced at trial, it did not undermine the reasonableness of the verdict. In R. v. Dadollahi-Sarab, 2021 ONCA 514, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 356, Doherty J.A. said, at para. 46:

When a verdict is said to be unreasonable, the question is not whether the jury could reasonably have acquitted, but whether the jury, acting judicially, that is applying the law as provided by the trial judge to the facts as found by the jury, could reasonably have concluded the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence: see R. v. Spencer, 2020 ONCA 838, at para. 44.

. R. v. Zock

In R. v. Zock (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a criminal appeal, here where the primary issue was "that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel regarding the mode of trial that was chosen".

Here the court considers 'unreasonable verdict' appeal grounds:

III. The Unreasonable Verdict Ground of Appeal

[67] The appellant argues that he is entitled to an acquittal on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable and properly instructed trier of fact could have concluded, as the trial judge did, that the evidence established that the complainant was incapable of consenting to the sexual activity in question due to her intoxication.

[68] We did not call on the Crown to respond to this argument and I describe only briefly why I reject it.

[69] In considering this ground of appeal, it is important to underscore that the question is not whether the appellate court may have entertained a reasonable doubt but whether, on the totality of the evidence, proper judicial fact finding precludes a conviction: R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 180, at paras. 27-28.

. R. v. Ahmed,

In R. v. Ahmed, (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered an unreasonable verdict issue, here apparently amounting to simple 'irrationality':

Issue 2: Did the trial judge err in his treatment of the appellant’s subjective beliefs that led to an unreasonable verdict?

[33] There are two pathways on which an appellate court may find that a verdict is unreasonable: (1) if the verdict is not one that a properly instructed jury acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered (R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15 (CanLII), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36); and (2) in a judge-alone trial, if the verdict is reached “illogically or irrationally”, even if the evidence may be reasonably capable of supporting the verdict: Beaudry, at paras. 96-97.

[34] The appellant argues that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the appellant’s evidence of his subjective belief and this error led to a verdict that was reached “illogically or irrationally”. As Fish J., dissenting in result, held in Beaudry, at paras. 96-97, “ [n]o one should stand convicted on the strength of manifestly bad reasons — reasons that are illogical on their face, or contrary to the evidence — on the ground that another judge (who never did and never will try the case) could but might not necessarily have reached the same conclusion for other reasons” and that “[a] verdict that was reached illogically or irrationally is hardly made reasonable by the fact that another judge could reasonably have convicted or acquitted the accused”. This approach was affirmed in Sinclair, at paras. 4, 15-17, per Fish J. (dissenting in result), and para. 44; see also R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 9.

[35] In assessing this ground of appeal, it is important to note that unreasonable verdicts under Beaudry or Sinclair are exceedingly rare: R. v. Bacchus, 2024 ONCA 43, at para. 13. The analysis does not involve this court substituting its own findings for that of the trial judge; nor does it provide free rein to interfere with a trial judge’s credibility findings: R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 30. Instead, this court’s task it to examine whether there are fundamental flaws in the reasoning process such that the verdict was not reached judicially or in accordance with the rule of law: C.P., at para. 30.

. R. v. Filli

In R. v. Filli (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here from a conviction for manslaughter.

Here the court considers an 'unreasonable verdict' issue, here usefully distinguishing two 'avenues' of the doctrine - one for jury trials and the other for non-jury trials:

(4) The Verdict was Not Unreasonable

[52] The appellant submits that his conviction is unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence. First, he travels the more traditional route, contending that no properly instructed jury acting judicially could have reasonably rendered the verdict reached by the trial judge in this case: see R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p.185; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36; and R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 28. This applies to trials conducted with a jury, and trials by judge alone: Biniaris, at para. 37; C.P., at para. 28.

[53] There is no basis for finding the verdict was unreasonable in this case. Hinging on key credibility assessments, the evidence provided a foundation for the trial judge’s conclusion that the Crown disproved the appellant’s claim of self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt. Although this was a trial by judge alone, it could not possibly be said that it would not have been open to a jury, acting on proper instructions, to reject the appellant’s claim of self-defence. The conclusion reached by the trial judge was available on the evidence.

[54] The appellant also relies on the second avenue for testing the reasonableness of a verdict, one that applies only to trials by judge alone. On this basis, the verdict of a trial judge will be unreasonable, even if it is supported by the evidence, if it is reached “illogically or irrationally”: R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paras. 96-97, per Fish J. (dissenting); R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 4, 15-17, per Fish J. (dissenting); and 44; R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 9. In C.P., Abella J. explained, at para. 29:

This may occur if the trial judge draws an inference or makes a finding of fact essential to the verdict that is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on by the judge in support of that inference or finding, or shown to be incompatible with evidence that has neither been contradicted by other evidence nor rejected by the trial judge.

