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Evidence - Stereotypical Thinking (2). R. v. J.W. [stereotypes and sex offence complainants]
In R. v. J.W. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a defendant's criminal appeal, here from "criminal offences involving the abuse of the complainant, who was his domestic partner at the time".
The court reviews doctrine regarding myth and stereotype evidence, here in a sex offence context:The Material Principles
[21] “Myths and stereotypes ... capture widely held ideas and beliefs that are not empirically true”: R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 433 C.C.C. (3d) 301, at para. 37. While the list of myths and stereotypes is not closed, there is a “circumscribed set of legal rules” identifying myths and stereotypes, based on their history, purpose, and character, that are linked to discrimination and inequality of treatment of complainants: Kruk, at paras. 45, 46, 49 and 64. Some myths and stereotypes “have now been jurisprudentially condemned as errors of law”: Kruk, at para. 41. It is an error of law for a trier of fact to rely on these myths or stereotypes to discredit complainants: Kruk, at para. 44; R. v. A.B.A., 2019 ONCA 124, 145 O.R. (3d) 634, at para. 7, citing R. v. A.R.D., 2017 ABCA 237, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (“A.R.D. (Alta. C.A.)”), at paras. 6-9, aff’d R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 218 (“A.R.J.D. (S.C.C.)”). This is most likely to occur in sexual assault cases, but it is equally wrong to rely on myths and stereotypes in domestic assault cases: Kruk, at para. 69.
[22] In Abdullahi, Rowe J. distinguished between “[m]andatory instructions that must be dealt with in every case” and “[c]ontingent instructions … that may be required in some cases but not others”: Abdullahi, at paras. 48-49. In my view, an instruction about myths or stereotypes is a contingent instruction. It need not be given in every case, but where there is a realistic possibility that jurors may rely upon a myth or stereotype recognized in law, the prohibition on relying on the myth or stereotype must be included in the judge’s instruction to the jury: see R. v. C.R.J., 2024 BCCA 308, at para. 89; R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, at para. 64.
[23] It is important that judges not overstate or interpret prohibited myths and stereotypes too broadly, including when charging juries. Myths and stereotypes operate like many rules of evidence by prohibiting lines of reasoning but not proof of categories of fact. As Martin J. cautioned in Kruk, “[J]ust because the evidence happens to align with a myth or stereotype does not necessarily mean that any inferences that can be drawn from that evidence will be prejudicial”: Kruk, at para. 65. She provided an instructive example at para. 65:While it is a myth that women regularly fabricate allegations of sexual assault, it is not an error to consider whether the circumstances of a particular case support the existence of a motive to fabricate — indeed, where the defence adduces evidence on this point, a trial judge is obliged to consider it to give full effect to the presumption of innocence, and a failure to do so constitutes reversible error. [Citations omitted; emphasis in original.] [24] There is no general rule presuming that evidence capable of supporting prohibited mythical reasoning will be inadmissible. As with any other evidence, so long as the evidence is relevant for a permissible purpose, it can be received. However, exceptionally, s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, makes evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge presumptively inadmissible unless the accused shows, among other things, that it is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting one of the prohibited inferences identified in s. 276(1): R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19, 448 C.C.C. (3d) 427, at para. 30. Even in this context, the admission of such evidence is not absolutely prohibited. As Wagner, C.J. explained, at para. 81, “[i]n holding that sexual inactivity evidence is presumptively inadmissible, I reiterate that this evidence is not categorically excluded. The presumption only functions to eliminate discriminatory lines of reasoning.” He went on to quote from Professor Lisa Dufraimont’s article, “Myth, Inference and Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials”: “‘[B]road conclusions that particular forms of evidence are irrelevant should be avoided … [M]yths and stereotypes about sexual assault are properly understood as prohibited inferences’”: Kinamore at para. 81, citing Lisa Dufraimont, “Myth, Inference and Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials” (2019), 4:2 Queen’s L.J. 316, at p. 346.
