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Criminal - Sentencing - Guilty Pleas. R. v. Griffiths
In R. v. Griffiths (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal conviction appeal, here from "six counts of breaking and entering a dwelling-house with intent to commit an indictable act, and one count of attempted break and enter".
Here the court considers remorse in sentencing context:[16] This reasoning is legally flawed. First, the trial judge erred by equating the appellant’s decision to proceed to trial with a lack of remorse warranting an increased sentence. As Di Luca J. explained in R. v. Lu, 2022 ONSC 1918, at para. 58:A plea of not guilty is not inconsistent with [a] claim of remorse. While a guilty plea is, inter alia, a sign of remorse, a person can be remorseful for having committed an offence while nonetheless exercising their constitutional right to a trial. The two are not incompatible. See also R. v. Kozy (1990), 1990 CanLII 2625 (ON CA), 74 O.R. (2d) 545 (C.A.), at p. 550.
[17] Second, although he did not expressly cite it as an aggravating factor, the trial judge erred in appearing to increase the appellant’s sentence because she exercised her right to a trial rather than plead guilty. As this court held in R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, 151 O.R. (3d) 65, at para. 20: “Accused persons are entitled to put the Crown to its proof and cannot be punished or seen to be punished after-the-fact, simply because the Crown met that burden.”
[18] The appellant and her co-accused were entitled to proceed to trial and require the Crown to meet its evidentiary burden. Indeed, the trial judge ultimately acquitted the co-accused, finding the Crown had failed to establish his identity. The trial judge’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which defence counsel conducted the trial, or with the fact that the Crown succeeded in proving its case, did not justify a harsher sentence for the appellant.
[19] Because the trial judge’s reasons reveal that this error in principle affected the sentence imposed, we must sentence the appellant afresh, without deference to the original sentence. However, we remain bound to accept any factual findings that are not tainted by the error. See R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 26-28. . R. v. E.H.
In R. v. E.H. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers the sentencing effect of guilty pleas:[46] There are several reasons why a guilty plea is mitigating. As this court explained in R. v. Faulds (1994), 1994 CanLII 770 (ON CA), 20 O.R. (3d) 13 (C.A.), at p. 17:The effect of a guilty plea in setting the appropriate sentence will vary with the circumstances of each case. In some cases, a guilty plea is a demonstration of remorse and a positive first step towards rehabilitation. In other cases, a guilty plea is simply a recognition of the inevitable. …. Even where the plea is not a manifestation of genuine remorse, it may still save valuable judicial resources and provide a degree of finality from the perspective of the victims which would not exist without the plea. . R. v. M.V.
In R. v. M.V. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered (and allowed) a sentencing appeal regarding sexual interference, and separate child luring and related, guilty pleas.
In these quotes the court considers the effect of guilty pleas on sentencing, here in the context of sexual offences:[70] I would give greater weight to the guilty plea than the trial judge did because I am persuaded that this is required, as a matter of principle. I accept that the case against the appellant was overwhelming, and that this reduces the force of his guilty plea as an indication of remorse: Friesen, at para. 164. But a strong Crown case does not undercut all of the considerations that result in guilty pleas being given mitigating effect. Speaking generally, a sentence should be more lenient after a guilty plea than it would be after trial: Anthony-Cook, at para. 36. Were this not so, the incentive to plead guilty would disappear, resulting in more costly, stressful trials. More importantly, it would result in more victims being forced to testify, with the trauma and emotional cost that a trial entails, particularly in sexual offence trials: Anthony-Cook, at para. 39, citing R. v. Edgar, 2010 ONCA 529, 101 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 111, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 33984. In this case, the guilty plea may have spared young children from having to testify. The guilty plea should therefore be given material weight. ... . R. v. C.L.
In R. v. C.L. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the criminal sentencing effect of guilty pleas:[10] With respect to the sentencing judge’s analysis on mitigation, she clearly considered the appellant’s guilty plea and expressly stated that the appellant, “receives great credit for his guilty pleas.” She added that, “[t]his significant mitigation is, however, tempered by [his] lack of insight into the impact of his actions.” The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in law by minimizing the true mitigating value of his guilty plea towards the ultimate sentence as a result of her finding that the appellant lacked insight into his offence.
[11] We disagree. This court has repeatedly found that a while a guilty plea is a mitigating factor to be considered, it does not entitle an offender to a set standard of mitigation, furthermore, the amount of credit a guilty plea attracts will vary with the circumstances of each case: R. v. F.H.L., 2018 ONCA 83, 360 C.C.C. (3d) 189, at para. 22; R. v. Shah, 2017 ONCA 872, at para. 8.
[12] Contrary to the appellant’s argument, the sentencing judge did not treat the appellant’s lack of remorse as an aggravating factor. She accepted that his guilty plea and his apology to his stepdaughter showed remorse. However, based on comments in the pre-sentence report, she found that the appellant lacked insight into the impact of his actions. She was entitled to consider a lack of insight as relevant to his potential for rehabilitation.
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