Simon's Legal Resources

Professionals - Penalties (2)

. Guerard v. The Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills

In Guerard v. The Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a township councillor's JR, this brought against "both the [SS: Integrity] Commissioner’s findings and the penalty imposed by the Municipality", these under the municipality’s Code of Conduct regarding non-compliance with the municipality's COVID vaccination policy.

Here the court considered the penalty of a 90 day suspension:

5.3.2 Was the penalty reasonable?

[66] I turn then to the applicant’s argument that the penalty recommended by the Commissioner and imposed by Council was unreasonable. At the outset, I note that decisions respecting penalty represent “an exercise of discretion that must be accorded a high degree of deference” in this court: Budarick v. Integrity Commissioner of Brudenell, Lyndoch and Raglan Townships, 2022 ONSC 640, at para. 40.

[67] The applicant submits that the penalty imposed in this case “went far beyond what was necessary.” She submits that the maximum penalty should be reserved for “the most egregious infractions, such as cases of sexual misconduct.” Further, she says that the Commissioner failed to provide satisfactory reasons for his recommendation of the maximum penalty given that it rested on his conclusion – as the applicant puts in her factum – that she “failed to cooperate with the investigation, which he took to be a sign of a lack of remorse.” In this respect, the applicant says that she did not fail to cooperate, she merely did not disclose her vaccination status. She notes that the Commissioner could have issued a summons to have her submit to an interview, but he never did. In any case, so the applicant argues, it is unreasonable to conclude that a failure to cooperate and a lack of remorse could justify the maximum penalty, especially when the refusal to answer the Commissioner’s question was expressive conduct.

[68] The Commissioner’s reasoning for recommending the maximum penalty was as follows:

The Integrity Commissioner recommends that Council suspend the Member’s remuneration for a period of 90 days. The Councillor has shown no respect for the policy and direction of Council and has failed to cooperate with the Integrity Commissioner in this investigation. While the Member’s actions during the investigation were conducted through counsel, the reasons for refusing to cooperate were found to have no basis in law and therefore do not justify the Member’s refusal to answer the question as to her vaccination status.

In the absence of remorse or any indication that the Member acknowledges her actions were improper, the Integrity Commissioner is left with no alternative but to recommend the maximum penalty available in the circumstances.

[69] Contrary to the submission of the applicant, the Commissioner did not rest his conclusion solely on a lack of cooperation. It rested on his dual findings that she had failed to show any respect for the policy and the direction of Council (because “her actions were improper”) and that she had failed to co-operate.

[70] In addition, the Commissioner did not find that the failure to co-operate was “a sign of a lack of remorse”, he simply found that there was no evidence of remorse. Nor was there any indication that the applicant recognised that she had engaged in improper conduct. It bears remembering that the Commissioner’s report was provided to Council in advance of the meeting at which it was to be discussed and where the applicant had a right to be heard. Therefore, it was at that time still possible that the applicant could attend the August 9, 2022, meeting, acknowledge her misconduct and apologize, and thereby express remorse. If she had, that might properly have moved Council to consider her expression of remorse as a mitigating factor that had the effect of necessitating a more lenient penalty than the one proposed by the Commissioner.

[71] Instead, the applicant filed written submissions on August 9, 2022 that alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against the Commissioner, urged that she had conducted herself in a way that showed “good will” and “ensured the safety of everyone,” and argued that she did not deserve the maximum penalty because her misconduct was “not in the same universe” as sexual misconduct.[6]

[72] The applicant’s written submissions show that she and her then counsel certainly understood that her misconduct was about much more than a failure to cooperate with the Commissioner. Instead, her misconduct included her failure to be vaccinated in the context of a worldwide health emergency and her attendance at two Council meetings where she was not vaccinated and thereby put in danger the health of her fellow councillors, staff of the Municipality, and members of the public. She recognized as much when, through her counsel, she submitted to Council that her penalty should be no more than a reprimand because she had “removed herself from contact with members of council, staff and the public during [council] meetings.” This was said to have “showed good will on her behalf and ensured the safety of everyone.”

[73] Notably, the applicant repeats almost none of these submissions on this review. In any case, her argument that she took steps that “ensured the safety of everyone” is difficult to credit when she attended Council meetings in person, apparently unvaccinated, and left only when asked to do so.

[74] I accept the applicant’s submission that she was entitled to make legal arguments in the context of the investigation into her conduct, even if (as the Commissioner concluded) those arguments were legally and/or factually baseless. However, as I have already said, the Commissioner’s reference to a lack of remorse or insight on the part of the applicant was merely a reference to the absence of evidence of a mitigating factor respecting penalty. The basis for his conclusion that the maximum penalty was appropriate was that the applicant’s non-compliance with the policy showed that she had no respect for it or for Council, and that her failure to answer his question respecting her vaccination status – her failure to cooperate – undermined the efficacy of the policy. In my view, these conclusions were supportable on the evidence and betray no improper reasoning.