[25] The stereotypes at issue in the instant case relate to the complainant’s delay in reporting, and her continued association with Mr. W. after many of the offences allegedly occurred. The underlying mythical or stereotypical reasoning that can occur when these factors are considered will arise if the trier of fact is judging “the complainant’s credibility based solely on the correspondence between her behaviour and the expected behaviour of the stereotypical victim”: A.R.J.D. (S.C.C.), at para. 2. This kind of reasoning is impermissible because it is now understood that there is “no inviolable rule on how people who are the victims of trauma like a sexual assault will behave”: D.D., at para. 65. As a matter of principle, if a relevant inference arises that does not require reliance on this prohibited inference, it should be permitted.
Stereotype and the Delay in Reporting
[26] The leading case explaining the improper use of delay in reporting remains D.D. In that decision, Major J. both describes the prohibited inferences and makes clear that in some circumstances a delay in reporting may permissibly be considered. He made the following important observations, at paras. 63 and 65:The significance of the complainant’s failure to make a timely complaint must not be the subject of any presumptive adverse inference based upon now rejected stereotypical assumptions of how persons … react to acts of sexual abuse.
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A trial judge should recognize and so instruct a jury that there is no inviolable rule on how people who are the victims of trauma like a sexual assault will behave. Some will make an immediate complaint, some will delay in disclosing the abuse, while some will never disclose the abuse. Reasons for delay are many and at least include embarrassment, fear, guilt, or a lack of understanding and knowledge. In assessing the credibility of a complainant, the timing of the complaint is simply one circumstance to consider in the factual mosaic of a particular case. A delay in disclosure, standing alone, will never give rise to an adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant. [Citations omitted; emphasis in original.] [27] It can be seen, then, that what is prohibited in a case where there has been a delay in reporting is starting from the “presumption” that a real victim would make a timely complaint, and then relying upon this stereotype to infer that since the complainant did not make a timely complaint, her complaint may not be credible: see R. v. Lacombe, 2019 ONCA 938, 383 C.C.C. (3d) 114, at para. 41, citing R. v. Mills, 1999 CanLII 637 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at p. 741. On the other hand, where there is an evidentiary foundation arising in the case at hand that logically links the timing of the complaint to a legitimate concern relevant to credibility, it is permissible to rely on the delay in reporting to draw that inference: C.R.J., at para. 65; R. v. S.G., 2022 ONCA 727, 85 C.R. (7th) 420, at para. 43; and R. v. Coristine, 2023 ONCA 517, at paras. 51-52; see also Lisa Dufraimont, “Myth, Inference and Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials” (2019), 44:2 Queen’s L.J. 316 at pp. 345-46.
[28] The most widely encountered and available instance of a permissible inference arises where “the timing of disclosure supports a defence argument that the complainant had a motive to fabricate the events”: R. v. Greif, 2021 BCCA 187, at para. 63, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 182 (emphasis added); see also R. v. Esquivel-Benitez, 2020 ONCA 160, 61 C.R. (7th) 326, at paras. 8-15. For example, in R. v. S.C. (2004), 2004 CanLII 4770 (ON CA), 188 O.A.C. 357 (C.A.), the delayed complaint against the accused coincided with a discussion the complainant had with her boyfriend who was upset about the accused having been at the home where she was babysitting. There may be other situations where evidence of delay is relevant. In R. v. Brown (2005), 2005 CanLII 30694 (ON CA), 201 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 15, Sharpe J. recognized that a delay in reporting may be relevant where the complainant makes a complaint to the police without mentioning an allegation that is subsequently made only after a period of delay. The relevant inference – that the initial narrated complaint differs from and is therefore inconsistent with the delayed complaint – is not based on generalizations about the way victims would behave. It is based instead on a case-specific inconsistency by omission.
[29] The bar against relying on delay in reporting is therefore commonly expressed in limited terms by stating that it is impermissible to reason that “delay in a complainant’s disclosure …, alone, undermines the credibility of the disclosure”: Kruk, at para. 41 (emphasis added). In D.D., Major J. included among the features he recommended for jury charges an instruction that “[a] delay in disclosure, standing alone, will never give rise to an adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant”: D.D., at para. 65 (emphasis added). In recognition that delay may be relevant in the circumstances of the case based on permissible inferences, he also said that “[i]n assessing the credibility of a complainant, the timing of the complaint is simply one circumstance to consider in the factual mosaic of a particular case”: D.D., at para. 65 (emphasis added).
