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Evidence - Credibility (2). R. v. Coristine
In R. v. Coristine (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers aspects of the law of credibility:[42] Findings of credibility are not a mathematical exercise: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, 459 D.L.R. (4th) 375, at para. 81. There was no requirement that the trial judge point to a specific number of inconsistencies to find that the appellant’s evidence was not credible. It is evident that many factors, besides the back scratch and baseball incidents, and his characterization of some of the appellant’s evidence of the “Sound of Music” incident, supported his credibility assessment. He specifically noted that some of this evidence led him to question her credibility at large. I see no miscarriage of justice in this case despite the trial judge’s misapprehension of three relatively minor aspects of the appellant’s evidence.
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[44] A trial judge’s findings of credibility are to be given significant deference and assessing credibility is not a scientific exercise: G.F., at para. 81. Appellate intervention will rarely be appropriate. It is not the role of an appellate court to parse the language used by the trial judge: G.F., at para. 69.
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[52] The trial judge was evidently aware of this context, but he nevertheless believed the complainant. He was entitled to do so. Delay in reporting abuse is simply one circumstance to consider when assessing the credibility of a complainant: R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, at para. 65; see also R. v. S.G., 2022 ONCA 727, at para. 43. The trial judge, having regard to all the circumstances, including the complainant’s detailed and measured testimony, found that the proximity in time between the complainant’s marital breakdown and the allegations did not make him less credible. I see no basis to disturb this finding. . R. v. Coristine
In R. v. Coristine (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers the test for miscarriage of justice, here focussing on issues of credibility:[37] A miscarriage of justice occurs where “a trial judge is mistaken as to the substance of material parts of the evidence and those errors play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction”: R. v. Morrissey (1995), 1995 CanLII 3498 (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at p. 541. This is a stringent standard. The misapprehension must be about a substantial portion of the evidence and not a detail, and it must be material rather than peripheral to the trial judge’s reasoning process: R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, at para. 2.
[38] Where the misapprehended evidence is used to assess credibility, the issue of whether there has been a miscarriage of justice turns on the extent to which the misapprehended evidence played a role in the trial judge’s credibility assessment. If the trial judge mischaracterized parts of the appellant’s evidence that were central to the trial judge’s assessment of her credibility, it is more likely that the appellate court will find a miscarriage of justice: R. v. Alboukhari, 2013 ONCA 581, 310 O.A.C. 305, at paras. 36-38; R. v. S.R., 2022 ONCA 192, at para. 15. . Bilyk v Breen
In Bilyk v Breen (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court cites long-standing doctrine on deference to trial judge's credibility findings:[19] It is a long-standing adage that appellate courts should show great deference to findings of credibility made at trial. Triers of fact are best placed to assess credibility: in particular, trial judges are in the unique position of seeing and hearing the evidence as witnesses testify. The Supreme Court of Canada provided the following guidance in R v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 26:Rarely will the deficiencies in the trial judge’s credibility analysis, as expressed in the reasons for judgment, merit intervention on appeal. [20] An appeal court must defer to the credibility findings and conclusions of a trial judge unless there is a palpable and overriding error in those findings or conclusions: see R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, at paras. 10 and 20. . R. v. Evans
In R. v. Evans (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers the standard of review for credibility findings at trial:[11] The appellant’s submissions essentially invite this court to revisit the trial judge’s findings. That is not our role on appeal. It is well established that a trial judge’s credibility findings are entitled to considerable deference in this court. This court will interfere with a credibility assessment only where there is palpable and overriding error. The question is whether the trial judge’s credibility finding cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence: R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 10. . Aslam v Ontario College of Pharmacists
In Aslam v Ontario College of Pharmacists (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court found in favour of an appellant on rare witness credibility grounds:[13] The Committee stated correctly the legal principles involved in assessing the credibility of witnesses. The Committee was entitled to believe all, part or none of the complainant’s evidence. It was not obliged to mention every item of evidence in its reasons. But the Committee made no reference to several important aspects of the evidence that had the potential to weigh heavily on the overall credibility and reliability of the complainant. We do not infer that the Committee simply thought them to be unimportant, because many of them were important enough for the Committee to decline to act on the complainant’s evidence with respect to most of the charges.
