Equity - Laches. Kloos v. Tangas
In Kloos v. Tangas (Ont CA, 2016) the court made the following brief but salutory comments on the doctrine of laches:
 We disagree. At the hearing, appellant’s counsel acknowledged that the timing of events in this case brought them within the analytical framework regarding laches described by this court in Perry, Farley & Onyschuk v. Outerbridge Management Ltd. (2001), 2001 CanLII 5678 (ON CA), 54 O.R. (3d) 131 (Ont. C.A.). In Perry, at para. 36, this court stated: “A party relying on the defence [of laches] must show a combination of delay and prejudice.” Accordingly, delay, standing alone, could not give rise to laches.. Van Allen v Vos
In Van Allen v Vos (Ont CA, 2014) the Court of Appeal comments on a laches argument:
 The same is true for the appellant’s laches and estoppel arguments. The doctrine of laches provides a defence to an equitable claim where the plaintiff’s delay in bringing a claim constitutes acquiescence or results in circumstances that make prosecution of the action unreasonable: M. (K.) v. M. (H.), 1992 CanLII 31 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 6, at pp. 77-78. However, a plaintiff cannot acquiesce without knowledge of the facts giving rise to her claim: ibid., at p. 78. The respondent here lacked this requisite knowledge.. Cosentino v. Roiatti
In Cosentino v. Roiatti (Div Ct, 2006) the Divisional Court considered the equitable doctrine of laches in the context of a solicitor suing for his fees:
 The Supreme Court of Canada in M.(K.) v. M. (H.) reviewed the equitable doctrine of laches. The court adopted the formulation of the doctrine which provides that a defendant can successfully resist an equitable claim made against him if he can demonstrate that the plaintiff, by delaying the institution or prosecution of his case, has either:
(a) acquiesced in the defendant’s conduct, Ultimately, laches must be resolved as a matter of justice between the parties, as is the case with any equitable doctrine M. (K.) v. M. (H.), supra, para. 98.
(b) caused the defendant to alter his position in reasonable reliance of the plaintiff’s acceptance of the status quo, or
(c) otherwise permitted a situation to arise which would be unjust to disturb. See M. (K.) v. M. (H.,) 1992 CanLII 31 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 6 para. 98.