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Estoppel - Issue Estoppel (3). Manulife v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation et al
In Manulife v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation et al (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court cites a test for issue estoppel:Issue estoppel
[25] The purpose of issue estoppel is to prevent the re-litigation of issues that have already been decided. The three-part test to apply issue estoppel is as follows:1. Has the same question been decided?
2. Was the decision said to create the estoppel final?
3. Were the parties to the decision the same parties as those to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised?: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at para. 23. . A. S. v. Peel Regional Police
In A. S. v. Peel Regional Police (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered a JR of decisions under the Police Records Checks Reform Act, here where a local police service "refused to remove non-conviction information relating to him in its response to his request for a Vulnerable Sector Check (“VSC”)". In these quotes the court considered issue estoppel where the applicant wished to challenge fact-findings made at an earlier JR between the same parties:[33] As a preliminary argument, the PRP submits that the doctrine of issue estoppel prevents the Applicant from re-litigating the interpretation of “alleged victim” as this issue has been finally decided by a panel of the Divisional Court as referred to above. The PRP argues that for this panel to consider the same issue in these proceedings that involve the same dispute and same parties would risk reaching a different conclusion and would undermine the credibility of the judicial review process.
[34] In the alternative, should this panel find that the Applicant is not estopped from raising the issue, the PRP submits that the interpretation of alleged victim was reasonable for the same reasons outlined by the panel in the previous judicial review application.
[35] The Applicant submits that the previous panel made its decision on a less comprehensive record and therefor it is not binding on this panel. He also argues that the interpretation of “alleged victim” is incorrect. In his submission the term should be interpreted narrowly and does not apply to those charges that he maintains involve only an adult victim.
[36] On the issue estoppel argument, I agree with the PRP that this panel should not re-visit the same issue of reasonableness of this aspect of a decision involving the same parties and the same facts on judicial review based on a record that, for the purposes of this issue, was essentially the same. That issue therefore has already been decided by a panel of the Divisional Court and should not be revisited (see: Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19 (CanLII), [2013] S.C.J. No. 19 and Angle v. Minister of National Revenue, 1974 CanLII 168 (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248). . Imperatore v. Fetesko
In Imperatore v. Fetesko (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court reviewed the doctrine of issue estoppel, a form of res judicata:The Applicable Principles
[23] The principle of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of previously adjudicated and finally decided matters: see 402 Mulock Investments Inc. v. Wheelhouse Coatings Inc., 2022 ONCA 718, at para. 16. In Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at para. 23, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the three pre-conditions that must be met in order for the court to exercise its discretion to apply the issue estoppel branch of res judicata:(i) The issue must be the same as the one decided in the prior decision;
(ii) The prior judicial decision must have been final; and
(iii) The parties to both proceedings must be the same. [24] In Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies, Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, at para. 18, the Supreme Court explained the rationale for the principle of res judicata as follows:The law rightly seeks a finality to litigation. To advance that objective, it requires litigants to put their best foot forward to establish the truth of their allegations when first called upon to do so. A litigant, to use the vernacular, is only entitled to one bite at the cherry. [25] As a result, “a judicial order pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction should not be brought into question in subsequent proceedings except those provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it”: Danyluk, at para. 20.
[26] In Kendall v. Sirard, 2007 ONCA 468, 225 O.A.C. 246, at paras. 43-45, the Court of Appeal examined the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel in the context of interlocutory orders. At para. 43, the court quoted at length from the decision of E. Macdonald J. in Ward v. Dana G. Colson Management Ltd. (1994), 24 C.P.C. (3d) 211 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 218, aff’d. [1994] O.J. No. 2792 (C.A.) as follows:A decision in an interlocutory application is binding on the parties, at least with respect to other proceedings in the same action. I agree with the submission that the general principle is that it is not open for the court, in a case of the same question arising between the same parties, to review a previous decision not open to appeal. If the decision was wrong, it ought to have been appealed within the appropriate time frames. This principle is not affected by the fact that the first decision was pronounced in the course of the same action....
