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Criminal - Appeal - Unreasonable Verdict (2). R. v. Filli
In R. v. Filli (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here from a conviction for manslaughter.
Here the court considers an 'unreasonable verdict' issue, here usefully distinguishing two 'avenues' of the doctrine - one for jury trials and the other for non-jury trials:(4) The Verdict was Not Unreasonable
[52] The appellant submits that his conviction is unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence. First, he travels the more traditional route, contending that no properly instructed jury acting judicially could have reasonably rendered the verdict reached by the trial judge in this case: see R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p.185; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36; and R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 28. This applies to trials conducted with a jury, and trials by judge alone: Biniaris, at para. 37; C.P., at para. 28.
[53] There is no basis for finding the verdict was unreasonable in this case. Hinging on key credibility assessments, the evidence provided a foundation for the trial judge’s conclusion that the Crown disproved the appellant’s claim of self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt. Although this was a trial by judge alone, it could not possibly be said that it would not have been open to a jury, acting on proper instructions, to reject the appellant’s claim of self-defence. The conclusion reached by the trial judge was available on the evidence.
[54] The appellant also relies on the second avenue for testing the reasonableness of a verdict, one that applies only to trials by judge alone. On this basis, the verdict of a trial judge will be unreasonable, even if it is supported by the evidence, if it is reached “illogically or irrationally”: R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paras. 96-97, per Fish J. (dissenting); R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 4, 15-17, per Fish J. (dissenting); and 44; R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 9. In C.P., Abella J. explained, at para. 29:This may occur if the trial judge draws an inference or makes a finding of fact essential to the verdict that is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on by the judge in support of that inference or finding, or shown to be incompatible with evidence that has neither been contradicted by other evidence nor rejected by the trial judge. [55] Justice Abella stressed that this prong of the unreasonable verdict analysis is not meant to invite appellate courts to substitute their own findings for that of the trial judge; nor does it provide free rein to interfere with a trial judge’s credibility findings: at para. 30. Instead, it is narrowly targeted at fundamental flaws in the reasoning process such that the verdict was not reached judicially or in accordance with the rule of law: para. 30. As this court held in R. v. Bacchus, 2024 ONCA 43, at para. 13: “Unreasonable verdicts under Beaudry/Sinclair are exceedingly rare.”
[56] There was nothing illogical or irrational in the trial judge’s findings that caused her to reject the appellant’s self-defence claim. The appellant simply disagrees with many of the trial judge’s factual conclusions based on her credibility assessments. In rejecting this ground of appeal in Bacchus, the court offered the following assessment, at para. 14:In our view, the trial judge came nowhere near making a Beaudry/Sinclair error in this case. As in many criminal trials, his credibility assessments and findings were a combination of both positive and negative facts relating to witnesses’ testimony standing alone and in comparison to other witnesses. This is normal in the course of a criminal trial. None of what the trial judge said in his judgment comes anywhere close to the label ‘unreasonable’. These words aptly describe my assessment of the trial judge’s reasons in this case. . R. v. Khill
In R. v. Khill (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal conviction appeal (but allows a sentencing reduction), here from a manslaughter conviction - this in the defendant's second trial, where the first went up to the SCC.
Here the court considered the law of 'unreasonable (jury) verdict':[51] A verdict will be unreasonable if it is one that no “properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered” or one that was reached “illogically or irrationally” even if supported by the evidence: R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36; R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 28; and R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 17-19, per Fish J. (dissenting, but not on this point), citing R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paras. 96-97. . R. v. A.L.
In R. v. A.L. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered inconsistent and unreasonable criminal verdicts:[9] We are not persuaded that the jury’s guilty verdicts and acquittals are inconsistent or unreasonable. Before an appellate court can interfere with a jury verdict on the ground that it is inconsistent, it must find that the verdict is unreasonable. A verdict is unreasonable if a trier of fact, acting reasonably and properly instructed, could not have reached it. See R. v. R.V., 2021 SCC 10, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 131, at paras. 28, 29; R. v. Pittman, 2006 SCC 9, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 6. . R. v. Case
In R. v. Case (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here considering an 'unreasonable verdict':[10] The standard for an unreasonable verdict is well established. A verdict is unreasonable if no “properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered” it: R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36, citing R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 185. The same standard applies to verdicts rendered by judges sitting without a jury: Biniaris, at para. 37. To say that a verdict is unreasonable in this sense is to say that the evidence cannot sustain it regardless of whether there were any errors in the conduct of the trial: R. v. Harvey, (2001), 2001 CanLII 24137 (ON CA), 57 O.R. (3d) 296 (C.A.), at paras. 19-20, aff’d 2002 SCC 80, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 311, or that it conflicts with the bulk of judicial experience: Biniaris at paras. 39-40. Where this occurs, the appropriate remedy is to enter an acquittal.
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The nature of illogical or irrational reason
[18] A verdict otherwise available on the evidence may, despite any errors at trial, be unreasonable if the reasons reveal that it was reached by a flawed reasoning process – specifically, if it was reached “illogically or irrationally”: R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paras. 96-97, per Fish J. (dissenting in the result); and R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 4 and 15-17, per Fish J. (dissenting in the result), and at para. 44, per LeBel J.
[19] The Court summarized the law in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 29, in this way: A verdict is unreasonable “if the trial judge draws an inference or makes a finding of fact essential to the verdict that is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on by the judge in support of that inference or finding, or shown to be incompatible with evidence that has neither been contradicted by other evidence nor rejected by the trial judge” (citations omitted).
[20] The possibility that a verdict is unreasonable in this sense is not an invitation to appeal courts to parse a trial judge’s findings or to quibble with the reasons proffered for them. In C.P., the Supreme Court admonished appellate courts to show restraint in inquiring into a trial judge’s findings and inferences: they are not to “substitute their preferred findings of fact for those made by the trial judge”. The court emphasized that the inquiry into logicality and rationality is narrowly targeted: it is concerned only with “‘fundamental flaws in the reasoning process’ which means that the verdict was not reached judicially or in accordance with the rule of law”: at para. 30.
[21] The rule of law benchmark emphasizes the narrow scope of the analysis. We are concerned only with fundamental analytical flaws – basic errors that go to the heart of the analysis. As this court has stated, an unreasonable verdict on the basis of illogicality or irrationality is “exceedingly rare”: R. v. Bacchus, 2024 ONCA 43, at para. 13.
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