[14] Viewed as a whole the complainant’s evidence was self-contradictory and arguably bizarre at times. It was also contradicted by another employee whose evidence was accepted and by video surveillance evidence. She alleged that the appellant had sexually assaulted another employee, an allegation that the other employee denied occurred. She had a history of making serious allegations against fellow employees, allegations that were never substantiated. Rather than deal with these issues, it appears that the Committee compartmentalized the evidence charge by charge and omitted to consider it as a whole when determining the reliability of the complainant on the charges on which it found misconduct. That was an error. The concerns about the complainant’s reliability were concerns that went to her reliability as a whole, not just to her reliability when it came to one particular incident.
[15] The finding of misconduct is based entirely on the complainant’s evidence. The Committee’s approach to assessing her reliability was flawed. The verdict on the office incident, then, cannot stand. It must be tried again. . R. v. T.O.
In R. v. T.O. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal states the deference accorded to a trial judge on an appeal, both with respect to credibility findings and with the assessment of reasons for decision:[29] A trial judge is owed very significant deference with respect to findings of credibility and reliability of witnesses: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, 459 D.L.R. (4th) 375, at para. 81; R. v. Slatter, 2019 ONCA 807, 148 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 18, per Pepall J.A. (dissenting; adopted in 2020 SCC 36, 452 D.L.R. (4th) 1). In addition, courts of appeal are instructed not to parse the reasons of the trial judge looking for error. Instead, as the Supreme Court of Canada directed in G.F., “Their task is much narrower: they must assess whether the reasons, read in context and as a whole, in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why they decided that way in a manner that permits effective appellate review”: at para. 69. . Watson v. Canadian Union of Public Employees
In Watson v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal considered administrative fairness when a tribunal declined to hold an oral hearing, and the relevance of credibility findings to this issue:[48] The applicant next says that the Board also breached its duty of procedural fairness by rejecting her request for an oral hearing. She believes she was unable to put her position forward without the opportunity to address outstanding credibility issues by cross-examining CUPE witnesses about the legal opinions discussed above. She also believes that statements by members of the executive committee in favour of federally mandated COVID-19 vaccinations in the transportation sector were without merit and did not reflect the applicant’s concerns about vaccines. The applicant argues that she could not fully advance her position having been denied the chance to cross-examine the individuals behind these statements.
[49] I disagree that the applicant was prevented from making her case to the Board in these ways.
[50] Section 16.1 of the Code states that "“[t]he Board may decide any matter before it without holding an oral hearing.”" The Board’s exercise of this discretionary power attracts considerable deference from this Court (Paris at para. 5). In this way, the Board is to be treated as "“master of its own procedure”" (Maritime Broadcasting System Limited v. Canadian Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59, 373 D.L.R. (4th) 167 at para. 50).
[51] Issues of credibility do not necessarily amount to exceptional circumstances requiring the CIRB to hold an oral hearing, nor do they amount to exceptional circumstances upon which to base an application for judicial review (Paris at para. 5; Nadeau at para. 6; Madrigga v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, 2016 FCA 151, 486 N.R. 248 at para. 28 [Madrigga]). As this Court has held, "“[c]redibility issues almost inevitably arise in antagonistic employer‑employee relations,”" and to require an oral hearing in each case raising such issues would render section 16.1 "“completely meaningless and deprived of Parliament’s intended effect”" (Nadeau at para. 6, endorsed in Ducharme at para. 21 and Madrigga at para. 27).
[52] This Court may only intervene in the Board’s decision to decide a matter without holding a hearing where the applicant has shown that they were unable to fully assert their rights or know the case they must meet (Ducharme at para. 19). The applicant here has not shown this to be the case.
