|
Evidence - Medical Reports [EA s.52 (Ont)]. Cabral v. Northbridge General Insurance
In Cabral v. Northbridge General Insurance (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court considered an administrative evidence issue, here regarding medical records:[25] The Appellant asserts that the LAT erred in law by violating the principles of procedural fairness when preferring “hearsay evidence” (his medical records) over the testimony of several witnesses.
[26] It has been long-established that medical records made contemporaneously by someone having personal knowledge of the matters being recorded and under a duty to make the entry or record should be received as evidence as prima facie proof of the facts stated therein, subject to a party wishing to challenge the accuracy of the records or entries from doing so: Ares v. Venner, 1970 CanLII 5 (SCC), [1970] S.C.R. 608. In this case the Appellant filed the medical records he objects to the LAT relying upon. Moreover, the LAT is able to admit any evidence relevant to the subject matter of a hearing: Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.22 at s.15(1). Manikam.v. Toronto Community Housing Corp., 2019 ONSC 2083 relied upon by the Appellant, is also highly distinguishable. In the Appellant’s case, the medical records were considered along with the other evidence. The Reconsideration Decision considered the hearsay argument in detail including the inapplicability of Manikam and found no error in relying on the medical records.
[27] There was no error in relying on the Appellant’s medical records. There is no issue of procedural unfairness. . Blake v Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company
In Blake v Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (Ont CA, 2015) the Court of Appeal commented on the treatment of medical reports as business records under the Evidence Act:[59] The trial judge’s refusal to treat the Designated Assessment Centre medical assessments prepared by Drs. Garner, Ghouse, and Meloff as business records under s. 35 of the Evidence Act followed the long-established principle stated by the High Court of Justice in Adderly v. Bremner[10] that a professional medical opinion, including a diagnosis, is not an “act, transaction, occurrence or event” within the meaning of s. 35(2) of the Evidence Act. . Girao v. Cunningham
The case of Girao v. Cunningham (Ont CA, 2020) is a remarkable ruling. That it had to be written this way is an embarrassment to the legal profession. It should be read by any litigation lawyer, especially those practicing MVA litigation, as a salutory lesson in dealing with self-representing parties. On it's face it was an appeal of an MVA tort jury award, but the Court of Appeal took the oppourtunity to review numerous (sadly, necessary) basics of civil litigation. Dealing at trial with a self-represented plaintiff who relied on a Spanish interpreter throughout, the Court of Appeal used defence behaviour as object lessons in why these legal principles are important and in the end, took the unusual step of ordering a new trial from scratch [paras 7, 173-174].
I'll go through the legal principles one by one as per topic, here the principles governing business record [s.35] and medical report [s.52] evidence under the Evidence Act:(b) The Governing Principles Regarding the Evidence Act
[42] Dr. Sanchez’s letter was adduced by the defence in order to substantiate its theory that the appellant was suffering before the accident from the same mental problems that she manifested after the accident. The defence wanted to rely on the words of Dr. Sanchez’s opinion as being true. This would be to use Dr. Sanchez’s statement for the truth of its content, making it hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence “is presumptively inadmissible because – in the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time the statement is made – it is often difficult for the trier of fact to assess its truth”: R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865, at para. 1.
[43] There are certain exceptions to the hearsay rule under which a statement may be adduced for its truth value. Two such exceptions, hedged about with additional protections, are found in ss. 35 and 52 of the Evidence Act.
[44] Section 35 of the Evidence Act relates to business records. If a record is made “in the usual and ordinary course of any business and if it was in the usual and ordinary course of such business to make such writing or record at the time of such act,” then the record is admissible as evidence of such act: s. 35(2).
[45] Section 52 of the Evidence Act relates to medical reports and is more expansive than s. 35. It permits the court to allow the report to be admitted into evidence without the need to call the practitioner. The opinion can then be accepted for the truth of its contents. However, the trial judge must, at the request of a party, oblige the medical practitioner to testify in order to permit cross-examination. See Kapulica v. Dumancic, 1968 CanLII 419 (ON CA), [1968] 2 O.R. 438 (C.A.); Reimer v. Thivierge, 1999 CanLII 9303 (ON CA), [1999] 46 O.R. (3d) 309, at paras. 12-15; see also Doran v. Melhado, 2015 ONSC 2845. See generally Michelle Fuerst, Mary Anne Sanderson, and Donald Ferguson, Ontario Courtroom Procedure, 4th ed. (Toronto: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2016), c. 41.
[46] The respective roles of the two sections have been distinguished in several cases. Section 35 is not a proper basis on which to admit opinion evidence. In Westerhof, Simmons J.A. said, at para. 103:Because these reports were tendered under s. 35 of the Evidence Act, the opinions concerning causation were not admissible for the truth of their contents: Robb Estate v. Canadian Red Cross Society (2001), 2001 CanLII 24138 (ON CA), 152 O.A.C. 60 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 152; McGregor v. Crossland, [[1994] O.J. No. 310] 1994 CanLII 388 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 3. Further, the appeal record contains no indication that notice was served for the admission of these reports under s. 52 of the Evidence Act. [Emphasis added.] [47] In Robb Estate v. Canadian Red Cross Society (2001), 2001 CanLII 24138 (ON CA), 152 O.A.C. 60 (Ont. C.A.), the court noted, at para. 152: “Section 52 differs from s. 35 in that it permits the admission of opinions and diagnoses contained in medical reports signed and prepared by qualified practitioners… Section 52 was designed as an alternative to oral testimony.”
[48] In McGregor v. Crossland, [1994] O.J. No. 310 (Ont. C.A.) the court noted, at para. 3:We do not think that the diagnosis … is admissible under s. 35. It does not relate to “any act, transaction, occurrence or event”. If the notes were to be admissible at all this would have had to have been under s. 52 of the Evidence Act.
|
