Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Family - Non-Compliance

. Riley v. Riley

In Riley v. Riley (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considers a family law non-compliance situation:

[23] Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules provides:

If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,

(a) an order for costs;

(a.1) an order to pay an amount to a party or into court as a penalty or fine;

(b) an order dismissing a claim;

(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;

(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in a case;

(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;

(f) an order postponing the trial and any other step in the case; and

(g) on motion, a contempt order.

[24] The appellant does not dispute that the motion judge had the power to make the order she did under r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules. Instead, he argues that the motion judge erred in exercising her discretion to give effect to that power. He refers to the primary objective of the Family Law Rules: to enable the court to deal with a matter justly: r. 2(2).[1] The appellant claims that the respondent had assets at the Valuation Date of several million dollars, while his were negligible. As such, he complains that the effect of the order is to deny him any right to pursue equalization, a result he says is unjust.

[25] This contention ignores, however, that “[t]he most basic obligation in family law is the duty to disclose financial information”: Roberts, at para. 11. It was that basic obligation that the motion judge found the appellant to have egregiously breached. The breach went directly to the question of what constituted dealing with the case justly. The whole point of requiring disclosure from the appellant was to allow the respondent to defend against the appellant’s contention about his assets. As the motion judge found, it would be unfair to expect the respondent to defend the equalization claim without the ordered disclosure; the non-disclosure showed that the appellant “did not intend to help the court come to a just resolution”.

[26] Where an order for financial disclosure has been made and not obeyed, r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules explicitly provides that striking an application may result. Although that remedy is reserved for “exceptional cases where no lesser remedy will redress the party’s failure to comply”, striking a claim where appropriate is “entirely consistent with the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to ‘deal with cases justly’”: Manjunath v. Kuppa, 2024 ONCA 668, at para. 10.

[27] The appellant relies on the decision-making framework for a motion under r. 1(8) set out in Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063, 19 R.F.L. (8th) 1, where this court said, at paras. 44-46:

First, when faced with an allegation of failure to obey a disclosure order, before granting a remedy, the judge must be satisfied that there has been non-compliance with the court order.

Second, once satisfied, a judge may have recourse to the alternatives described in Rule 1(8). In assessing the most appropriate remedy, a judge should consider the following factors:

. the relevance of the non-disclosure, including its significance in hindering the resolution of issues in dispute;

. the context and complexity of the issues in dispute, understanding that an uncomplicated case should have little tolerance for non-disclosure, whereas a case involving extensive valuation of assets may permit some reasonable delay in responsiveness;

. the extensiveness of existing disclosure;

. the seriousness of efforts made to disclose, and the explanations offered by a defaulting party for the inadequate or non-disclosure; and

. any other relevant factors.

Having considered these factors, the judge will then determine the best remedy. The orders identified in Rule 1(8) are not exclusive. Other approaches may be appropriate. For example, one option might be to invite the moving party to seek at trial an adverse inference from the failure to disclose and for the motion judge to memorialize this invitation in reasons for decision. Parties frequently rely on another option, namely a request for an adjournment to allow for more time to effect disclosure. Occasionally this may be appropriate especially in a complex case, but an adjournment should not be considered to be automatic. Fully compliant disclosure is the expectation, not the exception.

[28] The appellant argues that the motion judge’s approach was inconsistent with the framework because she did not properly focus on the relevance of the undisclosed material, which the appellant says was minimal or nonexistent, the significance of what had been disclosed, or the availability of an alternative remedy.

[29] I disagree.

[30] It is clear that the motion judge did properly consider the relevance of the non-disclosure in accordance with the Mullin framework. To assess a party’s net family property and equalization claim, the court requires a complete financial picture. Because the appellant did not provide all his bank account statements or documents related to the businesses in which he was alleged to have an interest, the motion judge found that the court could not fairly assess his equalization claim. This was an assessment of relevance.

[31] The appellant seeks to excuse his failure to produce what was ordered in connection with the businesses known as Original Mattress and Original Riley’s by contending that the documents are not relevant because he did not own an interest in the businesses at the relevant valuation date. But that fact is contested; the motion judge found the appellant’s evidence to be rife with inconsistencies. The documents were ordered produced as they were relevant to the contested issues of whether the appellant had an interest, when, and of what value; they were clearly relevant to disputed issues.

[32] The appellant points to the fact that some of the statements that he failed to produce pertain to a period after separation. He submits that for this reason they could not be relevant. He also points out that other statements he failed to produce, though they pertain to the time before separation, were for periods between the dates of statements that he did produce, and could only be of minimal relevance, if any. However, financial activity after the date of separation may illuminate what was in place at the time of separation; the date range ordered reflects this. And it is not necessarily the case that information in a missing statement is revealed by a prior or subsequent statement. The order for production of all statements reflects this by requiring all statements produced.