But within one cause of action, there may be several issues raised which are necessary for the determination of the whole case. The rule then is that, once an issue has been raised and distinctly determined between the parties then, as a general rule, neither party can be allowed to fight that issue all over again. The same issue cannot be raised by either of them again in the same or subsequent proceedings except in special circumstances. And within one issue, there may be several points available which go to aid one party or the other in his efforts to secure a determination of the issue in his favour. The rule then is that each party must use reasonable diligence to bring forward every point which he thinks would help him. If he omits to raise any particular point, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident (which would or might have decided the issue in his favour), he may find himself shut out from raising that point again, at any rate in any case where the self same issue arises in the same or subsequent proceedings. But this again is not an inflexible rule. It can be departed from in special circumstances. In my view, the courts should depart from the principles expressed by Lords Denning and Diplock in extremely rare circumstances. The reasons for this are obvious. A party to a proceeding, if granted a second chance to raise what was already before the court, undermines the integrity of the rules which guide the conduct of litigation. There has to be certainty and finality of the disposition of matters by the courts. Otherwise, the results would be chaotic. [Citations omitted.] [27] The Court of Appeal went on to quote Laskin J.A. in Minott v. O’Shanter Development Co. (1999), 1999 CanLII 3686 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at 329, in which he stated that the cause of action estoppel branch of res judicata “prevents a party from relitigating a claim that was decided or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding”: Kendall, at para. 44 (emphasis in original). Otherwise, “a party who was unsuccessful the first time and where there has been no change in circumstance, could bring the same motion before any number of judges in an effort to find one who would grant the relief sought. Such multiplicity of proceedings is to be discouraged”: Kendall, at para. 45.
....
[37] As noted above, the principle of res judicata includes not only what was raised, considered and determined by a court at first instance, but also all grounds that could have been raised with reasonable diligence. Even if the Respondent had failed to raise the issue of territorial jurisdiction on the first motion to set aside default judgment, he would have been estopped from raising it on a second motion. A failure to raise the issue, or raising it poorly, does not afford the Respondent a second opportunity to have the issue adjudicated.
[38] The principle of res judicata is intended to preclude precisely what happened here: (i) re-litigating in the form of repeated motions between the same parties on the same issues and the same record; and (ii) inconsistent results from different judges on the same issues and same record: see Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at paras. 50-52; Dosen v. Meloche Monnex Financial Services Inc. (Security National Insurance Company), 2021 ONCA 141, 457 D.L.R. (4th) 530, at para. 30, citing Danyluk, at para. 18. . 402 Mulock Investments Inc. v. Wheelhouse Coatings Inc.
In 402 Mulock Investments Inc. v. Wheelhouse Coatings Inc. (Ont CA, 2022) the Court of Appeal nicely summarizes res judicata and its elements:[16] Res judicata prevents the re-litigation of previously adjudicated and finally decided matters. There are two branches of res judicata: cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel: Dosen v. Meloche Monnex Financial Services Inc. (Security National Insurance Company), 2021 ONCA 141, 457 D.L.R. (4th) 530, at para. 31.
[17] Cause of action estoppel precludes the parties from litigating claims that have been determined in a prior action: Dosen, at para. 31. It applies where the basis of the cause of action was argued or could have been argued in the prior action through the exercise of reasonable diligence. The same parties must be involved in the subsequent litigation and the underlying decision must be final: The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. VimpelCom Ltd., 2019 ONCA 354, 145 O.R. (3d) 759, at paras. 50-51.
