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Evidence - Corroboration. Curd v. Pare
In Curd v. Pare (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, this brought against the dismissal of the appellant's "claim for dependent support under s. 58(1) [SS: 'Order for support'] of the Succession Law Reform Act".
Here the court considers EA s.13 ['Actions by or against heirs, etc.'], regarding 'corroboration' in estate matters:[1] The appellant, Nancy Curd, brought a claim for dependent support under s. 58(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (SLRA), and sought an equalization of net family property under s. 5 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (FLA). The basis of her claim for support was that she was the spouse of the deceased, Christopher Pare, at the time of his death and was not adequately provided for in his will.
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Section 13 of the Evidence Act:
[51] The appellant submits that the judge misunderstood and misapplied s. 13 of the Evidence Act by requiring corroboration for each material fact. The appellant submits that she had extensive corroborative evidence that the judge failed to consider and that the judge erred in requiring corroboration for each individual fact.
[52] Section 13 of the Evidence Act provides:In an action by or against the heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, an opposite or interested party shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on his or her own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence. [53] At paragraph 65 of the decision. The judge correctly set out the law as follows:"Corroboration" in this context has been held to mean evidence which is independent of the evidence of the party proffering it which shows that their evidence on a material issue is true. Such evidence may be direct or circumstantial and can consist of a single piece of evidence or several pieces of evidence to be considered cumulatively (see Burns Estate v. Mellon, 2000 CanLII 5739 (ON CA), [2000] 48 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 29). [54] The Supreme Court of Canada provides direction on this section, as follows:... the section here does not say that every fact necessary to be proved to establish a cause of action must be corroborated by evidence other than that of the interested party but that the evidence of the interested party itself is to be corroborated by some other material evidence. I do not think that the word "matter" in the section is to be taken as synonymous with every fact required to be proved in establishing a cause of action and it has never, as far as I am aware, been so construed: Smallman v. Moore, 1948 CanLII 4 (SCC), [1948] S.C.R. 295, at p. 301. [55] Corroboration has been defined as “strengthen”, that is that the evidence to be corroborated shall be strengthened by some evidence which appreciably helps the judge believe one or more of the material statements or facts deposed to: see Smallman at p. 303, McKean v. Black, [1921] 62 S.C.R. 145, at p. 308 and Radford v. Macdonald, [1891] 18 O.A.R. 167 at p. 171.
[56] There were only a few instances in the decision where the judge refers to an absence of corroboration. I will address each instance.
[57] On the issue of whether the deceased was paying the appellant’s rent, the judge found:If the deceased were paying the applicant's rent and providing her more than small sums of money when she asked for it, there should be some evidence to corroborate that. None has been provided: para. 83 of the Decision. [58] Corroborating evidence is still subject to the rules of evidence. The judge explained why she did not accept the evidence set out in third party affidavits about the rental payments. The affiants did not set out the source of the information or the belief in the information, as required by s. 39.01(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990 Reg. 194. It was open to the judge to give no weight to the evidence.
[59] Further, while s. 13 of the Evidence Act provides that a court cannot render a decision based on the interested party’s evidence alone, unless the evidence is corroborated by other material evidence, it does not mean that the court must accept the appellant’s evidence if there is corroborating evidence. The court must still weigh the evidence and make findings of fact.
[60] The judge weighed the evidence and made a finding of fact. At paragraph 88 of the decision the judge finds:I have considered the evidence related to how the applicant and the Deceased conducted themselves in relation to each other's homes. The applicant agrees that she did not contribute to any expenses at the Deceased's home beyond paying a bill once or twice. Despite the applicant's claims, the court has not been provided with any evidence that the Deceased paid the applicant's rent. There are no receipts provided or an affidavit from the applicant's landlord to support this position. The only evidence is from the applicant who attests that the Deceased assisted her with her rent, and the affidavits of the friends of the applicant which are not corroborative of her evidence in this regard for the reasons outlined above. [61] The appellant did not meet the onus of proving that the deceased paid her rent. I find no error in the judge’s finding in this regard.
[62] The judge also rejected the appellant’s position that the parties split their time between the two residences: see paras. 89-93. Other than the appellant’s testimony, there was no evidence to support her position and there was evidence to the contrary. Again, the judge weighed the evidence and made a finding of fact, concluding that “based on the totality of evidence, I conclude that the parties intentionally maintained separate residences.”