[33] The motion judge made each of the disclosure orders, case managed this matter for years, and heard the motions leading up to the order under appeal over four days. She was intimately familiar with the issues in the litigation. She found that the non-disclosure was egregious, that it would be unfair to expect the respondent to defend the equalization claim without the information that was ordered disclosed, and that by his non-disclosure the appellant evinced an intention not to assist the court in coming to a just resolution. These findings undercut any assertion that the non-disclosure lacked, or had minimal, relevance to the issues in dispute. The motion judge clearly considered the non-disclosure to be of significant relevance. Her findings are owed deference in this court.

[34] The appellant also argues that the motion judge failed to consider the disclosure the appellant did make. I do not accept this submission.

[35] The reference in Mullin to the “extensiveness of existing disclosure” does not suggest a level of disclosure beyond which breaches of further disclosure obligations are to go without a remedy. Rather, Mullin sets out a list of factors to consider as part of a holistic assessment of the default in its full context. That is what the motion judge did here.

[36] The motion judge did not lose sight of what had been produced by the appellant. Her discussion of the specific disclosure complaints referred repeatedly to what the appellant had and had not produced in a category. She correctly looked beyond what was produced to consider what had not been produced, what efforts had been made to comply, the explanations for non-compliance, and the effect of the non-compliance on the prospect of a just resolution of the matter. She appropriately considered the production the appellant made in its proper context. The appellant’s production was not a controlling factor in favour of the appellant, because of the effect of his remaining non-disclosure on the respondent’s ability to defend the equalization claim.

[37] Finally, the appellant argues that the motion judge did not consider alternative, less drastic, remedies. An alternative remedy must be one that would address the prejudice caused by non-disclosure. The appellant did not propose any such remedy to the motion judge, or to this court. Simply asserting that the matter should proceed without the disclosure is not an alternative remedy, where the non-disclosure makes it unfair to expect the party entitled to the disclosure to respond to the claim against them.

[38] The motion judge’s order was an exercise of discretion. This court will not interfere with a discretionary order unless the lower court misdirected itself, came to a decision that is so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice, or gave no or insufficient weight to relevant considerations: Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services), 2013 SCC 19, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 125, at para. 27. In my view, none of the grounds for appellate interference has been established.

. Singh v. Seth

In Singh v. Seth (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here brought against an uncontested trial where the appellant's application was struck because "the appellant failed to make the requisite financial disclosure":

[1] The appellant appeals from the judgment of Czutrin J. which followed an uncontested family law trial. He advances two grounds of appeal. First, he argues that the trial judge erred in his calculation of equalization and spousal support payments. Second, he submits that the trial judge failed to provide reasons that are capable of meaningful appellate review and, consequently, the judgment must be set aside.

[2] The appellant’s application was struck. In this case, we have exercised our discretion to consider his appeal: Peerenboom v. Peerenboom, 2020 ONCA 240, 446 D.L.R. (4th) 418, at para. 56. The appellant challenges the findings of the trial judge and asks this court to redo them, which is not our role. There is no merit to his submissions and, for the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.

. Daud v. Temor

In Daud v. Temor (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a striking pleadings remedy for "deliberate and persistent non-compliance with his financial disclosure obligations":

[9] I am satisfied that at least one of the costs orders had not been paid (Finlayson J.’s order for costs at the settlement conference), and that, in any event, the main reason for the order striking the appellant’s pleadings was not his non-compliance with costs orders, but his deliberate and persistent non-compliance with his financial disclosure obligations.

....

[12] While striking pleadings in family law cases is a remedy of last resort, no other remedy would have sufficed in this case: Kovachis v. Kovachis, 2013 ONCA 663, 367 D.L.R. (4th) 189, at paras. 24-25.

. Kamil v. Alnoor

In Kamil v. Alnoor (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal.

Here the court considers it's jurisdiction to quash appeals for non-compliance with court orders:

[7] The court’s well-established authority to quash an appeal for breach of court orders was recently described by D.A. Wilson J.A. in Sigalas v. Sigalas Selas, 2025 ONCA 75, 12 R.F.L. (9th) 47, at para. 10:

The court can quash an appeal if there has been non-compliance with court orders. The court may consider various factors when determining whether or not the appeal should be quashed, such as the wilfulness of the breach, the amount of arrears, the explanation for the breach, and any attempts to correct the breach. [Citations omitted.]