[18] Issue estoppel precludes the re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in another proceeding: Dosen, at para. 32. Three preconditions are required. First, the same issue must have been decided. Second, the judicial decision giving rise to the estoppel must be final. Third, the parties to the judicial decision must be the same persons as those in the proceeding in which the estoppel is raised, or their privies: Toronto (City), at para. 23. If the criteria are met, the court must determine whether, as a matter of discretion, issue estoppel ought to be applied: Danyluk, at para. 33. . Chartrand v. Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan
In Chartrand v. Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considered an issue of issue estoppel:Issue Estoppel
[13] Justice Swinton correctly stated the test for issue estoppel:Issue estoppel may apply where there has been a final judicial determination of an issue between the parties in an earlier proceeding. However, the court being asked to apply issue estoppel has a discretion whether to do so, and the court must determine whether an injustice would result if issue estoppel applied. [14] Justice Swinton’s decision not to apply the principle was discretionary. Justice Swinton considered all the relevant factors, including the fact that Justice Gomery was deciding a different issue than she was being asked to decide and Justice Gomery did not engage in any analysis of the Divisional Court’s jurisdiction. Justice Swinton also considered whether it would be just to apply issue estoppel and concluded it would not. She made no error in her analysis on this issue. . Cambridge Pallet Ltd. v. Pereira
In Cambridge Pallet Ltd. v. Pereira (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court made this reference to estoppel:[43] ... As stated in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44 at para. 51, an administrative decision which is made without jurisdiction from the outset cannot form the basis of an estoppel. . R. v. Cowan
In R. v. Cowan (SCC, 2021) the Supreme Court of Canada considered issue estoppel in the context of an appeal court ordering a new trial:(2) Issue Estoppel
[67] Before concluding, I wish to briefly address the matter of issue estoppel. Mr. Cowan has argued that this Court cannot order a full new trial because the doctrine of issue estoppel prevents the re‑litigation of the Crown’s theory that he is guilty of armed robbery as a principal offender. Specifically, he argues that the requirements of issue estoppel are satisfied, since the trial judge’s finding that the Crown had not met its burden of proving that he was a principal offender was: (1) a final decision; (2) made in a prior proceeding; (3) that involved the same parties (citing R. v. Mahalingan, 2008 SCC 63, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 316, at paras. 52 and 55-56). Respectfully, I would reject Mr. Cowan’s submissions on this point. While the doctrine of issue estoppel is available to an accused in the criminal law context, it is not available to Mr. Cowan here to preclude this Court from ordering a full retrial on the charge of armed robbery.
[68] Issue estoppel does not apply simply by virtue of the fact that a trial has been held. As the Court in Mahalingan explained, the decision that forms the basis for the issue estoppel must have been made in a prior proceeding that was final (paras. 52‑55). That case, however, concerned two separate proceedings and not, as here, a trial and a retrial of the same case following a successful appeal. There is no final decision made in a prior proceeding where an appellate court finds that a verdict of acquittal on a single criminal charge was tainted by legal error and, accordingly, renders that verdict invalid as a whole by setting it aside and ordering a new trial on the relevant charge. This premise was succinctly summarized more than a century ago in the case of Gray v. Dalgety & Co. Ltd. (1916), 21 C.L.R. 509 (H.C.A.), at p. 521, where Griffith C.J. stated: “I never before heard it suggested that a grant of a new trial was a final decision upon any point except that the matter should be further investigated”.
[69] Moreover, as G. Spencer‑Bower and A. K. Turner have explained in The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd ed. 1969), at para. 168 (cited with approval in R. v. Duhamel (No. 2) (1981), 1981 ABCA 295 (CanLII), 131 D.L.R. (3d) 352, at p. 357 (Alta. C.A.), aff’d 1984 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 555), no party can be estopped from re‑litigating an issue where a verdict is set aside and a new trial ordered:No finding of the court or of a jury of a trial which has proved abortive, a new trial having been directed, will give rise to a valid plea of estoppel. And a decision of the court setting aside the verdict of a jury, or setting aside a judgment entered pursuant thereto, and directing a new trial, will not result in either party being estopped per rem judicatam by anything held on the facts in the judgment in which the new trial is ordered, for the judgment must be read as deciding no more than that, the first trial being unsatisfactory, the issues tried therein should be re‑submitted to the court for fresh consideration. [Footnotes omitted.] [70] I agree with this statement. When an appellate court orders a new trial in a criminal prosecution, it does so to allow the opportunity “to correct errors in the proceedings at the first trial” (Welch v. The King, 1950 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1950] S.C.R. 412, at p. 417). Such a new trial is a “re‑examination of a case on the same information or indictment”, that “supposes a completed trial, which for some sufficient reason has been set aside, so that the issues may be litigated de novo” (ibid. (emphasis deleted)).
[71] These principles were applied by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in R. v. Ekman, 2006 BCCA 206, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 121. By way of background, in that case, the accused was acquitted at his first murder trial after his incriminating statement to the police was ruled inadmissible. On appeal, the court overturned that ruling and ordered a new trial. In the second trial, the accused was convicted of attempted murder, but acquitted of first degree murder. A Crown appeal from that acquittal was allowed and a third trial was directed on the charge of murder. At the third trial, the accused argued that issue estoppel prohibited the Crown from proceeding against him as the principal offender in the murder. He asked the trial judge for an order “limiting the scope of the new trial to the charge of first degree murder as a party only” (R. v. Ekman, 2004 BCSC 900, at paras. 3‑4 (CanLII)). The trial judge rejected this submission. The third trial did not reopen an issue that had been finally decided as the result from the second trial — the acquittal for murder — was entirely set aside. Issue estoppel therefore had no application.
