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Criminal - Sentencing - Standard of Review (SOR). R. v. Gilmore
In R. v. Gilmore (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a criminal sentence appeal, here which "illustrates the tension between the principle of proportionality and the objective of public protection".
Here the court considered appellate deference [SOR] wrt sentencing decisions:[30] Since R. v. Shropshire, 1995 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court of Canada has mandated a limited scope of appellate review for sentencing decisions, an approach rooted in deference to sentencing judges: see e.g. R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, at para. 14; R. v. L.F.W., 2000 SCC 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 132, at para. 25; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 43‑46. An appellate court may only intervene to vary a sentence if: (1) the sentence is demonstrably unfit; or (2) the sentencing judge made an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 11, 41 and 44; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 424 at para. 26; and R. v. J.W., 2025 SCC 16, at paras. 51-52. . R. v. Pike
In R. v. Pike (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal considers the SOR (deference) on a criminal appeal, and where it may be excepted:[124] ... While appellate review is deferential, this deference is displaced and the appellate court can conduct a fresh analysis if the trial judge overlooks or disregards relevant factors, errs in law or principle, or makes an unreasonable determination: R. v. Szilagyi, 2018 ONCA 695, 142 O.R. (3d) 700, at para. 41. The Crown can appeal these legal errors: R. v. Harris, 2007 ONCA 574, 87 O.R. (3d) 214, at para. 51. Even if the trial judge committed a legal error and should have admitted the evidence, the Crown still has a heavy burden to overturn an acquittal. It must show to a reasonable degree of certainty that the verdict would not necessarily have been the same but for the legal error: R. v. Hodgson, 2024 SCC 25, at para. 36. . R. v. Gobin
In R. v. Gobin (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers the deference accorded on a criminal sentencing appeal:[5] Nor are we persuaded that the sentence is unfit. The Supreme Court explained in Lacasse that a “very high threshold … applies to appellate courts when determining whether they should intervene after reviewing the fitness of sentence.” A sentence will be demonstrably unfit if it constitutes “an unreasonable departure” from the principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: Lacasse, at paras. 11-12, 39-40 and 44-53. . R. v. Simeunovich
In R. v. Simeunovich (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the standard of review for sentencing appeals:[13] An appellate court may not intervene with a sentencing decision simply because it would have weighed the relevant factors differently. The weight given to a mitigating factor is a discretionary decision that is afforded significant deference on appeal and will only constitute an error in principle if discretion is exercised unreasonably: Lacasse, at paras. 39-40, 48-49. Moreover, the relevant mitigating and aggravating factors are considered in a holistic manner to arrive at a composite sentence, as opposed to analysing the relevant factors in isolation from each other: R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, 418 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at para. 27. . R. v. J.W.
In R. v. J.W. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the SOR applicable to criminal sentencing appeals:[13] In assessing this ground of appeal, we note that sentencing determinations are owed considerable deference on appeal. Appellant intervention is justified only where (i) the sentence imposed is demonstrably unfit; or (ii) there is an error in principle, the failure to consider a relevant factor or the erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor, and it appears from the trial judge’s decision that such an error had an impact on the sentence: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 44, 51; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 26-28.
[14] It should also be noted that an appellate court may not intervene in a sentencing decision simply because it would have weighed the relevant factors differently. The choice of the sentencing range, or of a category within a range, falls within the trial judge’s discretion and cannot, in itself, constitute a reversible error. An appellate court may only intervene if the sentence a trial judge imposed is demonstrably unfit: Lacasse, at para, 51; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, 463 D.L.R. (4th) 389, at paras. 29-30, 117-122, 229-237. . R. v. Khan
In R. v. Khan (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers the SOR (deference) for sentencing appeals:[8] Sentencing determinations are owed considerable deference on appeal. Appellate intervention is justified only where: (i) the sentence imposed is demonstrably unfit; or (ii) there is an error in principle, the failure to consider a relevant factor or the erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor, and it appears from the trial judge’s decision that such an error had an impact on the sentence: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 44, 51; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 26-28.
[9] Further, an appellate court may not intervene with a sentencing decision simply because it would have weighed the relevant factors differently. The weight given to a mitigating factor is a discretionary decision that is afforded significant deference on appeal and will only constitute an error in principle if discretion is exercised unreasonably: Lacasse, at paras. 39-40; 48-49. Moreover, the relevant mitigating and aggravating factors are considered in a holistic manner to arrive at a composite sentence, as opposed to analysing the relevant factors in isolation from each other: R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, 418 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at para. 27. . R. v. S.B.
In R. v. S.B. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the SOR for criminal sentencing:[35] Sentencing judges are afforded a great deal of deference in their decisions. Absent a sentence which is demonstrably unfit, or an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence, an appellate court cannot intervene: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 25-26; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 11, 41 and 44.
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