[53] The Board’s analysis of CUPE’s conduct in responding to the Vaccination Policy did not engage any credibility issues; the Board itself noted that the "“chronology of events [was] straightforward and largely uncontested as it [was] based on email announcements and email exchanges”" (Decision at para. 7). The parties do not appear to disagree on the facts relevant to the issue before the Board. The applicant was able to fully advance her position and understand the respondents’ position even without cross-examining CUPE employees or ACCEX members. Further, the proposed cross-examination would appear, at least in part, to be directed to the merits of the Vaccination Policy, a consideration irrelevant to the matter that was before the Board. Finally, I note that the nature and breadth of the record before the Board demonstrates that the applicant had the opportunity to make her case fairly and fully. . R. v. C.P.
In R. v. C.P. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers the deference accorded findings of credibility on appeal:[15] Turning to the second ground of appeal, we see no error in the trial judge’s credibility and reliability findings. Significant deference is warranted to a trial judge’s credibility findings as they have the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence of witnesses: R. v. Tynes, 2022 ONCA 866, at para. 57; R. v. R.A., 2017 ONCA 714, 355 C.C.C. (3d) 400, at para. 44, aff’d 2018 SCC 13, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 307. Credibility findings should not be interfered with on appeal unless they cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence: R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 10. Absent a palpable and overriding error, an appellate court must not interfere in a trial judge’s credibility findings: Tynes, at para. 57. . Cann v. Ontario College of Teachers
In Cann v. Ontario College of Teachers (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considers an Ontario College of Teachers Act (OCTA) appeal from the revocation of a teacher's "certificate of qualification and registration". In these quotes the court sets out factors to be had regard to when deciding credibility:[40] Under the heading “Credibility Assessment and Factual Findings”, the Panel, citing Re Pitts and Director of Family Benefits Branch of the Ministry of Community & Social Services, 1986 CanLII 2053 (ON SC), identified the factors relevant to credibility that it considered. These included the witness’s ability to observe and recall the events, whether the witness has an interest in the outcome of the hearing that may cloud their recollection, the plausibility or reasonability of the evidence and the internal and external consistency or inconsistency of the evidence. It also noted that it was entitled to consider the context of the case, logic, common sense, and its experience in making determinations of credibility. . Cann v. Ontario College of Teachers
In Cann v. Ontario College of Teachers (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considers an Ontario College of Teachers Act (OCTA) appeal from the revocation of a teacher's "certificate of qualification and registration". In these quotes the court considers the reasons for decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers, particularly regarding credibility:[21] Recently, in R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, 459 D.L.R. (4th) 375, the Supreme Court of Canada provided guidance on the correct approach to employ on appellate review of trial reasons. At para. 69, the Court reiterated “the importance of a functional and contextual reading of a trial judge’s reasons when those reasons are alleged to be insufficient.” It warned against finely parsing the reasons in search of an error. Rather, the appellate court must “assess whether the reasons, read in context and as a whole, in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why they decided that way in a manner that permits effective appellate review.”
[22] At para. 76, the Court went on to express frustration at the ongoing failure of appellate courts to follow the Court’s clear direction with respect to appellate review, particularly when findings of credibility are challenged:Despite this Court’s clear guidance in the 19 years since Sheppard to review reasons functionally and contextually, we continue to encounter appellate court decisions that scrutinize the text of trial reasons in a search for error, particularly in sexual assault cases, where safe convictions after fair trials are being overturned not on the basis of legal error but on the basis of parsing imperfect or summary expression on the part of the trial judge. Frequently, it is the findings of credibility that are challenged. [23] Although the Court’s comments were made in the context of reviews of criminal convictions by trial judges, they apply equally to the Panel’s decision in this case. The Panel’s reasons must be read functionally and contextually to determine whether they explain what the Panel decided in a way that permits appellate review.
[24] G.F. underscores the approach the Supreme Court of Canada articulated in R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3 to appellate review of reasons in the context of conflicting evidence regarding sexual assault. R.E.M. is also instructive in this case.
[25] In R.E.M., the Court confirmed that a trier of fact’s reasons must be judged in the context of the record, the issues, and submissions of counsel at trial. “The question is whether, viewing the reasons in their entire context, the foundations for the trial judge’s conclusions — the “why” for the verdict — are discernable”: at para. 37.