[72] The trial judge’s reasoning was upheld by the Court of Appeal:Trial No. 3 did not reopen a matter that had been fully litigated between the parties because the result of Trial No. 2 was entirely set aside and a new trial was ordered on all issues. There were errors of law in the charge in Trial No. 2 that impeached the verdict. The Crown appeal in Appeal No. 2 advanced three grounds for setting aside the jury’s verdict. This Court found it necessary to decide only one of those grounds but it is implicit in the decision that the whole of the verdict was tainted and had to be set aside. Otherwise, it would have been necessary to address the other grounds which attacked the entire verdict. All the issues of fact were therefore at large and to be considered afresh in Trial No. 3. No “scandal of conflicting decisions” is involved. No issue was finally decided in Trial No. 2 and, in my view, the doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel has no application. [para. 22] [73] Similarly, in the present case, no issue can be said to have been finally decided in the first trial because the result of that trial — the acquittal on the single charge of armed robbery — has been entirely set aside. As the trial judge committed a legal error that had a material bearing on Mr. Cowan’s acquittal, the verdict is necessarily invalid. The findings in the first trial that led to his acquittal must therefore be set aside and cannot form the basis of a claim of issue estoppel. . Havaris v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Havaris v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2021) the Federal Court of Appeal considered issue estoppel in provincial family law proceedings versus federal CPP proceedings:[10] The doctrine of issue estoppel applies to prevent re-litigation of an issue where the following criteria are met: the same question was decided in the previous proceeding; that proceeding involved the same parties or their privies; and the previous decision was a final one (Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460 at para. 25, Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 125 at para. 92).
[11] Here the questions decided by the Ontario Superior Court and the SST-GD were not the same given the differences between the SLRA and the CPP, which define "“spouse”" differently.
[12] Under Part II of the SLRA, for purposes of the division of property of a deceased who died intestate, where such property has a value below $200,000.00, a "“spouse”" does not include an unmarried spouse but does include a married spouse from whom the deceased has been separated, even if they were separated for several years (SLRA, ss. 1(1), referring to the definition of "“spouse”" in ss. 1(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, and SLRA, s. 45; General, O. Reg. 54/95 under the SLRA, ss. 1(a)). Conversely, for purposes of support of dependants, under Part V of the SLRA, a "“spouse”" is defined to include persons who are not married and have cohabited "“continuously for a period of not less than three years”" (SLRA, ss. 57(1), referring to the definition of "“spouse”" in s. 29 of the Family Law Act).
[13] Given the different definitions in Part II and Part V of the SLRA, a deceased’s estate may be divided between more than one spouse as that term is defined differently for different purposes. Indeed, that is precisely what occurred in the applicant’s case before the Superior Court, where she was awarded only a relatively small portion of the deceased’s estate.
[14] In contrast, the survivor’s pension under the CPP cannot be split in this way as the CPP provides that only one spouse may be awarded a survivor’s pension (see Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Tait, 2006 FCA 380, 356 N.R. 382 at para. 22; Carter v. Canada (Minister of Social Development), 2006 FCA 172, 351 N.R. 83 at para. 15; Dilka v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 90, 388 N.R. 72 at para. 3).
[15] Under paragraph 44(1)(d) of the CPP, a survivor’s pension is payable to "“the survivor of a deceased contributor who has made base contributions for not less than the minimum qualifying period”". Subsection 42(1) defines the "“survivor”" of a contributor as "“a person who was the common-law partner of the contributor at the time of the contributor’s death”", or, if there is no such person, "“a person who was married to the contributor at the time of the contributor’s death”". The term "“common-law partner”" of a contributor is in turn defined in section 2 as "“a person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the relevant time, having so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year”".