[63] The judge comments that the appellant offered no corroborating evidence that the parties were in a conjugal relationship at the time of the deceased’s death: see para. 96. The only evidence comes from the appellant. While the judge comments that there is no corroborating evidence on this issue, ultimately, the decision does not rest on whether the parties were in a conjugal relationship. The judge does not arrive at a conclusion on this specific issue but goes through all the factors to conclude that the parties were not cohabiting at the time of death.
[64] The judge concludes that “[o]n the totality of the evidence, the applicant has failed to establish that she was a dependent of the deceased at the time of his death within the meaning of s. 57 of the SLRA.” This was a finding of fact available to the judge, and I find no palpable or overriding error of fact, and no error in the judge’s understanding of s. 13 of the Evidence Act. The decision shows a careful weighing of all the evidence before the judge in finding that the appellant was not a dependent. . R. v. Knight
In R. v. Knight (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here brought against convictions for "first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and arson."
Here the court considers the law of 'corroboration':[59] Turning to corroboration, the trial judge accurately summarized the four-part framework set out by Karakatsanis J. in Bradshaw, at para. 57:In sum, to determine whether corroborative evidence is of assistance in the substantive reliability inquiry, a trial judge should
1. identify the material aspects of the hearsay statement that are tendered for their truth;
2. identify the specific hearsay dangers raised by those aspects of the statement in the particular circumstances of the case;
3. based on the circumstances and these dangers, consider alternative, even speculative, explanations for the statement; and
4. determine whether, given the circumstances of the case, the corroborative evidence led at the voir dire rules out these alternative explanations such that the only remaining likely explanation for the statement is the declarant’s truthfulness about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement. . R. v. Beljour
In R. v. Beljour (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here brought against "convictions for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possession of the proceeds of crime, and obstruction of a peace officer".
Here the court approves of the use of evidence from "a disreputable witness" even when not corroborated:[13] In any event, as this court held in R. v. Ramdeo, 2025 ONCA 492, at para. 28, a trier of fact is entitled to convict on the evidence of a disreputable witness in the absence of independent confirmatory evidence so long as they are aware of the danger in doing so. The trial judge exceeded this minimum standard. She was satisfied that Ms. Bizzarino was telling the truth, was aware of the risks in accepting Ms. Bizzarino’s evidence, and pointed to several pieces of confirmatory evidence. There is no basis to disturb the trial judge’s credibility findings. . R. v. J.M.
In R. v. J.M. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here from convictions for "sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, two counts of assault, and threatening death".
Here the court considers a point about 'corroboration':[11] Nor did the trial judge err in finding that M.K.’s evidence on this point was confirmatory of the complainant’s evidence regarding the incident. As previously noted by this court in R. v. Varghese, 2024 ONCA 555, 439 C.C.C. (3d) 402, at para. 49, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 41475 (January 16, 2024): “[t]o be given confirmatory weight, evidence need only be more consistent with the complainant’s version than with another version.” Further, “[d]eciding whether evidence confirms or corroborates a complainant’s allegations is ‘part of the broader assessment of the complainant’s credibility and reliability that trial judges must make based on the entirety of the evidence’”: Varghese, at para. 49, citing R. v. G.H., 2023 ONCA 89, at para. 20. M.K. initially testified that the appellant was present when she hit the complainant, and the complainant testified that M.K.’s assault and the appellant choking her were part of the same incident. The trial judge was entitled to find that M.K.’s evidence provided confirmatory support for the complainant’s evidence. . R. v. Krawczyk
In R. v. Krawczyk (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the deference accorded to a trial judge's credibility findings, and cited factors that may support truth-telling - including corroboration:[60] While credibility findings by a trial judge are accorded significant deference by this court, they are not immune from review where the trial judge has failed to weigh and assess a witness’s overwhelming credibility issues. As the Supreme Court stated in R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at para. 82:[U]nder a functional and contextual reading of trial reasons, appellate courts should consider not whether the trial judge specifically used the words “credibility” and “reliability” but whether the trial judge turned their mind to the relevant factors that go to the believability of the evidence in the factual context of the case, including truthfulness and accuracy concerns. [61] In this case, the trial judge took comfort from the fact that the PA was “adamant” in his testimony. Insofar as “adamant” indicates that the witness was “unshaken” or “unfailingly consistent with the evidence”, it could be a relevant consideration in a credibility analysis. However, the PA was not unshaken or unfailingly consistent.
[62] For example, the trial judge did not refer to the fact that, in his evidence in chief, the PA stated that he told the RCMP during his June 2018 interview that he had never done a drug deal with the appellant. He tried to back track later, stating that he had misunderstood the question, but this was a significant contradiction from his evidence that the appellant had brought him cocaine to sell in the months after the January meeting. It is trite law that a prior inconsistent statement is a potent factor in considering credibility: R. v. P. (G.), 1996 CanLII 420 (ON CA), 31 O.R. (3d) 504 (C.A.), at para. 46. In this case, it went to the heart of the reasonable suspicion issue: whether there was evidence that the appellant was already a drug dealer before he met the PA.