[26] The Court noted that it is difficult to articulate the basis or process for findings of credibility precisely or completely: R.E.M., at para. 49. See also F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41 at paras. 72, 100; G.F., at para. 81.
[27] In terms of what constitutes sufficient reasons on issues of credibility, the Court held that credibility findings must be made with regard to the other evidence in the case, which “may require at least some reference to the contradictory evidence.” However, “what is required is that the reasons show that the judge has seized the substance of the issue.” A trial judge is not required to enter into a detailed account of the conflicting evidence: R.E.M., at para. 50, citing R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788 at paras. 23, 30. An appellate court should ask whether the trial judge appears to have recognized and dealt with the contradictions: R.E.M., at para. 55.
[28] As the Court held in G.F., at para. 82, “under a functional and contextual reading of trial reasons, appellate courts should consider not whether the trial judge specifically used the words ‘credibility’ and ‘reliability’ but whether the trial judge turned their mind to the relevant factors that go to the believability of the evidence in the factual context of the case, including truthfulness and accuracy concerns.”
[29] A trier of fact “is not required to summarize specific findings on credibility by issuing a general statement as to ‘overall’ credibility. It is enough that the trial judge has demonstrated a recognition, where applicable, that the witness’s credibility was a live issue”: R.E.M., at para. 64.
Appellate Review Where There are Divergent Accounts of What Happened
[30] Case law also offers guidance on the correct approach to appellate review of trial reasons when faced with two opposing versions of events.
[31] The steps set out in R. v. W. (D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 — to aid in determining reasonable doubt in the criminal law context where a jury is faced with conflicting testimonial accounts — are not an appropriate tool for evaluating conflicting evidence on the balance of probabilities in civil cases. Rather, “[i]n such cases, believing one party will mean explicitly or implicitly that the other party was not believed on the important issue in the case. That may be especially true where a plaintiff makes allegations that are altogether denied by the defendant”: McDougall, at para. 86. See also Caine v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2022 ONSC 2592 (Div. Ct.), at para. 35.
[32] In R.E.M., the Court, at para. 66, similarly described what is required with respect to credibility findings when the parties’ versions of events conflict:Finally, the trial judge’s failure to explain why he rejected the accused’s plausible denial of the charges provides no ground for finding the reasons deficient. The trial judge’s reasons made it clear that in general, where the complainant’s evidence and the accused’s evidence conflicted, he accepted the evidence of the complainant. This explains why he rejected the accused’s denial. He gave reasons for accepting the complainant’s evidence, finding her generally truthful and ‘a very credible witness’, and concluding that her testimony on specific events was ‘not seriously challenged’. It followed of necessity that he rejected the accused’s evidence where it conflicted with evidence of the complainant that he accepted. No further explanation for rejecting the accused’s evidence was required. In this context, the convictions themselves raise a reasonable inference that the accused’s denial of the charges failed to raise a reasonable doubt. . R. v. B.T.D.
In R. v. B.T.D. (Ont CA, 2022) the Court of Appeal considers motive as an evidentiary issue:[82] As this court recently instructed in R. v. G.B., 2021 ONCA 675, at para. 18, “trial judges must approach an apparent lack of motive to fabricate with great caution when assessing the credibility of a complainant.” This caution arises out of the well-established distinction between an absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a proven absence of a motive to fabricate. While the proven absence of motive might give affirmative weight to a witness’s testimony in a trial judge’s credibility assessment, the absence of any evidence of a motive to fabricate is a neutral factor and cannot be used to enhance a witness’s credibility. This is because the fact that a complainant has no apparent motive to fabricate does not mean that a complainant has no motive to fabricate. Reasoning from the apparent absence of a motive to fabricate undermines the presumption of innocence by reversing the burden of proof and fails to recognize that motives to mislead can be hidden. See: R. v. Gerrard, 2022 SCC 13, 468 D.L.R. (4th) 389, at paras. 4-5, R. v. L.L., 2009 ONCA 413, 96 O.R. (3d) 412, at para. 44; R. v. Bartholomew, 2019 ONCA 377, 375 C.C.C. (3d) 534, at paras. 22-23; R. v. S.H., 2020 ONCA 34, at para. 11; R. v. A.S., 2020 ONCA 229, at para. 59. . R. v. B.T.D.
