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Highways - License Suspension. Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation)
In Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation) (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court briefly resolves a Charter s.15 ['equality rights'] argument, here regarding a driver's license suspension:[20] .... To establish that equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter are infringed, Mr. Mitanidis must show that the decision creates a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground on its face or in its impact. And secondly, that this imposes a burden or denies a benefit in a manner that reinforces or perpetuates disadvantage. He has met neither step. The evidence in this case indicates that the Minister received information that Mr. Mitanidis’ driving privilege should be reviewed for medical reasons. The Minister’s decision to request a medical examination was made on the basis of the police officer’s observation after a traffic stop. In these circumstances, the Minister’s request for further information in the form of a medical examination was entirely consistent with the highway safety purposes of the Act and was not discrimination within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter. . Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation)
In Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation) (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court resolves a Charter s.7 ['life, liberty and security of the person'] argument, here regarding a driver's license suspension:[18] .... In Horsefield v. Reg. of Motor Vehicles, 1999 CanLII 2023 (ON CA), 44 O.R.(3d) 73, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that s. 7 of the Charter does not include the right to drive a motor vehicle. A driver’s licence is not a “liberty” or “security of the person” interest guaranteed by the Charter and the suspension of a drivers licence does not engage the principles of fundamental justice. . Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation)
In Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation) (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, here where the self-presenting applicant was contesting "two decisions by the Minister of Transportation (the request that Mr. Mitanidis submit to a medical examination and the subsequent decision to suspend his licence)":The Decision to Request a Medical Examination was Reasonable.
[12] The Minister’s decisions were discretionary decisions that were made in relation to the highly regulated drivers licensing regime that exists to protect the users of roads. The Act and the regulation authorize the minister to request that a licence holder complete a medical examination for any reasons that would advance the Act’s objectives, including where there is doubt as to a licence holder’s fitness to drive.
[13] It cannot be unreasonable for the Minister to have asked Mr. Mitanidis to provide evidence of fitness, when his ability to drive safely was put into question by a police officer who interacted directly with Mr. Mitanidis on the roadway and had cogent reasons for concern about Mr. Mitanidis’ fitness to drive. The Act does not prohibit the Minister from acting on information received from a police officer and since police officers are often the officers of the law who are tasked with observing the public’s driving, it was an eminently reasonable and fair choice for the Minister to act on information from a police officer to protect road safety. That choice is entitled to deference from this court.
[14] Mr. Mitanidis suggested that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable because it relied on a “biased” police report. There is nothing in the evidentiary record to support his assertion.
The Decision to Suspend Mr. Mitanidis’ Drivers Licence was Reasonable.
[15] The Minister’s decision to suspend was also a good faith exercise of his statutory powers. The Minister sought to protect road safety when he suspended Mr. Mitanidis’ driver’s licence because Mr. Mitanidis failed to provide evidence of fitness to drive. This was a reasonable and fair choice that the Minister was entitled to make under the legislation.
[16] The suggestion that the Minister did not afford Mr. Mitanidis adequate time to obtain an examination is belied by the fact that it has been 11 months since the examination was first requested and Mr. Mitanidis still has not completed an examination. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to support an assertion that Mr. Mitanidis’ failure to obtain an examination in the seven-week period before the decision to suspend was caused by the fact that he could not find someone to do the examination within that period of time.
The Minister’s Decisions were Procedurally Fair
[17] The decisions were made in a procedurally fair manner. Mr. Mitanidis was notified in writing of the reason for the medical examination request and was given six weeks to comply if he wished to keep his driving privileges. Mr. Mitanidis’ suggestion that the decisions were procedurally unfair because the Minister did not hold an oral hearing, with him being given the right to cross examine the police officer who submitted the report, ignores the finding of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Horsefield v. Reg. of Motor Vehicles, 1999 CanLII 2023 (ON CA), 44 O.R.(3d) 73 at para 28, that the province has the power to suspend a drivers licence without a hearing. . Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation)
In Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation) (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court illustrates some legal processes for suspending a driver's license, here over concern that the driver is not "medically fit to operate a motor vehicle" [HTA 32(5) 'Issuance of driver’s licence, endorsements']:[1] On November 8, 2023, Mr. Mitanidis was stopped by a police officer because his vehicle’s licence plate had expired. The police officer submitted a report describing the occurrence to the Driver Medical Review Office. The report stated that Mr. Mitanidis seemed unable to see activated emergency lights or hear airhorn blasts even while waiting at a red light. The report indicated that Mr. Mitanidis’ driving ability was likely compromised to due issues with hearing, vision and/or inability to be aware of his surroundings.
[2] The report was reviewed by the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles who concluded that there was reason to believe that Mr. Mitanidis may have a medical condition that makes it unsafe for him to drive. As a result, pursuant to s. 32(5) of the Highway Traffic Act R.S.O 1990, c.H.8 (the “Act”), on November 9, 2023, the Minister requested that Mr. Mitanidis complete a medical examination to demonstrate that he is medically fit to operate a motor vehicle. Mr. Mitanidis was given three weeks (until November 30, 2023) to complete the examination and submit a report.