Stereotype and Continued Association
[30] Relatedly, it is impermissible for triers of fact to conclude that “a complainant associating with or not avoiding the accused after the alleged … assault suggests that … no assault occurred”: Kruk, at para. 41. Some complainants avoid associating with their abusers, and others do not. Since there is no typical reaction for victims, it is erroneous to find relevance in the non-avoidant behaviour of the complainant by comparing that behaviour to the presumed or expected reaction of victims: A.R.D. (Alta. C.A.), at paras. 42-43, aff’d A.R.J.D. (S.C.C.), at para. 2.
[31] Since the impermissible inference arising from continued association is linked to the stereotype of how a real victim would behave, it should remain open, as a matter of principle, for accused persons to rely on evidence disclosing the absence of avoidant behaviour if the circumstances of the case support inferences that do not depend upon this stereotype. To take an obvious example, if a complainant testified that they avoided their abuser after the alleged assault, evidence that they did not do so would be relevant to their credibility since the relevance of this evidence would not depend upon the stereotype of how real victims behave. Although the factual details of the case are lacking, the case of R. v. M. (W.W.) (2006), 2006 CanLII 3262 (ON CA), 205 C.C.C. (3d) 410 (Ont. C.A.) may provide a further illustration. It appears in that case, this court found relevance in changes in the complainant’s behaviour towards the appellant over time, leading up to the complaint: M. (W.W.), at para. 8. In such circumstances, the relevant, permissible line of reasoning would not be based on the stereotype that a real victim would have avoided their abuser, but rather on the changes in the behaviour of the complainant towards the accused that occurred in the case at hand, and their timing.
[32] Based on these principles, Mr. W. took great exception in his submissions before us with an oft-quoted passage in A.R.D. (Alta. C.A.), at para. 39, that he interpreted as holding that no reliance can be placed on the absence of avoidant behaviour, regardless of the circumstances of the case: “[W]hat, if anything, can evidence of a lack of avoidant behaviour by a complainant tell a trier of fact about a sexual assault allegation? The answer is simple—nothing.” I do not read this passage so broadly. In A.R.D. (Alta. C.A.), the issue before the Court was whether it was proper for a trial judge to rely on “what he presumed to be the ‘expected’ conduct of a victim of sexual abuse after an assault, and comparing the specific behaviour of the complainant to that expectation”: A.R.D. (Alta. C.A.), at para. 8 (emphasis in original). The answer to that question is of course “no”. In my view, when para. 39 of A.R.D. (Alta C.A.) is read in context, the Court of Appeal of Alberta was simply and correctly stating that evidence of a lack of avoidant behaviour by a complainant, standing alone, tells a trier of fact nothing.
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[49] The charge the trial judge gave, which she commented was “almost the exact wording from D.D.”, omitted the underlined sentence, which was an important part in the proposed charge in D.D. As I pointed out in para. 29 above, it is this sentence that makes clear to jurors that they are not absolutely prohibited from relying on delay in assessing credibility. To underscore the point, in several cases this court has relied upon the inclusion in a jury charge of the principles found in the passage in D.D. to find otherwise imperfect charges to be functional and therefore sufficient: R. v. B. (R.) (2005), 2005 CanLII 30693 (ON CA), 77 O.R. (3d) 171 (C.A.), at paras. 29-31, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 31101 (February 16, 2006); R. v. Marshall, 2017 ONCA 1013, at paras. 19, 21, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 238; and R. v. A.W.B., 2015 ONCA 185, 322 C.C.C. (3d) 130, at para. 46; see also S.C., at para. 5. Yet the key passage that I have underlined above is missing from the charge the trial judge provided. Certainly, the charge should have either included this passage or otherwise communicated explicitly that so long as jurors avoid stereotypical reasoning, they are not absolutely prohibited from relying on delay or the pattern of disclosure in assessing the complainant’s credibility.
