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Legislature - Parliamentary Sovereignty. Yusheng Cheng v. Toronto Community Housing Corporation
In Yusheng Cheng v. Toronto Community Housing Corporation (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismissed a motion to extend time to commence an RTA social housing appeal, here focussing on the legislature's choice to limit RTA appeal to questions of law:[20] Under s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, this court’s jurisdiction on appeals is limited to hearing questions of law. The Divisional Court cannot hear appeals based on questions of fact or mixed fact and law (unless there is an extricable question of law presented). Last week Justice Stratas wrote about recognition of limits on an appeal court’s jurisdiction in similar circumstances to this case.
[21] In Halton (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2024 FCA 122 (CanLII), the court was asked to hear an appeal from an administrative tribunal. As is the case here, the right of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was subject to a statutory limit. Justice Stratas wrote:[8] But even where we grant leave, this issue always remains live: whether we have a “question of law or of jurisdiction” before us under subsection 64(1) goes to our subject-matter jurisdiction. We cannot take on things that Parliament forbids us from taking: See Emerson at para. 9, citing Green v. Rutherforth (1750), 27 E.R. 1144, 1 Ves. Sen. 462, at page 471; Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750), 27 E.R. 1132, 1 Ves. Sen. 444, at page 446; Attorney General v. Lord Hotham (1827), 38 E.R. 631, 3 Russ. 415; Thompson v. Sheil (1840), 3 Ir. Eq. R. 135. And of even longer standing is the principle of legislative supremacy, one corollary of which is that Parliament’s laws bind courts, just like everyone else: Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, 1981 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 805-806 S.C.R.; Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at paras. 71–72; Ref. re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref. re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I., 1997 CanLII 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at para. 10.
[9] In considering our jurisdiction in cases like this, we must remain on high alert. The say-so of a party that a “legal test” or “the Act” is involved is not enough. “Skilful pleaders” who are “armed with sophisticated wordsmithing tools and cunning minds” can express grounds in such a way as to make them sound like legal questions “when they are nothing of the sort”: JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc. v. Canada (National Revenue), 2013 FCA 250, [2014] 2 F.C.R. 557 at para. 49. Put another way, “the mere say-so of a party that a ‘legal test’ is implicated” or the expression of grounds of appeal “in an artful way to make them appear to raise legal questions when they do not” is “insufficient to found an appeal”: Bell Canada v. British Columbia Broadband Association, 2020 FCA 140, [2021] 3 F.C.R. 206 at para. 51.
[10] Instead, we must look at the substance of what is being raised, not the form. See generally JP Morgan at paras. 49-50, cited in Emerson at para. 29; British Columbia Broadband at para. 51.
[11] In this appeal, Halton offers a number of grounds for setting aside the Agency’s decision and phrases them as legal issues—for example, adequacy of the Agency’s reasons—to try to get past the limitation in subsection 41(1). However, in my view, Halton’s real concern is mere disagreement with the Agency’s weighing of various factors and its conclusion that the location of the railway line is reasonable, matters we are powerless to address.
[Emphasis added.] . Canada (Attorney General) v. Power
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Power (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada re-considers and confirms [the previous case was Mackin (SCC, 2002)] whether and how the Crown can be liable for Charter damages for passing unconstitutional legislation.
Here the court considers 'parliamentary sovereignty':(5) Constitutional Principles
[47] Canada argues that anything less than absolute immunity is inconsistent with three longstanding and foundational constitutional principles: parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers, and parliamentary privilege. Mr. Power responds that these principles do not necessitate absolute immunity and, moreover, that such immunity is inconsistent with other foundational constitutional principles, including constitutionalism and the rule of law. Each of these principles inform the separation of powers. We will briefly consider each in turn, before addressing the parties’ substantive submissions later in the analysis.
[48] Canada rightly notes that parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege are constitutional principles that ensure that democratically elected officials are free to make laws and to hold the executive to account, without undue interference from an unelected judiciary. The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 states that Canada has “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”. Parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege are core features of the British Constitution (R. (on the application of Miller) v. Prime Minister, [2019] UKSC 41, [2019] 4 All E.R. 299). As a result, these are also important constitutional principles in Canada.
[49] As for parliamentary sovereignty, there are important differences between the United Kingdom and Canada. In the United Kingdom, the “laws enacted by the Crown in Parliament are the supreme form of law” (Miller, at para. 41; see also Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 189, at paras. 54-55). In Canada, it is the Constitution that is the supreme law: the legislature can “make or unmake any law it wishes, within the confines of its constitutional authority” (Mikisew, at para. 36 (emphasis added)). In other words, in Canada the principle of parliamentary sovereignty must not be confused with parliamentary supremacy (Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, 1997 CanLII 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 308-9).
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[81] First, parliamentary sovereignty is not undermined by the Mackin threshold. As noted above, parliamentary sovereignty does not mean that Parliament is above the Constitution. Parliament remains subject to the constraints and accountability mechanisms of the Constitution, including the Charter. By the text of s. 32(1), the Charter specifically applies to Parliament and the provincial legislatures. The supremacy of the Constitution in relation to Parliament is well recognized in each application of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Limited immunity does not impair Parliament’s power to make and repeal laws within the confines of the Constitution.
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