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Natural Justice (1). R. v. P.P.
In R. v. P.P. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal notes the fresh law doctrine as an aspect of natural justice, in this allowed criminal appeal:[11] Trial judges are entitled to make common sense assumptions, but they are not entitled to engage in sweeping generalizations about human conduct. In this case, what appears to be the trial judge’s assumption about how a couple would interrelate in these circumstances was unsubstantiated and unwarranted. As Martin J. said in R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 433 C.C.C. (3d) 301, at para. 97:Although trial judges are clearly best placed to make factual findings and assess the accuracy of generalizations, appellate courts can balance the need for deference to those findings with employing their own common sense to determine whether the presumption was clearly illogical or unwarranted so as to make out a palpable error. [Emphasis in original.] . Vento Motorcycles, Inc. v. Mexico [NJ equated with fairness]
In Vento Motorcycles, Inc. v. Mexico (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, this from a Chapter 11 decision by a three-arbitrator NAFTA tribunal, here against Mexico.
Here the court reviews the two basics of natural justice (bias and right to be heard), essentially equating it with 'procedural fairness':The two pillars of natural justice
[23] The requirements of procedural fairness flow from the pillars of natural justice. The first pillar, audi alteram partem, requires decisionmakers to hear both sides before deciding a dispute. In essence, it requires that a fair hearing be provided before a decision is made. At its most basic level, a fair hearing requires notice of the decision that is to be made and an opportunity to make submissions to the decisionmaker. The second pillar, nemo iudex in sua causa, precludes a person from being judge in their own cause. In essence, it requires that a decisionmaker be impartial or unbiased – someone without an interest in or connection to the dispute, who will fairly consider the parties’ positions before deciding.
[24] The two pillars of natural justice – compendiously described as “procedural fairness” in a wide range of judicial and administrative applications – are basic features of the common law, so important that their existence goes without saying.
[25] Depending on the nature of the proceedings and the decision to be made, and taking into account the procedural choices of the decisionmaker, a fair hearing may require relatively minimal procedural protection. But it may also require something much more substantial, approximating the protections accorded in a judicial proceeding including disclosure, a right to counsel, an oral hearing and, ultimately, a decision with reasons. See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. The requirements of a fair hearing are tailored not only to protect litigants’ interests but also to ensure that those subject to state authority are treated with respect. Thus, a failure to provide a fair hearing may be caused by procedural defects that are relatively minor in nature, or by more significant defects that affect the substantive decision reached.
. Rebello v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services)
In Rebello v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal of an earlier dismissal "of her lawsuit alleging that the Ontario Provincial Police breached common law and statutory duties they owed to her by failing to meaningfully investigate complaints".
Here the court, while considering an appellant-raised 'procedural fairness' argument in a civil Charter and tort context, refers to the doctrine as one of 'natural justice':[6] Third, the appellant contends that the motion judge denied her procedural fairness by ordering that the parties must attend the motion hearing in person and then by holding the hearing when she failed to attend. As held in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817, at para. 21, the content of procedural fairness is to be decided in the specific context of each case. In the context of this case, we do not agree that the motion judge’s conduct of the proceeding resulted in any unfairness.
....
[14] We conclude that the motion judge exercised his discretion reasonably, and that the appellant’s allegation of a breach of natural justice has no merit. . ABDOU v. Governing Council of UOT
In ABDOU v. Governing Council of UOT (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers the related concepts of administrative procedural fairness and natural justice:[59] With respect to the Deputy Judge’s comments about the lack of natural justice, the evidence does not support that finding. The concept of natural justice is often addressed in the field of administrative law. It requires the court to assess whether rules of procedural fairness have been adhered to in the particular circumstances of the case, and whether the appropriate procedures and safeguards required to comply with the principles of natural justice were in place: Newcastle Salvage Inv. v. 2270739 Ont. Ltd., 2019 ONSC 2810 (Div. Crt.), at para. 52. ... . R v Olusoga
In R v Olusoga (Ont CA, 2019) the Court of Appeal reiterated the principle that a miscarriage of justice grounds an appeal even though no prejudice is shown:[13] We agree with duty counsel that the appeal must be allowed and a new trial ordered. It is well-established that “a miscarriage of justice need not always be supported by the demonstration of actual prejudice to an appellant; sometimes, public confidence in the administration of justice is just as shaken by the appearance as by the fact of an unfair proceeding”: R. v. McDonald, 2018 ONCA 369 (CanLII), 360 C.C.C. (3d) 494, at para. 51 (quoting from R. v. Kankis, 2012 ONSC 378 (CanLII), 281 C.C.C. (3d) 113, at para. 37); see also R. v. Cameron (1991), 1991 CanLII 7182 (ON CA), 2 O.R. (3d) 633 (C.A.), at pp. 638-39; R. v. Morrissey (1995), 1995 CanLII 3498 (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at pp. 541-42. . Hearn v. McLeod Estate
In Hearn v. McLeod Estate (Ont CA, 2019) the Court of Appeal held that reliance on unadmitted evidence by the trial judge was a breach of natural justice:[28] ... The first is a breach of the rules of natural justice. In Pfizer Co. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue (Customs & Excise), 1975 CanLII 194 (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 456, the Tariff Board relied on two scientific publications that were not put into evidence or referred to at the hearing. The Supreme Court found this to be a breach of the rules of natural justice. Pigeon J. noted, at para. 18: “It is clearly contrary to those rules to rely on information obtained after the hearing was completed without disclosing it to the parties and giving them an opportunity to meet it.” He added at para. 19 that this was a “grave error”. In my view this principle applies to this case. See also Cronk v. Canadian General Insurance Co. (1995) 1995 CanLII 814 (ON CA), 25 O.R. (3d) 505, at paras. 24-26, per Lacourciere J.A. . R. v. G.F
In R. v. G.F (SCC, 2021) the Supreme Court of Canada cited R v Mian (SCC, 2014) as a leading case on natural justice:.... It argues that this was a breach of natural justice, in contravention of this Court’s decision in R. v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 689.
[93] While this point is moot as I have determined that the Court of Appeal erred in reaching its conclusion, I do not agree that Mian was breached. Mian sought to strike a balance between the adversarial process and the appellate court’s duty to ensure that justice is done. In pursuit of that duty, sometimes the appellate court will need to raise a new issue that suggests error in the decision below that goes beyond the arguments set forth by the parties. If the appellate court raises a new issue, fairness to the adversarial process requires the court to provide the parties with notice and an opportunity to respond to it: Mian, at para. 30. However, where the appellate court raises an issue that is not “new” but rather is rooted in or forms a component of the issues raised by the parties, Mian gives appellate courts a discretion to determine whether notice and submissions are warranted: para. 33. . McGregor v. Pitawanakwat
In McGregor v. Pitawanakwat (Ont CA, 2017) the court noted the useful point that a violation of natural justice in a hearing is appealable regardless of whether the violation influenced the outcome:[12] A final preliminary point is that the denial of a fair hearing is a free-standing ground of review. A correct decision cannot cure an unfair hearing, because the unfairness would taint the entire proceedings: see R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 100.
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