[3] Mr. Mitanidis did not provide the report. On December 20, 2023, (six weeks after the medical examination request), the Minister issued a notice of suspension of driver’s licence under s. 32 (5)(b)(ii) of the Act, to Mr. Mitanidis for his failure to submit a medical report. The notice advised Mr. Mitanidis that his licence could be reinstated upon the filing of a satisfactory medical report. To date, no such report has been filed. . Mitanidis v Ontario (Minister of Transportation)
In Mitanidis v Ontario (Minister of Transportation) (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismisses a JR stay motion against the Minister of Transportation's "suspension of his license and the decision requiring him to produce medical evidence of his fitness to drive pending the hearing of the application", here where the applicant is 83 years old.
These quotes illustrate procedures and considerations applied by the court in such a case:[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of the exercise of the Minister’s authority to require him to provide medical evidence of his cognitive fitness to drive based on the report of a police officer. He also challenges the Minister’s suspension of his driver’s license when he failed to deliver evidence as required.
[2] The applicant appealed the Ministers decisions to the LAT. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear appeals from license suspensions on the basis applicable here. The notice of application before this court is not clear whether the LAT’s decision is being appealed or if it is just recited as among the grounds of judicial review of the Minister’s decisions.
[3] Mr. Mitanidis is 83 years old. He passed his most recent biennial fitness examination last August. He cannot understand why he was then required to produce fresh evidence of his fitness to drive based on a police officer’s report to the MTO this past November.
....
[13] I am very dubious that there is a serious issue to be heard. Mr. Mitanidis submits that he was entitled to notice before the Minister acted on the police officer’s tip that led the Minister to require Mr. Mitanidis to deliver evidence of his fitness to drive. He submits that the decision so interfered with his dignity as to amount to a breach of his right to liberty under the Charter of Rights. He also submits that as a matter of statutory construction, the Minister can act only on the advice of a prescribed person i.e., a health professional, before deciding a license holder is unfit.
[14] None of these points are compelling. Driving is a privilege not a right. Horsefield v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), 1999 CanLII 2023 (ON CA). Each of us bears the statutory burden to continuously meet the requirements to drive.
[15] The statute and applicable regulation do not require the Minister to show any grounds before requiring a license holder to submit evidence of fitness. It allows, and in some cases requires, prescribed people to report fitness concerns. But nothing precludes the Minister from acting on information otherwise obtained.
[16] Neither does the decision to require a person to deliver evidence of his fitness to drive raise procedural concerns. If he provided the requisite evidence and then a licensure decision was required on contested facts, the duty of procedural fairness might impose some constraints. But I am not aware of any basis to say that one is entitled to a hearing before being required to supply evidence so as to allow the substantive fitness or licensing decision to be considered.
[17] Mr. Mitanidis proposes the Minister hold a hearing into his fitness before he is required to provide medical evidence. He is trying to read into the statute a form of precondition -like the Minster having to show reasonable grounds- before being entitled to call on a license holder to prove his fitness. There is no such requirement in the statute or the regulation.
[18] I recognize that the test for raising a serious issue is a light one. I am not deciding the merits today. But I have read the lengthy notice of application as well as the applicant’s comprehensive legal submission supporting a stay and I am hard put to find anything approaching a prima facie or arguable case on the merits.
[19] I accept that there will be no monetary compensation to Mr. Mitanidis if he has to wait several on months to have this case heard and then he succeeds (despite my preliminary view of the merits). I also accept that driving can be a symbolic manifestation of a senior person’s independence and self-worth. We have state funded transportation alternatives. So, the symbolism of driving is likely more important than the actual mobility.
[20] But having said that, Mr. Mitanidis has the ability today to end the harm from which he suffers. He can go to the doctor and obtain the medical evidence required by the Minister. If he is, in fact, unfit, he cannot complain about being deprived of his license. So, he suffers harm only if is he is fit and chooses to fight the good fight rather than just doing as he is being required to do. I understand that Mr. Mitanidis asserts that what is being asked of him is an unlawful intrusion into his rights and dignity. Others have raised concerns with, for example, having to have their pictures displayed on their drivers’ licenses. The cost of asserting such claims is not being entitled to exercise the privilege to drive. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 (CanLII).
[21] Finally, the balance of convenience is straightforward. If I do not grant the stay, Mr. Mitanidis is put to his choice of obtaining medical evidence or not driving until the matter is resolved in the fall. If I grant a stay as sought, Mr. Mitanidis will be entitled to drive without providing the evidence of fitness required by the Minister until the hearing. The risk of harm on this branch of the test is to other drivers, pedestrians, and the users of public streets who may be put at risk.
[22] The very purpose of the statutory regime is to protect the public. The Minister’s powers are exercised for that goal. The granting of the stay then undermines the statutory purpose and puts the public at risk. This far outweighs the harm to Mr. Mitanidis of choosing to obtain a doctor’s letter if he is able do so.
[23] In all, I find there is no or a most minimal issue to be tried. The applicant may suffer some incompensable harm if denied a stay; but it is harm that he can readily avoid. And the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours the denial of stay.
[24] I therefore refuse to grant a stay of the Minister’s decisions at this time. If the applicant wishes to bring a motion on full evidentiary and legal material he may seek leave to do so at a case conference.
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