[63] In addition, being adamant on the critical issue is wholly in keeping with lying to receive the $400,000 compensation. In that context, it does not follow that because he was adamant, what he said was the truth. In any event, the PA was a seasoned court witness and liar, a factor the trial judge did not consider when he relied on his adamance.
[64] To summarize, the trial judge had to address the credibility and reliability problems of the PA. He was an unsavoury witness whose testimony alone, unaccompanied by contemporaneous notes, text messages or other confirmatory evidence, was relied on to decide the key issue on entrapment. While the trial judge acknowledged that the PA had credibility problems, he failed to address how any of those problems were overcome in this case other than by the witness’s adamance in his testimony or by the finding of corroboration from the attitude of the appellant, which I turn to now.
The Finding of Corroboration in the Willingness of the Appellant over One Year Later
[65] Where a witness is of unsavoury character, a trier of fact is required to look at their testimony with caution and to look for confirmation or corroboration from an independent source. To be confirmatory, the evidence must be capable of giving comfort that the witness’s material evidence can be trusted: R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, at paras. 39-40.
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[70] This was not a case, as in R. v. Snyder, 2011 ONCA 445, 273 C.C.C. (3d) 211, where the trial judge’s reasons were sparse yet addressed the key issue. Here, the trial judge acknowledged the PA’s credibility issue in his reasons, but he failed to address how he reconciled it with his decision to accept that evidence as true. . R. v. Casarsa
In R. v. Casarsa (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered evidentiary 'corroboration':[8] The proper use of evidence that is equally supportive of competing versions, when assessing the credibility and reliability of those versions, was recently addressed by this court in R. v. Brown, 2022 ONCA 417, at para. 22. In Brown, the competing testimonial versions of the complainant and the accused both included the same sexual contact. Forensic evidence provided strong support for concluding that Mr. Brown had engaged in such sexual contact. The trial judge treated this forensic evidence as “corroborating” the complainant’s account. Mr. Brown appealed, arguing that the trial judged erred in doing so. Justice Miller denied this ground of appeal after finding that evidence that supports a complainant’s account does not cease to support that account because it also supports the account given by the accused. He reasoned that since judges are required to consider all of the evidence, the trial judge did not err in finding that this evidence provided some support for the complainant’s evidence.
[9] Notably, Miller J.A. qualified this holding by confirming that the forensic evidence “was neutral on the issue of consent”, which was the key issue in contest. This makes sense, given that the forensic evidence supported both competing versions, therefore providing no logical basis for preferring one of the competing versions over the other. It follows, in our view, that Brown does not hold that it is permissible to rely on evidence that equally supports competing accounts as a basis for accepting one of those accounts over the other, nor does it support the proposition that in a “he said/she said” case, a trier of fact is free to use evidence that supports both competing accounts selectively as supporting only the complainant’s account. If the Crown intended to suggest otherwise in oral submissions, we do not agree.
[10] We are accordingly persuaded that Brown does not answer Mr. Casarsa’s complaints, namely, that the trial judge acted unfairly in selectively using the confirming evidence as supporting the complainant’s evidence, but not his, and by using this evidence as a basis for ultimately choosing to believe the complainant’s account about the sexual assault over his denial.
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[12] We note that Mr. Casarsa did not appeal the trial judge’s reasoning on the basis that the evidence he relied upon was not capable in law of “corroborating” the complainant’s testimony. It is nonetheless worth pointing out that evidence is not “corroborative” simply because it confirms some of the testimony a witness provides. Technically, evidence is not corroborative unless it is independent proof that confirms a material feature of the criminal allegation: R. v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 (Eng. C.A.). If all evidence does is provide some support for the credibility of a witness, it should not be described as “corroborative”. Doing so presents the risk that the impact of that evidence may be given exaggerated importance. In R. v. Brown, the court found the trial judge did not err by misusing the technical term “corroboration” after concluding, in context, that trial judge was using the term in its informal sense as evidence providing some support for the complainant’s testimony. Had Mr. Casarsa raised this issue in this appeal we would have disposed of it the same way. There is no basis for concluding that the trial judge did anything other than this in this case. Still, care should be taken in using the term “corroboration” to describe evidence that lends no more than incidental support to some feature of a witness’s testimony.
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