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Presentation - When Things Go Bad. Aboutaleb-Maragheh v. Khanlari
In Aboutaleb-Maragheh v. Khanlari (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered an appeal argument by a self-presenter:[3] The appellant seeks to advance an argument he expressly abandoned on the motion. He submits that he was treated unfairly because, as a self-represented litigant, the motion judge did not explain what it meant to abandon an argument in a legal proceeding.
[4] We reject this argument. The trial judge described the appellant as “intelligent, articulate and well prepared”. The appellant is clearly familiar with legal terminology and reasoning. There is no reason to believe that the appellant did not make a fully informed decision when he specifically abandoned the argument in question. It would be unfair to the respondent to allow the appellant to advance that argument in this court. This ground of appeal cannot succeed. . Persaud v. Estate of Rita Persaud
In Persaud v. Estate of Rita Persaud (Div Ct, 2022) the Divisional Court deals with what Corbett J describes as "classic vexatious litigation" on the part of a presenting party seeking leave to appeal:[50] Litigation is not a reiterative, circular process. It is linear. When a court makes an order or gives a direction, that is not an invitation for debate or discussion. A party is not excused from following a court order because she disagrees with it, feels it should not have been made, or wishes to take steps to try to have it changed or set aside. A self-represented litigant is not entitled to ignore these principles because she is self-represented.
[51] Self-represented litigants are entitled to assistance from the court to navigate the court’s process. However, it is not the role of the court to descend into the fray to provide self-represented parties with legal, procedural, or strategic advice. In providing support and assistance to self-represented litigants, the court must also bear in mind procedural and substantive fairness to other parties. This includes requiring appropriately tailored processes, reasonable scheduling deadlines, and preventing endless repetition of arguments and issues. This court went so far as to advise Ms Persaud that it would be unwise for her to delay moving forward with her motion for leave to appeal – that sort of advice is at the outer limits of the appropriate role of the court in advising a self-represented litigant.
[52] The impugned interlocutory orders of McEwen J. were made in January and May 2021. The time to challenge them has long passed. The corrections to those orders, in February 2022, were clerical, as so described by McEwen J., and as reflected in his endorsement. It is also clear from the endorsement of McEwen J. that the appellant wanted other changes made to the orders and he declined to make those changes. On the face of the endorsements, any issue Ms Persaud has about the orders has been raised with and decided by McEwen J.
[53] It was open to the appellant to seek leave to appeal McEwen J.’s decision not to make further amendments to the orders; other challenges to the orders of McEwen J. would seem to be so far out of time as to preclude appeal proceedings, but since Ms Persaud did not deliver motion materials, this cannot be certain: the court did provide her with a process to seek any required extension to bring a motion for leave to appeal broader issues connected with the orders of McEwen J.
[54] The order of Kimmel J. is clear that Ms Persaud may bring no more preliminary motions prior to the motions on April 20, 2022, except with leave from the court. The time for leave to appeal the order of Kimmel J. expired before Ms Persaud brought her motion for leave to appeal.
[55] The order of Kimmel J. is clear that variation of prior orders may not be sought at a case conference, except as regards scheduling, and yet that is precisely what Ms Persaud did before Dietrich J. On the information before me, it is clear that the issue of the proper contents of the orders of McEwen J. has been decided by McEwen J., and that Ms Persaud’s recourse is a motion for leave to appeal to his court. This court provided her with a clear process by which she could pursue those appeal rights in a timely way so as not to disrupt the orderly process of the case below. She has not availed herself of that process. All parties are entitled to decision on the leave motions prior to April 20th, not just Mohini Persaud.
[56] This is classic vexatious litigation – refusing to accept that an issue has been decided, and endlessly challenging it through repeated circular processes.
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[66] Mohini Persaud’s conduct in his matter has been vexatious. As a self-represented litigant, she is not entitled to seek a running colloquy with a judge, she is not entitled to reasons for every routine direction provided in a file, she is not entitled to debate directions that have been given, and she is not entitled to argue with the court’s directions, and she is not entitled to ignore directions because she thinks she knows better. In the ordinary course, a motion for leave to appeal is scheduled in this court with the assistance of one or two short emails. This motion has involved a running exchange of communications with Ms Persaud which have been a profligate waste of judicial and staff resources.
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