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Jurisdiction - Meaning. Li v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
In Li v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here from a court 'direction' (not from an 'order') that "the appellant’s motion for a stay of removal was premature because travel documents for the appellant were not ready". 'Directions' can't be appealed, thus raising a lack of jurisdiction argument and respondent countered with a Rule 74 motion to 'remove document from the court file', which - in conjunction with the Federal Court's 'plenary' authority under Constitution Act, 1867 s.101 - serves in some Federal Court contexts as a de facto quashing of an appeal.
Here the court (Stratas JA, quoting himself further in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tennant, 2018 FCA 132) considers the sometimes-meaning of the term 'jurisdiction', here in the context of an exception to a statutory IRPA [s.74(d)] bar on appeals to the FCA without certification of the questions:[10] Another reason why this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal is the statutory bar against appeals to this Court under s. 74(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
[11] There are some judge-made exceptions to that bar based on the constitutional principle of the rule of law: Tennant at para. 14. The appellant submits that a number of exceptions apply here.
[12] First, the appellant alleges that the Federal Court exceeded its "“jurisdiction”" and so this Court should hear the appeal.
[13] Here, there is no issue of jurisdiction. The appellant’s use of "“jurisdiction”" is misplaced. As this Court said in Tennant at para. 20:Seen in this way, “jurisdiction” is not some sort of a magic password that opens the door to access to this Court. Rather, it is nothing more than a rhetorical label people sometimes use to try to boost a garden-variety issue of statutory interpretation into something more significant. In my view, in describing this very rare exception to the statutory bars it would be best if this word [jurisdiction] were avoided altogether. Rather, the exception is for fundamental flaws in well-defined, extraordinary circumstances. [14] On the issue of jurisdiction, the appellant further submits that the Federal Court had no power to remove the appellant’s motion from the Court’s general sittings. This is incorrect. The Federal Court has the right to control its own processes and can adjourn, schedule and reschedule matters as is appropriate and fair. This right is founded in a plenary power:The Federal Courts’ power to control the integrity of its own processes is part of its core function, essential for the due administration of justice, the preservation of the rule of law and the maintenance of a proper balance of power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. Without that power, any court—even a court under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867—is emasculated, and is not really a court at all.
(Canada (National Revenue) v. RBC Life Insurance Company, 2013 FCA 50, 443 N.R. 378 at para. 36.)
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