[8] Relevant to the circumstances of the present appeal, this court has quashed appeals where a party willfully fails to comply with support orders: see, for example: S.S. v. S.R.A., 2025 ONCA 724, at paras. 7-9; Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 824, 48 R.F.L. (8th) 330, at para. 4; Consentino v. Consentino, 2017 ONCA 593, 98 R.F.L. (7th) 53, at para. 8; Lamothe v. Ellis, 2022 ONCA 789, 79 R.F.L. (8th) 8, at para. 4.

....

Conclusion

[15] There comes a time when enough is enough. The appellant is well past that time. He has put the respondent through unnecessary stress and expense and has not acted in the best interests of his children.

[16] Applying the relevant principles from the above cases, we are of the view that this is a clear case in which dismissing the appellant’s appeal is justified as a result of: his continued and flagrant disregard of court orders, including his fundamental obligation to support his children; the complete lack of merit to the appeal; and the fact that it constitutes a collateral attack on previous court orders. We agree with the respondent’s submission that this appeal, including the fresh evidence motion, is the culmination of the long litany of the frivolous, vexatious and abusive steps that the appellant has taken in these high conflict proceedings.

. O.K. v. M.H.

In O.K. v. M.H. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the effect of order non-compliance on an appeal, here in a family law support context:

[7] In the face of non-payment of support, an appellate court may exercise its discretion and adjourn, stay or dismiss the appeal: A.A. v. Z.G., 2016 ONCA 660, at paras. 2-5. Accordingly, I exercise my discretion to adjourn the appeal. The appeal shall be stayed until the responding party pays to the moving party the support arrears in the amount of $24,396 (as well as the other amounts listed below). He shall pay these arrears no later than June 6, 2025, and provide proof of payment to this court’s Registrar, failing which his appeal shall be administratively dismissed without further notice. If he is successful on appeal, adjustments may be ordered accordingly.

. Wade v. Avery

In Wade v. Avery (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here from an order "to pay past and ongoing child support as well as s. 7 expenses and granting the respondent a vesting order conferring to her sole title to the matrimonial home".

Here the court applies doctrine which bars appeal from uncontested trials:

[3] This court will typically not entertain appeals from uncontested trials absent exceptional circumstances, notably where the issues raised in the appeal have clear merit or an injustice has been done: Lamothe v. Ellis, 2022 ONCA 789, 79 R.F.L. (8th) 8, at para. 3; Matos v. Driesman, 2024 ONCA 271, at paras. 17-18. The court may also decline to hear appeals from parties who have ignored court orders, particularly orders to pay child support: Cosentino v. Cosentino, 2017 ONCA 593, 98 R.F.L. (7th) 53, at para. 8.

[4] Although we permitted the appellant to present his submissions, we find that no exceptional circumstances exist. We are not persuaded that the appeal has clear merit or that the trial judge’s order is unjust.

. Sigalas v. Sigalas Selas

In Sigalas v. Sigalas Selas (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed both a family law appeal, and a countering motion to quash.

Here the court considers grounds to quash an appeal for non-compliance with prior orders:

[10] The court can quash an appeal if there has been non-compliance with court orders: see Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134(3); Cosentino v. Cosentino, 2017 ONCA 593, 98 R.F.L. (7th) 53, at para. 8; Dickie v. Dickie (2006), 2006 CanLII 576 (ON CA), 78 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at paras. 84-87, per Laskin J.A. (dissenting), rev’d 2007 SCC 8, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 346; Siddiqui v. Anwar, 2018 ONCA 965, at para. 19; A.A. v. Z.G., 2016 ONCA 660, at para. 4. The court may consider various factors when determining whether or not the appeal should be quashed, such as the wilfulness of the breach, the amount of arrears, the explanation for the breach, and any attempts to correct the breach: see Brophy v. Brophy (2004), 2004 CanLII 25419 (ON CA), 45 R.F.L. (5th) 56 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 9-15.

....

[14] In Gray v. Gray, 2017 ONCA 100, 137 O.R. (3d) 65, this court considered a motion to quash in the context of a family law matter. The husband failed to attend trial and the trial judge made orders fixing child support: Gray, at paras. 9-11. This court concluded, at para. 33, that while this court retains jurisdiction to hear any appeal of a final order, r. 25(19) of the Family Law Rules provides a more effective way to correct orders within its ambit.