In R. v. B.T.D. (Ont CA, 2022) the Court of Appeal considers conclusions about credibility:[68] Moreover, the trial judge’s assessment of the appellant’s evidence contains assumptions about how the appellant should have behaved, including how often he should have walked his dog, and how he should have given his evidence. As already discussed, it is an error for a trial judge to make a negative credibility finding based on stereotypical assumptions or generalizations that are not supported by the evidence: R. v. Roth, 2020 BCCA 240, 66 C.R. (7th) 107, at para. 64; MacIsaac, at para. 46; Morrissey, at pp. 530-31.
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[87] While the trial judge’s observations might stand as valid reasons not to discredit the complainant’s credibility, they could not enhance it. As this court instructed in Kiss, at para. 53: “It is an error for a trial judge to use lack of exaggeration or embellishment as a makeweight in favour of credibility. No material inconsistencies in a witness’ evidence or evidence stood up to cross-examination are not factors that show credibility; they are explanation for why a witness has not been found to be incredible.” . Taliano v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario
In Taliano v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court 'believability':The Distinction Between Credibility and Reliability
[46] Dr. Taliano submitted that the Committee’s reasons failed to do an adequate analysis of distinguishing between credibility and reliability and as a consequence focused too much on credibility and not enough on reliability. In considering this argument it is important to keep in mind the admonition from the Supreme Court in G.F., at para. 82, that:Credibility findings must also be assessed in light of the presumption of the correct application of the law, particularly regarding the relationship between reliability and credibility ... However, under a functional and contextual reading of the trial reasons, appellate courts should consider not whether the trial judge specifically used the words “credibility” and “reliability” but whether the trial judge turned their mind to the relevant factors that go to the believability of the evidence in the factual context of the case, including truthfulness and accuracy concerns ... Provided trial judges turn their mind to these considerations, there is no requirement that they utter the word “reliable”. . Caine v. Ontario College of Teachers
In Caine v. Ontario College of Teachers (Div Ct, 2022) the Divisional Court considered the weighing of credibility evidence on appeal [see the case itself for the numbered authorities]:[32] The Supreme Court has held that there is no rule as to when inconsistencies in the evidence of a witness will cause a trier to conclude that the witness’s evidence is not credible or reliable. The trier should not consider the witness’s evidence in isolation but must look at the totality of the evidence to assess the impact of the inconsistency in that evidence on questions of credibility and reliability pertaining to the core issues in the case.[8]
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[35] A trier is entitled to believe the complainant and to reject the denial of the respondent based on the totality of the evidence.[9] As this court recognized in Lee[10], where the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, believing one party may in fact mean disbelieving the other. Furthermore, a trier’s failure to explain why it rejected a respondent’s plausible denial of the allegations will not render the reasons deficient, as long as the reasons generally demonstrate that where the complainant’s evidence and the respondent’s evidence conflicted, the trier accepted the complainant’s evidence.[11] This is particularly so in cases where there are no witnesses other than the member and the complainant and no corroborating evidence to tip the scales in favor of one version of events. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court held in F.H. v. McDougall:…in civil cases in which there is conflicting testimony, the judge is deciding whether a fact occurred on a balance of probabilities. In such cases, provided the judge has not ignored evidence, finding the evidence of one party credible may well be conclusive of the issue because that evidence is inconsistent with that of the other party. In such cases, believing one party will mean explicitly or implicitly that the other party was not believed on the important issue in the case. That may be especially true where a plaintiff makes allegations that are altogether denied by the defendant as in this case.[12] ....
Issue 3: Did the Panel assess the Appellant’s credibility on a more stringent basis than the students?
[48] The Appellant claims that the Panel (a) ignored “positive indicators” of credibility in his evidence and (b) gave weight to prior consistent statements of the students when assessing their credibility.
