Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Human Rights (Ontario) - Duty to Accomodate

. Waterloo North Condominium Corporation No. 37 v. Baha [service dog]

In Waterloo North Condominium Corporation No. 37 v. Baha (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a condo's "appeal pursuant to s. 1.46 of the Condominium Act, which provides that a party to a proceeding before the CAT may appeal the order to the Divisional Court on a question of law", here requesting "to have a dog removed".

Here the court considers the presence in a condo of a 'service dog' (here, a second dog) as a human rights accomodation:

Issue 1: The CAT did not err in law with respect to the applicable framework for determining eligibility for accommodations and finding that Ms. Baha and Mr. Murphy are permitted to keep the second dog in the unit

[30] WNCC 37 submits that the CAT failed to apply the correct framework applicable to accommodations requests and unlawfully delegated its decision-making authority in concluding that a recommendation from a qualified medical professional for a specific support animal was determinative of the accommodation analysis. It submitted that there was a complete absence of evidence of Mr. Murphy’s needs arising from his disability and the need to be accommodated by his service dog.

[31] WNCC 37 disputed that Mr. Murphy had a disability in its application. It eventually conceded that he had a disability but maintained the position that he had refused to provide the required information to establish that his requested form of accommodation (a second dog) was appropriate and necessary, rather than any other form of accommodation.

[32] I disagree with WNCC 37’s submission that there was an absence of evidence of Mr. Murphy’s needs arising from his disability and the need to be accommodated by his service dog. The medical evidence before the CAT, which it accepted, was that Mr. Murphy suffered from a disability and that his service dog, Rylie, was necessary to alleviate his symptoms. The CAT found at para. 25 of the Decision:

[25] A person seeking accommodation must provide a reasonable and sufficient amount of information about their disability-related needs. I find that Mr. Murphy has done so. Mr. Murphy testified that in the spring of 2020 his specialist prescribed a service dog to alleviate his symptoms. He acquired his dog (“Rylie”) in February 2021. This evidence was not challenged by WNCC 37, although whether the dog was appropriately trained seemed to become a matter of contention for WNCC 37 at the hearing. He has provided two letters from his treating psychiatrist, the last one being in July 2023 at which time the psychiatrist wrote that the presence of his service dog is necessary to alleviate his symptoms. In addition, Mr. Murphy provided a letter dated April 15, 2024, from another of his treating physicians describing daily anxiety symptoms exacerbated, in the physician’s assessment, by the dispute about the presence of Rylie in the unit. Whether or not this dispute has worsened his symptoms, the letter does indicate that another of Mr. Murphy’s treating physicians has linked the presence of Rylie to a medically-related need arising from his disability.

[33] There is no merit to WNCC 37’s submission that the CAT discounted relevant authorities. Rather, the CAT found that context is important and distinguished the authorities relating to accommodation in the employment context and earlier authorities upon which WNCC 37 relied in favour of Peel Condominium Corporation No. 415 v. Vokrri, 2024 ONCAT 78 (“Vokrri)” at paras. 25-27. The CAT made the following findings of fact and law in the Decision:

[29] ... As Vokrri indicates, where opinions provided by qualified medical professionals support the position that the particular animal is the appropriate accommodation, it is not appropriate for the condominium’s board or counsel, or the Tribunal, to disregard those opinions and assume that some other animal would suffice.

[30] Mr. Murphy’s physicians have clearly identified Rylie, his existing service dog, as the appropriate accommodation to meet his specific needs. Nevertheless, WNCC 37 submits that it needs further information to be able to propose other potential accommodation methods – in other words, to substitute its opinion for that of the medical professionals, as alluded to in WNCC 37’s counsel’s letter of February 13, 2024. One such proposal made in submissions was that one dog may be sufficient – that is, that Ms. Baha and Mr. Murphy share a service dog, thereby bringing themselves into compliance with the one-pet rule. As stated in Vokrri, dogs are not widgets, and even less so when considering service dogs which serve an individual’s specific needs.

[34] Section 8.7 of the Ontario Human Right Commission’s policy on ableism and discrimination based on disability sets out that an accommodation provider is not entitled to substitute its own opinion for that of a doctor’s documentation. Where more information about a person’s disability is needed, the information requested must be the least intrusive of the person’s privacy while still giving the accommodation provider enough information to make the accommodation. It is also a violation of the Code to require a person with a mental disability to divulge private medical information as a condition of maintaining his or her accommodation: Eagleson Co-Operative Homes Inc. v. Théberge, 2006 CanLII 29987 (ON SCDC), [2006] O.J. No 4585, at para. 26.

[35] There is no merit to WNCC 37’s submission that CAT delegated its decision-making authority to any other entity or individual. I find that the Decision was made on the evidence, including the medical evidence of Mr. Murphy’s treating physicians that was before it, that Mr. Murphy suffers from anxiety and requires the accommodation of the presence of his service dog to live an independent life.

. Empower Simcoe v. JL

In Empower Simcoe v. JL (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court commented on the human rights duty to provide reasonable accomodation:

[73] In addition, it was unreasonable for the HRTO decision to conclude that between June and August 2020, the accommodation alternatives offered to JL’s family were insufficient. Empower Simcoe proposed a number of reasonable alternatives that allowed for visitation that accorded with the provincial guidelines at the time. In crafting these accommodations, Empower Simcoe balanced the individualized needs of JL as well as the MCCSS and MOH guidelines in effect at the time. In failing to find that these proposals satisfied Empower Simcoe’s duty to accommodate, the HRTO decisions neglected the principle that the duty to accommodate requires reasonable efforts, not perfection: Fisher v. York University, 2011 HRTO 1229.