[55] Justice Abella stressed that this prong of the unreasonable verdict analysis is not meant to invite appellate courts to substitute their own findings for that of the trial judge; nor does it provide free rein to interfere with a trial judge’s credibility findings: at para. 30. Instead, it is narrowly targeted at fundamental flaws in the reasoning process such that the verdict was not reached judicially or in accordance with the rule of law: para. 30. As this court held in R. v. Bacchus, 2024 ONCA 43, at para. 13: “Unreasonable verdicts under Beaudry/Sinclair are exceedingly rare.”

[56] There was nothing illogical or irrational in the trial judge’s findings that caused her to reject the appellant’s self-defence claim. The appellant simply disagrees with many of the trial judge’s factual conclusions based on her credibility assessments. In rejecting this ground of appeal in Bacchus, the court offered the following assessment, at para. 14:

In our view, the trial judge came nowhere near making a Beaudry/Sinclair error in this case. As in many criminal trials, his credibility assessments and findings were a combination of both positive and negative facts relating to witnesses’ testimony standing alone and in comparison to other witnesses. This is normal in the course of a criminal trial. None of what the trial judge said in his judgment comes anywhere close to the label ‘unreasonable’.

These words aptly describe my assessment of the trial judge’s reasons in this case.

. R. v. Khill

In R. v. Khill (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal conviction appeal (but allows a sentencing reduction), here from a manslaughter conviction - this in the defendant's second trial, where the first went up to the SCC.

Here the court considered the law of 'unreasonable (jury) verdict':

[51] A verdict will be unreasonable if it is one that no “properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered” or one that was reached “illogically or irrationally” even if supported by the evidence: R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36; R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 28; and R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 17-19, per Fish J. (dissenting, but not on this point), citing R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paras. 96-97.

. R. v. A.L.

In R. v. A.L. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered inconsistent and unreasonable criminal verdicts:

[9] We are not persuaded that the jury’s guilty verdicts and acquittals are inconsistent or unreasonable. Before an appellate court can interfere with a jury verdict on the ground that it is inconsistent, it must find that the verdict is unreasonable. A verdict is unreasonable if a trier of fact, acting reasonably and properly instructed, could not have reached it. See R. v. R.V., 2021 SCC 10, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 131, at paras. 28, 29; R. v. Pittman, 2006 SCC 9, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 6.

. R. v. Case

In R. v. Case (Ont CA, 2024) [affirmed at R v Case (SCC, 2026)] the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here considering an 'unreasonable verdict':

[10] The standard for an unreasonable verdict is well established. A verdict is unreasonable if no “properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered” it: R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36, citing R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 185. The same standard applies to verdicts rendered by judges sitting without a jury: Biniaris, at para. 37. To say that a verdict is unreasonable in this sense is to say that the evidence cannot sustain it regardless of whether there were any errors in the conduct of the trial: R. v. Harvey, (2001), 2001 CanLII 24137 (ON CA), 57 O.R. (3d) 296 (C.A.), at paras. 19-20, aff’d 2002 SCC 80, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 311, or that it conflicts with the bulk of judicial experience: Biniaris at paras. 39-40. Where this occurs, the appropriate remedy is to enter an acquittal.

....

The nature of illogical or irrational reason

[18] A verdict otherwise available on the evidence may, despite any errors at trial, be unreasonable if the reasons reveal that it was reached by a flawed reasoning process – specifically, if it was reached “illogically or irrationally”: R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paras. 96-97, per Fish J. (dissenting in the result); and R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 4 and 15-17, per Fish J. (dissenting in the result), and at para. 44, per LeBel J.

[19] The Court summarized the law in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 29, in this way: A verdict is unreasonable “if the trial judge draws an inference or makes a finding of fact essential to the verdict that is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on by the judge in support of that inference or finding, or shown to be incompatible with evidence that has neither been contradicted by other evidence nor rejected by the trial judge” (citations omitted).

[20] The possibility that a verdict is unreasonable in this sense is not an invitation to appeal courts to parse a trial judge’s findings or to quibble with the reasons proffered for them. In C.P., the Supreme Court admonished appellate courts to show restraint in inquiring into a trial judge’s findings and inferences: they are not to “substitute their preferred findings of fact for those made by the trial judge”. The court emphasized that the inquiry into logicality and rationality is narrowly targeted: it is concerned only with “‘fundamental flaws in the reasoning process’ which means that the verdict was not reached judicially or in accordance with the rule of law”: at para. 30.

[21] The rule of law benchmark emphasizes the narrow scope of the analysis. We are concerned only with fundamental analytical flaws – basic errors that go to the heart of the analysis. As this court has stated, an unreasonable verdict on the basis of illogicality or irrationality is “exceedingly rare”: R. v. Bacchus, 2024 ONCA 43, at para. 13.