|
Criminal - Sentencing - 'Jump Principle'. R. v. Wallace
In R. v. Wallace (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this from a 'Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act, 2017' sentence.
Here the court consider the sentencing 'jump principle':[3] The appellant contends that the sentencing judge failed to respect the jump principle. He argues that, since he had never received a sentence longer than 90 days for past breaches of court orders, a 12-month custodial sentence was unwarranted.
[4] We disagree. As the sentencing judge correctly observed, the jump principle is not iron-clad. In certain circumstances, it is appropriate to impose a significantly more onerous sanction for an offence than an offender has previously received for the same or similar offences. Departure from the jump principle may be merited where rehabilitation is not a significant factor; where the offender has a lengthy criminal record; or where previous sanctions have been ineffective in deterring the offender: R. v. Simeunovich, 2023 ONCA 562, 168 O.R. (3d) 632, at para. 22, leave to appeal refused, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 48.
[5] All three circumstances arise here. The appellant has a lengthy criminal record that includes 18 convictions for disobeying court orders, including orders with respect to the complainant. According to a psychologist who has counselled the appellant, although the appellant exhibited some insight into his behaviour, “he rigidly defended his actions and beliefs” and “appeared to enjoy challenging social policies and laws and living a lifestyle that may often straddle the law.”[1]
[6] We endorse the sentencing judge’s observation that:At a certain point, an offender with multiple breach convictions ought not to be surprised if a subsequent sentencing leads to a leap rather than a step. Such a leap represents a realization that for some offenders incremental increases (or even sentences matching previous sentences for similar offences) are incapable of bringing out any awareness on the offender’s part of the seriousness of his or her pattern of disregard for court orders. This is such a case. [7] The appellant contends that the sentence is unfit. We again disagree. The sentence falls within the range of sentences that may be imposed for a non-technical breach of a court order: see e.g., R. v. Duivenvoorde, 2018 ONCA 158; R. v. Exell, 2015 ONCA 704; and R. v. Jacobson, 2006 CanLII 12412 (ON CA).
[8] Specific deterrence and public safety are important sentencing objectives in this case. In a victim impact statement, the complainant described how the appellant’s actions and behaviour had caused her “significant emotional distress, financial hardship, and a pervasive sense of fear.” . R. v. Parker
In R. v. Parker (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a child sex offence sentencing appeal, here considering the 'jump principle':[41] The jump principle cautions a court against imposing a dramatically more severe sentence than the sentences imposed upon the offender for similar offences in the recent past, provided the subsequent offence is not significantly more serious: R. v. Borde (2003), 2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 417, at para. 39; R. v. Green, 2021 ONCA 932, at para. 11. The court has clearly explained that the jump principle “has little application where the severity of the offender’s crimes shows a dramatic increase in violence and seriousness”: Borde, at para. 39; Green at para. 12. . R. v. Simeunovich
In R. v. Simeunovich (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the 'jump principle' in criminal sentencing:The jump principle
[22] In his reasons, the sentencing judge also considered the application of the jump principle, which stands for the proposition that a subsequent sentence imposed on an offender should not be disproportionate to sentences imposed for prior offences, provided the subsequent offence is not significantly more serious than the prior offence: R. v. Green, 2021 ONCA 932, at para. 11. The sentencing judge drew on caselaw that holds the jump principle has less relevance where rehabilitation is not a significant factor influencing sentence: R. v. Robitaille (1993), 1993 CanLII 2561 (BC CA), 31 B.C.A.C. 7, at para. 9. A similar point was made by this court in Green where it stated, at para. 12:As noted by Rosenberg J.A. in [R. v. Borde (2003), 2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 417], at para. 39, the jump principle “has little application where the severity of the offender’s crimes shows a dramatic increase in violence and seriousness”. The same is true when dealing with multiple convictions for an offender with a lengthy criminal record, or where previous sanctions have been ineffective in deterring the offender. [Emphasis added.] [23] In the present case, the sentencing judge properly proceeded on the basis that the jump principle had little application to sentencing the appellant. Numerous driving prohibition orders have not deterred the appellant from driving while disqualified. In its 2019 decision, this court described the appellant as a “serious serial recidivist of driving offences under the Criminal Code” and noted his “incorrigibility”: Simeunovich (ONCA), at paras. 2, 13. In his 2018 sentencing reasons, West J. characterized the appellant as “an incorrigible and uncontrollable offender”: Simeunovich (ONCJ), at para. 53. In those reasons, West J. also made these prescient comments, at para. 93:[Mr. Simeunovich’s] actions demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others, putting his own interests above anyone else. Considering his criminal record for dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, failing to stop when he is involved in an accident and driving while he is prohibited, it is my belief that as soon as Mr. Simeunovich is released from custody he will continue to drive and he will put his own interests above anyone else, completely unconcerned about putting other members of the public at risk. [Emphasis added] [24] And the appellant did precisely that, leading to his present convictions.
[25] Finally, I see no merit in the appellant’s submission that the jump principle narrowly confined the sentencing judge to measuring any permissible increase in sentence against only the last, highest conviction for the offence of driving while disqualified. A sentencing judge is entitled to take a more holistic view of the past and present conduct of the offender. This is evident from the remarks of this court in its 2019 decision involving the appellant, quoted above in para. 18. (See also R. v. Antaya, 2022 ONCA 819, where this court stated, at para. 19, in the context of an order imposed for breach of a conditional sentence, that the application of the jump principle would have to include a consideration of the circumstances of the offence for which the conditional sentence was originally imposed, and the circumstances of the breach of the conditional sentence order).
|