[49] The court should not re-weigh and reassess the trial evidence. In Schoelly v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, the Divisional Court held that:The fact that there is conflicting or contradictory evidence resolved in favour of one party or another does not constitute palpable and overriding error. There was evidence to support the findings of fact made by the Panel. The Panel had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses in person. Its findings about which evidence to accept and which to reject are not subject to challenge.[14] [50] The Panel did not ignore “positive indicators” of credibility in the Appellant’s evidence. The fact that the Appellant believes he was “consistent in his evidence with respect to all material facts”, “forthright” and “did not overstate his evidence” does not demonstrate that the Panel’s factual findings are clearly wrong and unsupported by the evidence. The Panel was entitled to prefer the students’ evidence over his evidence as noted above.
[51] The Panel is not required to demonstrate in the decision that they considered every aspect of the evidence.[15] The mere failure to mention something in reasons does not constitute an error of law.[16]
[52] The case of R. v. J.M.,[17] relied upon by the Appellant, is distinguishable as a criminal case where a different burden of proof applies. The Supreme Court has determined that R v. W.(D.),[18] which applies in criminal cases, is not an appropriate test for evaluating evidence on the balance of probabilities in civil cases.[19]
[53] The Appellant has failed to show that there was an unevenness in the Panel’s approach to the evidence. As Doherty, J.A. stated in Howe[20] the Appellant must show that it is clear that the Panel applied a different standard in assessing his evidence, compared to the assessment of the evidence of the students, either by pointing to something in the reasons or in the record:This argument or some variation on it is common on appeals from conviction in judge alone trials where the evidence pits the word of the complainant against the denial of the accused and the result turns on the trial judge’s credibility assessments. This is a difficult argument to make successfully. It is not enough to show that a different trial judge could have reached a different credibility assessment, or that the trial judge failed to say something that he could have said in assessing the respective credibility of the complainant and the accused or that he failed to expressly set out legal principles relevant to the credibility assessment, To succeed in this kind of argument, the appellant must point to something in the reasons of the trial judge or perhaps elsewhere in the record that make it clear that the trial judge had applied different standards in assessing the evidence of the appellant and the complainant.[21] [54] The Panel did not treat the students’ prior statements as corroborative of their evidence at the hearing. The prior statements were raised by the Appellant on cross-examination of the students.
[55] Ultimately, believing the evidence of one witness and not the other is a matter of judgment to which deference is owed in the absence of a palpable and overriding error. The Panel considered the Appellant’s evidence and found the students’ evidence more credible than that of the Appellant as it was entitled to do. This ground of appeal is dismissed.
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[61] Sexual misconduct is one of the most significant and serious findings that the Respondent can make against a member. Given the consequences of such a finding, the Panel is required to act with care and caution in assessing and weighing all the evidence. In doing so, the Panel must ensure that the evidence is of such a quality and quantity to justify a finding of sexual misconduct. Having said that, the findings of the Panel are entitled to a high degree of deference. Reasons need not be perfect. Reasons are not inadequate because in hindsight it may be possible to say that the reasons were not as clear and comprehensive as they might have been.[24] A reviewing court should not minutely dissect the reasons of the Panel nor should it retry the case.
[62] Where credibility and reliability are at issue and the trier demonstrates that they are alive to inconsistencies but accepts the evidence of the witness nevertheless, in the absence of palpable and overriding error, there is no basis for appellate interference. Here the Panel considered all of the circumstances and found on a balance of probabilities that the allegations were made out.
[63] Issues of credibility were fully argued before the Panel. The decision makes it plain that there was a direct conflict in the testimony between the students and the Appellant about the sexual abuse and inappropriate comments and that the Panel accepted the students’ testimony in preference to that the Appellant and provided reasons for doing so. The reasons make it clear that the Panel considered the Appellant’s evidence and did not ignore evidence. The reasons reveal the path the Panel took to reach a conclusion on the matter in dispute. These findings are supported by the evidence and there is no basis to interfere.
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