[15] The facts of Hilton v. Hilton, 2021 ONCA 29, are also similar to the instant case. In that case, the husband did not file his answer or comply with a court order requiring delivery of his answer and financial disclosure within 30 days: Hilton, at paras. 1-2. The matter then proceeded as an uncontested trial. This court directed that the husband pursue his remedies in the Superior Court of Justice by way of a r. 25(19) motion. The court’s comments are applicable here:

By failing to comply with the Family Law Rules and the orders of Fryer J., the appellant is the author of much of his misfortune. When a party does not participate in the process, things tend to not go well. Nevertheless, the appellant’s allegations of the respondent’s misrepresentations and material omissions must still be determined on the merits: Hilton, at para. 10.

[16] In Kim v. McIntosh, 2023 ONCA 356, this court addressed when a motion under r. 25(19) ought to be brought: see paras. 29-33. That option was available to the husband in this case if he was of the view that the trial judge’s order ought to be set aside.

. Craige v. Hall

In Craige v. Hall (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court refused to schedule any steps in a parenting matter (here - seeking leave to appeal, extending time to commence an appeal and fresh evidence) at the request of a party who was significantly non-compliant with past orders:

[7] Mr. Craige now voluntarily approaches the Divisional Court to commence a court proceeding that seeks to invoke the court’s appellate jurisdiction under Ontario law set out in s.19 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43.

[8] The matter came before me in writing for intake triage and scheduling.

....

[12] I am not prepared to schedule an urgent case conference or any proceeding before this court at the behest of Mr. Craige while he actively breaches and refuses to comply with the orders of the Superior Court. In my view, he should not be heard to ask for the assistance of the law of Ontario when he denies and deliberately frustrates its applicability to him. In her August 30, 2024 endorsement, the judge was clear that Mr. Craige is in breach of the April 29, 2024 order and the August 20, 2024 order that he return the child. She found essentially that he acted with subterfuge to circumvent the court’s orders and that he did so without even the pretense of espousing the best interests of the child who has lived here for most of his life.

[13] Not every breach of a court order necessarily deprives a party of the right of audience before an appellate court. But the unadulterated chutzpah being demonstrated by Mr. Craige is beyond the pale. The court will not play procedural games with the life and wellbeing of a child in the balance. This matter is too urgent and too important to become mired in a panoply of procedural motions for extensions of time, to stay a cherry-picked order, then for fresh evidence, and leave to appeal.

[14] Comply first; then appeal.

[15] I am not making any order. I am simply unwilling to hear Mr. Craige’s administrative request to convene an urgent case conference or to schedule any steps in a proceeding in this court while he remains defiantly in breach of the orders made by the Superior Court judge. I leave it to Ms. Hall to determine whether or how she might wish or be advised to proceed.

. Manjunath v. Kuppa

In Manjunath v. Kuppa (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses a family law appeal, here against a striking of pleadings after a history of "delay, disregard of court orders, and non-disclosure":

[9] Before this court, the appellant submits that the motion judge failed to consider and apply the principle that striking pleadings is an instrument of last resort. He further submits that the order striking his pleadings contravenes the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 to deal with cases justly. He relies on case law from this court establishing that pleadings should only be struck “in exceptional circumstances and where no other remedy would suffice”: Purcaru v. Purcaru, 2010 ONCA 92, 265 OAC 121, at para. 47. See also Marcoccia v. Marcoccia, 2008 ONCA 866, 60 RFL (6th) 1 and Kovachis v. Kovachis, 2013 ONCA 663, 367 D.L.R. (4th) 189, at para. 24.

[10] This argument has no traction in this case. The motion judge expressly recognized that striking a party’s pleadings is reserved for exceptional cases where no lesser remedy will redress the party’s failure to comply with court order(s). Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules explicitly provides direction to the court on the types of orders that may be made when a person fails to obey an order. Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, where appropriate, striking pleadings is entirely consistent with the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to “deal with cases justly” as set out at rr. 2(2) and (3):

Dealing with a case justly includes,

(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;

(b) saving expense and time;

(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and

(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.

[11] In Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063, 19 R.F.L. (8th) 1, this court established a decision-making framework for assessing whether pleadings should be struck. This framework includes consideration of the relevance of the non-disclosure, the context and complexity of the issues in dispute, the extensiveness of existing disclosure, the seriousness of efforts made to disclose, and any other relevant factors. Here, the motion judge did just that.

[12] We would also add that, to defeat a motion to strike, the alternative remedy or remedies proposed must be reasonable and not ones that have already proven unsuccessful as was the case here. In addition, “exceptional” circumstances, while not usual or typical, need not rise to a standard of “extraordinary” circumstances. The challenges associated with non-compliance with court orders must be answered with responsive remedies. One such remedy is to strike pleadings.