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[56] Having said this, I would encourage judges to avoid thinking of the charges they give relating to myths and stereotypes as being exclusively about prohibited inferences. It is optimal to explicitly address the permitted inferences while impermissible inferences are being described. It will make things simpler for jurors and avoid any realistic risk of confusion by explaining the law and then identifying with specificity the permissible inferences that arise. I recognize that concision is a virtue, but these recommendations should not burden the charge. At paras 40-56 the court considers stereotypical evidence doctrine on the facts (and jury charge) of the case.
. R. v. Singh
In R. v. Singh (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a Crown criminal appeal, here where the defendant was acquitted of "sexual assault but convicted ... of the included offence of common assault."
The appeal court comments on facts relating to sexual assault myths and stereotypes:The Trial Judge’s Error
[11] While the trial judge repeatedly cautioned against relying on myths and stereotypes, and reminded himself that one cannot expect a sexual assault victim to act in a particular way, he did not follow this advice. He relied on passages from an unreported trial decision, as they appeared in the appeal decision of R. v A.R.D., 2017 ABCA 237, 422 D.L.R. (4th) 471, stating:I am aware that cases such as [R. v. DD, 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275] instruct me that “there is no inviolable rule on how people who are the victims of trauma and sexual assault will behave” see para. 65. As stated in A.R.D. … and affirmed 2018 SCC 6:I do not discount the complainant’s credibility because she delayed [reporting] or because she did not cry out, or search for help from her mother or other family members. To judge her credibility against those myths of appropriate behaviour is not helpful. The supposedly expected behaviour of the usual victim tells me nothing about this particular victim. Later in the judgment, at paragraph 53 it states:As a matter of logic and common sense, one would [expect] that a victim of sexual abuse [would] demonstrate behaviours consistent with that abuse or at least some change of behaviour such as avoiding the perpetrator. The incongruity between the nature of the relationship, and the case at bar, the seriousness of the allegation, and the lack of support by [S.T.] are significant enough to leave me with concern about these allegations. [Emphasis added.] The underlined passage, however, was found to demonstrate a reversible legal error on appeal: A.R.D., paras. 58-68, aff’d 2018 SCC 6, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 218.
[12] The fact that the complainant returned to the respondent’s bed after she says he sexually assaulted her caused the trial judge “concern…especially so when [he] evaluate[d] the reliability and credibility of the rest of [the complainant’s] evidence”.
[13] While this has not always been well understood in our society, we all now know that there is no specific or right way for a sexual assault victim to behave. Everyone reacts differently to a traumatic event, and the trial judge erred by not recognizing this.
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Application of the Principles
[20] I agree with the Crown that the trial judge erred by reasoning that, as a matter of common sense, a sexual assault victim would take steps to avoid the person who sexually assaulted them, and by applying that standard to the complainant. In other words, he assessed her evidence based on a wrong legal principle, which is an error of law: R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, at paras. 24 and 29-30; Hodgson, at para. 35.
[21] The trial judge did not simply misquote from A.R.D. He was clearly concerned by the complainant’s return to the respondent’s bed for the night after meeting her friend in the bathroom, reflecting an assumption that a real victim would take steps to avoid the perpetrator:The relationship between [the respondent] and [the complainant] is not a relationship that had been forged in the past. These were basically strangers who met each other that very day. Although I cannot say how the complainant would react the next day, and I make no findings in relation to her behaviour the day after the incident, I do find that given the nature of the relationship, the brutal nature of the sexual assault described, along with other evidence, I find that her return to the same bed causes this court concern. This is especially so when I evaluate the reliability and credibility of the rest of the evidence. [22] In this case the legal error is compounded by the fact that the complainant actually explained why she returned to the respondent’s bed, evidence that the trial judge largely ignored. The trial judge did not address the complainant’s evidence about being scared of what the respondent and his friends might do to her, or her worry about what might happen once it became known that she had been raped. The trial judge stated that “one of the primary reasons” the respondent did not leave immediately was because she had valuables in the respondent’s car. Without making an explicit finding, the trial judge noted that the two women “ended up staying yet another night” and that, according to the respondent’s testimony, he had already removed a bag of their belongings from the car at their request before the party and the alleged assault.