[75] Last, I reject the applicant’s submission that the maximum penalty was inappropriate on its face in this case. A 90-day suspension is not reserved for cases of sexual misconduct and has been imposed in a variety of circumstances. To cite just one example, this court recently upheld a 90-day suspension in a case involving objectionable public statements: Robinson v. Pickering, 2026 ONSC 451. Here, where (by her own acknowledgement) the applicant engaged in conduct which might have been dangerous to the health of others, where the applicant was reasonably found to have no respect for either the policy or Council and to have failed to cooperate with the investigation, and where there was no evidence of mitigating circumstances, it cannot be said that the penalty recommended by the Commissioner and adopted by Council was unreasonable.

. Shahnematollah-Yazde v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002

In Shahnematollah-Yazde v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002 (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court partially allowed an LAT MVDA salesperson and dealer registration appeal, this where the "Tribunal directed that the Registrar attach conditions to those registrations: an eight-month suspension and a remedial-course requirement for Hussein, and a two-year prohibition on lien registration and on out-of-province vehicle registration for Premium".

Here the court comments on - but does firmly decide - whether it was appropriate for the Tribunal to "have regard to the effect of revocation on Premium's employees" while determining disciplinary sanctions:

[30] I do not accept the Registrar's submission that it was an error of law for the Tribunal to have regard to the effect of revocation on Premium's employees. The Tribunal was engaged in an evaluative exercise — weighing whether the public interest required outright disentitlement or could be protected through conditions — and the practical consequences of the available sanctions for third parties were a relevant, if not determinative, consideration in that exercise. I do not read the authorities the Registrar relies on as establishing a rule that such considerations may never be weighed; nor need this be decided definitively, since the point does not affect the disposition I would reach in any event.

. Shahnematollah-Yazde v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002

In Shahnematollah-Yazde v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002 (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court partially allowed an LAT MVDA salesperson and dealer registration appeal, this where the "Tribunal directed that the Registrar attach conditions to those registrations: an eight-month suspension and a remedial-course requirement for Hussein, and a two-year prohibition on lien registration and on out-of-province vehicle registration for Premium".

Here the court considers the inadequacy (almost, lack of 'justification') of reasons for a professional discipline penalty ruling:

(c) Penalty

[23] I agree with the appellants that the Decision does not adequately explain the sanctions imposed. Paragraphs 100 to 109 of the Decision address, in general terms, why conditions rather than revocation would adequately protect the public interest, but nowhere in the Decision does it explain why an eight-month suspension of Hussein's registration, as opposed to some shorter or longer period, follows from the misconduct found, nor why Premium should be barred for two years, across the whole of Canada, from registering any lien on any vehicle, when there is no finding that Premium filed, or was complicit in filing, a false lien. The lien at issue was filed in connection with the truck in which the Tribunal itself found the appellants held a legitimate financial interest; the Decision contains no finding that the lien itself, as opposed to the registration of ownership underlying it, was unlawful. Reasons of this generality do not permit meaningful appellate scrutiny of whether the specific sanctions chosen were a proportionate response to the specific misconduct found.

. Guiste v. Law Society of Ontario

In Guiste v. Law Society of Ontario (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, this brought against several professional misconduct findings where: "a panel of the Hearing Division of the Law Society Tribunal found that the allegations were proven.[1] The Hearing Panel imposed a three-month suspension, and ordered that Mr. Guiste pay costs of $225,000 to the Law Society.[2] Mr. Guiste’s appeal to the Appeal Division of the Tribunal was dismissed."

Here the court considers anti-black racism and causation in assessing professional discipline penalties:

[142] In Morris, at paras. 96-97, the court made it clear in the sentencing context that a causal connection does not need to be established before experiences of anti-Black racism can be considered as mitigating personal responsibility, but held that there had to be “some connection between the overt and systemic racism …and the circumstances or events that are said to explain or mitigate the criminal conduct in issue.” This approach has been adopted in the context of Law Society penalty cases: Law Society of Ontario v. Barnwell, 2024 ONLSTA 15, at paras. 117-119, aff’d 2025 ONSC 1825 (Div. Ct.).

[143] In my view, nothing in the Hearing Panel’s reasons show a failure to adhere to the applicable legal principles. I agree with the Appeal Panel’s conclusion, at para. 126, that “[t]he hearing panel’s analysis represents a nuanced approach towards the ‘connection’ component of the test and did not improperly insist on a direct causal link before systemic racism could be found to be mitigating.”

. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act v. 2631273 Ontario Inc.

In Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act v. 2631273 Ontario Inc. (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed an MVDA Registrar's appeal, here brought against a decision "in which the LAT decided not to revoke the registration of the Respondents under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002".

The court considers the SOR (deference) for professional disciplinary penalties, here in this MVDA context:

[4] Significant deference is owed in this court to a discretionary decision on remedy. Generally, this court will interfere with such a decision only if the remedy reflects an error in law, an error in principle, or if the penalty is “clearly unfit” (Cabot v. College of Nurses, 2023 ONSC 2977, para. 23 (Div. Ct.); Gould v. College of Teachers, 2026 ONSC 1095, para. 7 (Div. Ct.); Budarick v. Brudenell, Lyndoch and Raglan (Townships) (Integrity Commissioner), 2022 ONSC 640, para. 40 (Div. Ct.)). A penalty will be clearly unfit where the decision does not fall within “a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420, para. 38, citing Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, para. 47. As stated by Penny J. in 1855456 Ontario Inc. v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2021 ONSC 2905, paras. 12-13 (Div. Ct.):

On the question of penalty, it is well established that in order to overturn a penalty imposed by a regulatory tribunal, it must be shown that the decision-maker made an error in principle or that the penalty was “clearly unfit”: Mitelman v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2020 ONSC 3039 at para. 18.

Courts in the criminal context have used a variety of expressions to describe a sentence that reaches this threshold, including “demonstrably unfit”, “clearly unreasonable”, “clearly or manifestly excessive”, “clearly excessive or inadequate” or representing a “substantial and marked departure” from penalties in similar cases. This high threshold applies equally in the administrative law context. To be clearly unfit, the penalty must be disproportionate or fall outside the range of penalties for similar offences in similar circumstances. A fit penalty is guided by an assessment of the facts of the particular case and the penalties imposed in other cases involving similar infractions and circumstances, College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420 at para. 56.

. Bacchus v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario

In Bacchus v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an RHPA appeal, this brought against "the decision of a Committee of the Discipline Committee of the Royal College of Dental Surgeons" finding that the appellant "committed professional misconduct (the “Merits Decisions”), and the Committee decision ... revoking Dr Bacchus’ license and ordering him to pay costs of $451,461.61 (among other orders) (the “Penalty Decision”).".

Here the court considers the appellate SOR applicable to professional sanctions issue:

[5] With respect to appeals from a sanction imposed by a regulated professions tribunal, the court will interfere with a tribunal’s penalty decision only if the penalty reflects an error in law, an error in principle, or if the penalty is “clearly unfit”: Cabot v College of Nurses of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2977 (Div. Ct.), para. 23, citing Budarick v. the Corporation of the Townships of Brudenell, Lyndoch and Raglan (Integrity Commissioner), 2022 ONSC 640 (Div. Ct.), para. 40. A penalty will be “clearly unfit” where it does not fall within “a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420, para. 38, citing Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47.

. Okafor v. Ontario College of Teachers

In Okafor v. Ontario College of Teachers (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a teacher's appeal [under s.35(1) of the Ontario College of Teachers Act], here brought against "the decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers .... which found her guilty of professional misconduct ..." and from "the Discipline Committee’s penalty decision ... that ordered ... a five-month suspension, and costs in the amount of $60,000.00".

Here the court considers professional penalties as a disciplinary matter:

[90] A fit penalty is guided by an assessment of the facts of the particular case and the penalties imposed in other cases involving similar infractions and circumstances. To overturn a penalty imposed by a regulatory tribunal, it must be shown that the decision-maker made an error in principle or that the penalty was “clearly unfit” meaning that the penalty is disproportionate or falls outside the range of penalties for similar offences in similar circumstances: Dr. John Mitelman v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2020 ONSC 3039, at paras. 18, 34, and 41.

. Moore v. College of Chiropractors

In Moore v. College of Chiropractors (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed most of an appeal (but for costs), this brought against a "decision rendered by a panel of the Discipline Committee of the College of Chiropractors of Ontario".

Here the court considers a professional discipline penalty phase:

[123] Deference is owed to a penalty decision of an administrative tribunal. To be overturned by a reviewing court, the Discipline Committee must have made an error in principle, or the penalty must be "clearly unfit". Regarding the latter, in College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420, 143 O.R. (3d) 596, at para. 57, after referring to the Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation of the very high threshold for appellate review of criminal sentences in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 52, the Ontario Court of Appeal said the following:

A similarly high threshold applies in the administrative context. To be clearly unfit, the penalty must fall outside of the range of reasonableness. A reasonable penalty will be "guided by proportionality and an assessment of the range of appropriate penalties dependent upon the facts of each case [and] guided by penalties imposed in other cases."

