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Police - Discipline. Zarabi-Majd v. Toronto Police Service
In Zarabi-Majd v. Toronto Police Service (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a police officer-brought JR, this against a dismissed appeal by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, that against a TPS discipline hearing finding that the applicant "was found guilty of four counts of discreditable conduct and four counts of insubordination, and was dismissed from the TPS".
Here the court consider an administrative Charter s.2(b) ['freedom of expression'] by a police officer professional:c. The Commission’s finding that Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s dismissal is a proportionate limit on her freedom of expression is reasonable.
[50] Having found that the Commission was correct that ss. 7 and 15 were not engaged, the remaining question is whether the Commission’s decision upholding Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s dismissal is reasonable. To be reasonable, the decision must reflect a “proportionate balancing” of her Charter rights and the statutory objectives of the Police Services Act: Commission scolaire francophone at para. 67. The decision must also show that the Commission meaningfully considered the impact its decision might have on others: Vavilov, at paras. 128 and 133.
[51] The Commission made no error in finding that the objectives of the Police Services Act are to ensure transparency and enhance public confidence in policing: Figueiras v. (York) Police Services Board, 2013 ONSC 7419 at para. 54. The restrictions in the TPS Policy and Standards of Conduct on the use of social media by officers are consistent with the objectives of the Police Services Act. The Commission found that Ms. Zarabi-Majd was aware of the limits placed on her social media use by the TPS Policy and Standards of Conduct when she took oath to become a police officer.
[52] The Commission also made no error in finding that Ms. Zarabi-Majd was not punished for her use of social media generally. Rather, Ms. Zarabi-Majd was punished only for those posts that violated the TPS Policy and Code of Conduct, and undermined public confidence in the TPS. Under the Police Services Act, an officer cannot be disciplined for misconduct while off duty unless there is a connection between the conduct and “the occupational requirements for a police officer or the reputation of the police force”: Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, s. 80(2).
[53] Despite finding that ss. 7 and 15 were not engaged in this case, the Commission fully considered Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s argument that her Twitter posts were intended to raise awareness about the TPS work environment and expose TPS wrongdoing. The Commission considered and rejected Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s argument that her Twitter posts had significant public value that were intended to promote the objectives of the Police Services Act, including maintaining public confidence in policing. The Commission found that Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s argument was an attempt to relitigate the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.
[54] The Commission also rejected Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s argument that she had no way other than Twitter to address her concerns about misconduct within the TPS. That finding was reasonable.
[55] Finally, the Commission considered and rejected Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s argument that punishing her for her Twitter posts would discourage other TPS employees from reporting harassment within the Service. The Commission found that, given the “exceptional circumstances” of Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s matter, including the content and volume of her posts as well as the very public nature of her criticisms, her dismissal from the TPS would not impact the reporting of harassment through appropriate channels.
[56] In the end, the Commission found that Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s dismissal was proportionate. On the one hand, the Commission found that Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s dismissal from the TPS would not have a chilling effect on the expressive rights of other officers beyond the limits imposed by the Police Services Act and the TPS policies. On the other hand, the Commission found that the findings of misconduct and Ms. Zarabi-Majd’s dismissal were “necessary to protect public confidence in policing.”
[57] We see no basis to interfere with the Commission’s conclusion that the penalty was a proportionate limit on the values underlying freedom of expression in light of the objectives of the Police Services Act.
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