[23] The trial judge, at the very least, discounted the complainant’s evidence on the basis that a true victim of sexual assault would have taken steps to avoid the perpetrator. . R. v. Hoggard
In R. v. Hoggard (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses an appeal of a conviction for 'sexual assault causing bodily harm'.
Here the court revisits stereotypical evidence, and a jury charge remedy to it:[26] It is common ground that myth-based reasoning should be eradicated. As has been recently articulated in R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at paras. 42-43:The legislative and jurisprudential treatment of these issues reflects a collective understanding that courts should strive to eradicate myths and stereotypes from their decisions because they threaten the rights of complainants and undermine the truth-seeking function of trials.
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This Court has repeatedly held that “myths and stereotypes have no place in a rational and just system of law, as they jeopardize the courts’ truth-finding function” A trial is a truth-seeking process, and reliance on myths and stereotypes distorts the truth. In Mills, this Court explained that myths and stereotypes about sexual assault victims hamper the search for truth and impose “harsh and irrelevant burdens on complainants in prosecutions of sexual offences”. While the accused’s constitutional rights must remain at the forefront of any criminal trial, this Court has also acknowledged that measures can be taken to avoid reliance on myths and stereotypes without compromising those rights. [Citations omitted]. [27] Yet, myths and stereotypes about how a victim might behave persist, including in the jurisprudence. In R. v. Varghese, 2024 ONCA 555, at para. 35, this court said: “[d]iscredited myths and stereotypes endure about how a sexual assault victim should behave, often masked in ‘common sense’ language”, citing R. v. A.R.D., 2017 ABCA 237, 422 D.L.R. (4th) 471, at para. 9, cited by this court in Lacombe, at para. 33, and R. v. Donnelly, 2023 ONCA 243, at para. 40. As Varghese demonstrates, judges are not immune to myth-based reasoning.
[28] The issue on appeal is not whether myth-based reasoning should be eradicated. Rather it is how best to do so.
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(a) A jury instruction is sufficient and preferable
[32] The jury instructions tell the jury what the law is and how to apply it. The concept that there is no standard way for a complainant to act in response to a sexual assault is well-entrenched in the law: R. v. Lacombe, 2019 ONCA 938, 383 C.C.C. (3d) 114, at para. 45; R. v. Kiss, 2018 ONCA 184, at para. 101, citing D.D., at para. 65. Akin to the delayed disclosure considered in D.D. over twenty years ago, there is no basis to refute the “undeniable nature of the proposition”: at para. 66. Expert testimony is not necessary to explain this law to the jury. A jury instruction “would have effectively dispelled the possibility that the jury might engage in stereotypical reasoning, [and] it was not necessary to inject the dangers of expert evidence into the trial”: D.D., at para 64. The Supreme Court also presented additional advantages of a jury instruction at para. 67:A jury instruction, in preference to expert opinion, where practicable, has advantages. It saves time and expense. But of greater importance, it is given by an impartial judicial officer, and any risk of superfluous or prejudicial content is eliminated. [33] The trial judge cautioned the jury against stereotypical reasoning four times during the trial, starting with her opening instructions. She reminded the jury that “[t]here is no single rule or way regarding how people who are the victims of trauma like sexual assault will behave during and afterwards.” For further clarification, the trial judge could have expanded and provided examples in the charge. It was not necessary to admit expert testimony.
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[42] I do not agree that expert evidence is required in order to understand jury instructions. The purpose of jury charges is to instruct the jury on how to approach a legal issue. If expert evidence is found to be necessary to explain certain jury instructions, it will likely be sought in many cases. In sexual assault trials, juries will be presumed to require such evidence to be able to understand and apply the judge’s instruction on myths and stereotypes. This, in turn, will mean that the defence might choose to lead expert evidence as to what constitutes a trauma, the duration of the phenomena, factors that may or may not affect the way a particular victim might be expected to react, and factors such as training, health and the duration of the assault.