[16] While the case law under the CPP has relied on the case law decided under provincial family or succession law legislation for the sorts of factors to be assessed to determine the existence of a conjugal relationship (see, for example McLaughlin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 556, 408 F.T.R. 286 at paras. 15-16; Perez v. Hull, 2019 FCA 238, 2019 CarswellNat 4956 at paras. 7 and 22-23; L.H. v. Minister of Employment and Social Development and L.K., 2021 SST 58 at para. 10; C.L. v. Minister of Employment and Social Development, 2020 SST 985 at para. 11), determinations of spousal status under provincial legislation are not binding under the CPP given the different statutory contexts.
[17] Thus, findings made under provincial law as to the existence of a conjugal relationship are not binding under the CPP. Several decisions of the Social Security Tribunal, while not binding on this Court, are instructive on this point: see for example K. B. v. Minister of Employment and Social Development and S. C., 2019 SST 1501 at paras. 14 and 52; J. R. v. Minister of Employment and Social Development, 2019 SST 1357 at paras. 23-24, rev’d on other grounds in Canada (Attorney General) v. Redman, 2020 FCA 209, 2020 CarswellNat 5280); see also, by analogy, A. V. v. Minister of Employment and Social Development, 2019 SST 645 at paras. 9-14 (where the Social Security Tribunal found that the meaning of "“separated”" under provincial law was not determinative for the purposes of the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-9).
[18] The second requisite factor for the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel is likewise absent in the instant case as the Minister of Employment and Social Development was not a party to the case before the Superior Court but was the respondent and essential party before the SST-GD and SST-AD. Nor could the Minister be considered a "“privy”" to the deceased’s married spouse as the Minister’s interests were not allied with hers. In The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc. , 2015) at pp. 80-81, Donald Lange explains that for a party in later proceedings to be considered the privy of another party who participated in earlier proceedings, there must be a community or unity of interest between the two parties; their interests "“cannot be different in substance.”" They must have "“a parallel interest in the merits of the [previous] proceeding, not simply a financial interest in the result.”" This cannot be said of the Minister and the Added Party as the Minister has an independent interest in the application of the CPP and an obligation to ensure its correct application to all claimants, which is different from the Added Party’s interest in the deceased’s estate. . Qin v. Ontario Securities Commission
In Qin v. Ontario Securities Commission (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal considered the relationship between issue estoppel and abuse of process:[15] Although the motion judge referred to both issue estoppel and abuse of process in holding the respondents’ claim could not go forward, he correctly analyzed the arguments by reference to the essential elements of issue estoppel: Qin v. Ontario Securities Commission, 2020, ONSC 1145, at paras. 11, 17. The doctrine of abuse of process may preclude re-litigation that does not meet the exact criteria for issue estoppel: see Winter v. Sherman Estate, 2018 ONCA 703, at para. 7. However, on the facts of this case, there is no basis apart from issue estoppel to argue the malicious prosecution claim constitutes an impermissible re-litigation of decided facts. I will examine the merits of the appellants’ argument solely by reference to the elements of issue estoppel.
[16] Issue estoppel protects against the abuse of the court’s process by preventing an unsuccessful party from re-litigating a material fact or issue previously and finally decided in proceedings involving the same parties or their privies. The doctrine is not absolute and will not be applied if the interests of justice dictate otherwise: Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, at paras. 20, 24-25, 33.
[17] Issue estoppel operates to preclude re-litigation when an issue or material fact that must be decided in the second proceeding raises the same question that was decided in the previous proceeding. Binnie J. explained this requirement in Danyluk, at para. 54:… In this case, for example, the existence of an employment contract is a material fact common to both the ESA proceeding and to the appellant’s wrongful dismissal claim in court. Issue estoppel simply means that once a material fact such as a valid employment contract is found to exist (or not to exist) by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, whether on the basis of evidence or admissions, the same issue cannot be relitigated in subsequent proceedings between the same parties. The estoppel, in other words, extends to the issues of fact, law and mixed fact and law that are necessarily bound up with determination of that “issue” in the prior proceedings. [Emphasis added.] [18] Issue estoppel extends to findings that are “necessarily bound up” in the findings made in the prior proceeding. The outcome of this appeal turns on whether a determination the OSC had reasonable and probable cause to commence proceedings against the appellants was “necessarily bound up” in Pattillo J.’s finding that the OSC allegations raised “a serious issue to be tried”.
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