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Criminal - Sentencing - Manslaughter. R. v. Khill
In R. v. Khill (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal conviction appeal (but allows a sentencing reduction), here from a manslaughter conviction - this in the defendant's second trial, where the first went up to the SCC.
Here the court considers sentencing in manslaughter:[116] The trial judge reviewed the case law governing sentencing in manslaughter cases. A wide range of sentences may be imposed. This is due to the broad spectrum of scenarios and varying levels of blameworthiness in manslaughter cases that range from situations of “near accident” to “near murder”: see R. v. Carrière (2002), 2002 CanLII 41803 (ON CA), 164 C.C.C. (3d) 569 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 10. Notably, where an offender’s conduct is accompanied by aggravating factors, the applicable range of sentence is usually between eight to twelve years’ imprisonment: see e.g., R. v. Jones-Solomon, 2015 ONCA 654, 329 C.C.C. (3d) 191, at paras. 81-83.
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[154] The key to determining an appropriate sentence for manslaughter is the moral culpability or blameworthiness of the offender: R. v. Creighton, 1993 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 48-49; R. v. Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290, at pp. 410-413; Carrière, at para. 10. This assessment engages a plethora of factors relevant to the circumstances of the offender and the offence.
[155] Although Mr. Styres was in the process of committing a criminal offence that night by breaking into the appellant’s truck, it was the appellant who created the dangerous situation that unfolded. He chose not to take a number of obvious, alternative courses of action, such as turning the lights on in his house, making noise, or even firing a warning shot. He should have called 911; it is unfathomable that he did not do so. Instead, he armed himself with a loaded shotgun and decided to confront someone on his property – someone who appeared to be, at most, a thief. As the trial judge found, the appellant could have avoided “the foreseeable violent outcome” that unfolded that night and resulted in the senseless death of Mr. Styres: R. v. Yaali, 2020 ONCA 150, at para. 6.
[156] The appellant submits that the trial judge erred by failing to give effect to his finding that the appellant feared for his life. We disagree. The trial judge accepted that the appellant perceived that he had no other choice short of using lethal force. This finding had the impact of reducing the appellant’s moral blameworthiness. We agree that this finding is to be factored into the analysis.
[157] It is true that the trial judge found that the appellant expressed genuine remorse. However, as the trial judge noted, the appellant told the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that he does not believe that he should be punished for what he did. Moreover, we echo the trial judge’s observations that, while the appellant made attempts to resuscitate Mr. Styres, he did not do so right away.
[158] These factors foreclose the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence of four years’ imprisonment. This was not a case of “near accident”. It was further along the “near accident”/“near murder” continuum.
[159] An appropriate sentence must take into account all of the relevant principles of sentencing, including totality, parity, and restraint: Criminal Code, ss. 718-718.2. The trial judge acknowledged the appellant’s strong rehabilitative prospects. However, as this court has said, rehabilitation takes on a lesser role in sentencing for manslaughter: R. v. Kwayke, 2015 ONCA 108, at para. 3. Denunciation and general deterrence must be the predominant sentencing objectives in this case, especially in view of the normative character of the appellant’s conduct. His actions that night must be strongly discouraged.
[160] In our view, the applicable goals of sentencing can only be achieved with a term lengthier than the mandatory minimum sentence of four years’ imprisonment, the existence of which does not displace the range of sentences for manslaughter developed by this court: see e.g., Jones-Solomon. A sentence of six years’ imprisonment is justified on the basis of previous decisions of this court: R. v. Kwakye, 2015 ONCA 108; R. v. Green, 2023 ONCA 317; and R. v. Araya, 2015 ONCA 854, 344 O.A.C. 36. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the Victim Impact Statements and the Community Impact Statement that describe the “devastating impact” that the death of Mr. Styres had on his family and community.
[161] We reduce the sentence to six years’ imprisonment.
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