[43] Admitting expert evidence risks opening areas of cross-examination of a complainant that are undesirable. As explained by Dr. Haskell, a person responds to trauma by reflex and habit, and that habit comes from the personal experience of a person over a lifetime. In response, the accused could argue that the complainant’s experience and prior traumas are appropriate and relevant areas of cross examination as they go to how the expert evidence can be applied.
[44] The efficient use of court resources requires a well-crafted instruction to the jury regarding myths and stereotypes, combined with vigilance, to ensure that counsel do not seek to rely on or advance stereotypical reasoning. This is a better use of court time than calling expert evidence that seeks to explain the mechanisms behind various myths and stereotypes. This type of expert evidence risks distracting and confusing the jury and lengthens and complicates trials. As explained in D.D., at para. 67: “a jury instruction, in preference to expert opinion, where practicable, has advantages. It saves time and expense.”
[45] For all of these reasons, I conclude that the trial judge erred by admitting Dr. Haskell’s evidence. . R. v. G.H.
In R. v. G.H. (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a Crown criminal appeal, here involving 'stereotypical reasoning', and the common-sense assumption doctrine set down recently in Kruk (SSS, 2024) regarding sexual assault victims:[15] The Crown argues that the trial judge’s assessment of the complainant’s credibility was influenced by impermissible stereotypical reasoning.
[16] According to the Crown, the trial judge was fixated on the reasons why the complainant would continue to nap with the respondent, or go on scrap runs with him, despite “knowing what would happen”. The trial judge came back to this same point six times in her reasons and then emphasized it again in her conclusions about the complainant’s credibility.
[17] The Crown argues that the complainant did not need to provide any explanation for going on scrap runs. The fact that she continued to go on scrap runs with the respondent was logically irrelevant to deciding whether she was sexually abused. The Crown highlights that these passages in the trial judge’s reasons suggest that the trial judge found it was inconsistent that the complainant would know that a sexual assault would likely occur, yet go on the scrap runs anyway. In doing so, the trial judge presumed that a victim of sexual abuse would not continue to engage with her abuser.
[18] The Crown relies on R. v. J.C., 2021 ONCA 131, 401 C.C.C. (3d) 433, at para. 63, where Paciocco J.A. held that, “it is an error of law to rely on stereotypes or erroneous common-sense assumptions about how a sexual offence complainant is expected to act, to either bolster or compromise their credibility.” The Crown asserts that, in particular, it is a stereotype that a complainant would avoid their assailant or change their behaviour towards their assailant, and it is an error to employ such reasoning.
[19] The respondent argues that this approach to common sense assumptions has been overtaken by R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 433 C.C.C. (3d) 301, and in any event, the trial judge was not employing stereotypes about how a potential victim of sexual assault might behave, but rather assessing the explanations offered by the complainant and whether they were credible. As the respondent put it in his factum, “Her Honour was not generalizing, but evaluating the evidence of this particular complainant, and finding it lacking, due to numerous inconsistencies that could not be reconciled.”
[20] We accept the Crown’s position that the trial judge’s reasons, and her repeated focus on concerns with the complainant’s explanation of why she continued to engage in certain activities with the respondent notwithstanding the risk of further assault, give rise to an inference that she engaged in stereotypical reasoning. As the Supreme Court has emphasized on many occasions, there is no expected or proper way for a victim of abuse to act, particularly a victim of childhood abuse: R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, at para. 65; R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 218, at para. 2; Kruk, at para. 192, per Rowe J. (concurring).
[21] Kruk does not provide assistance to the respondent. The Supreme Court clarified that its rejection of a rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions did not alter or erode in any way the existing rules which do not permit stereotypical reasoning in relation to the expected or appropriate conduct of a victim of sexual assault: Kruk, at paras. 41-45, 54, 57, and 96.
[22] We also do not accept the distinction drawn by the respondent between stereotypical reasoning being limited to how a victim of an assault might act or respond, as opposed to the evaluation of a complainant’s explanation for why they did respond in a particular way. Stereotypical reasoning can apply in both types of assessments. In this case, the trial judge’s assessment of the complainant’s credibility gives rise to an inference that she did not accept the complainant’s testimony because it was inconsistent with how the trial judge believed a victim of assault would or should act in the face of future risk of assaults.
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