[124] Citing Vavilov, at para. 33, this court in Ontario College of Pharmacists v. Mourid, 2023 ONSC 1221 (Div. Ct.), at para. 34, observed that the “legislature gave the Discipline Committee the task of determining penalty and respect for legislative intent is the ‘polar star of judicial review’."

. Moore v. College of Chiropractors

In Moore v. College of Chiropractors (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed most of an appeal (but for costs), this brought against a "decision rendered by a panel of the Discipline Committee of the College of Chiropractors of Ontario".

Here the court considered to SOR for a professional penalty appeal:

[49] With respect to the appeal from penalty, the appellant must show that the Panel made an error in principle or that the penalty was clearly unfit. To be clearly unfit, the penalty must be disproportionate or fall outside the range of penalties for similar offences in similar circumstances: Gill v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 49 (Div. Ct.), at para. 82.

. Dhaliwal v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario

In Dhaliwal v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed appeals from "decisions of the Discipline Committee (the “DC”) of the College of Veterinarians of Ontario (the “College”) involving three separate complaints. On each complaint, the DC held that Dr. Dhaliwal had engaged in professional misconduct and sanctions were imposed upon him".

Here the court considers the law of penalties for professional discipline:

The Law on Penalty

[100] A determination of penalty is “at the heart of the discretion of an administrative tribunal and a penalty decision is owed great deference”: Reid, at para. 98; Mitelman v College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2020 ONSC 6171, at para. 34.

[101] Deference is owed also because these tribunals are composed of members of the profession and of the public with the expertise to assess “the level of threat to the public and ... the ... profession posed by certain forms of behaviour”: CPSO v Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420, at para. 73.

[102] In addition, the tribunal has the benefit of hearing from the witnesses, which gives it a “more comprehensive understanding of the evidence” and because determining the proper penalty “is a question of mixed fact and law, which does not lend itself to the extrication of a pure question of law”: Peirovy, at para 75.

[103] To succeed in his assertion that the penalty imposed was “clearly unfit”, Dr. Dhaliwal must establish that the penalty was disproportionate or fell outside the range of penalties imposed “for similar offences in similar circumstances”: Dr. Jonathan Mitelman v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2020 ONSC 3039 (“Jonathan Mitelman”), at para. 18.

. Van Arem v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario

In Van Arem v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario (Ont Divisional Ct, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against veterinarian misconduct penalty assessments:

B. Dr. Van Arem’s penalty appeal

[11] Dr. Van Arem has a statutory right to appeal the penalty decision of the Discipline Committee on any question of law, question of fact or question of mixed fact and law: Veterinarians Act, s. 35(1)(a). As a result, the appellate standards of review apply: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 653, at para. 37.

[12] The burden is on Dr. Van Arem to establish that the Discipline Committee made an error in principle or that the penalty was “clearly unfit.” A regulatory penalty will not be “clearly unfit” unless it is disproportionate or falls outside the range of penalties for similar offences in similar circumstances: Mitelman v. v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2020 ONSC 3039 (Div. Ct.), at para. 18; College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420, 143 O.R. (3d) 596, at para. 56.

[13] Dr. Van Arem argues the one-month suspension was disproportionate and outside the range of penalties imposed in other comparable cases. We disagree.

[14] Counsel for Dr. Van Arem relied on two cases to support his position that a suspension is outside the range: Fletcher v. Flanigan, 2023 CanLII 47343 (ON HPARB) and Betts v. Mogavero, 2023 CanLII 2519 (ON HPARB). Both cases involved issues related to inadequate record keeping and both were resolved without a suspension. However, those cases are distinguishable from this case. Neither involved a contested disciplinary hearing. Both were resolved at the investigative stage by the Complaints Committee of the College before the matters were referred for a discipline hearing. In Fletcher, Dr. Flanigan undertook to complete various remedial programs and the Complaints Committee accepted her undertaking. In Betts, the Complaints Committee decided to provide advice to Dr. Mogavero about his professional obligations but did not refer the matter to a discipline hearing.

[15] The fact that other cases involving allegations of inadequate record keeping have been resolved without a suspension does not support a finding that imposing a short suspension after a contested hearing is outside the range. At most, Fletcher and Betts stand for the proposition that, in some cases, a resolution without a suspension may be appropriate.

[16] The Discipline Committee had the jurisdiction to suspend a member’s licence and we are satisfied that that a suspension was within the appropriate range: Veterinarians Act, s. 30(5)(c). The College relied on several cases involving allegations of inadequate record keeping where suspensions were imposed. Some cases were from the Discipline Committee of the College of Veterinarians: College of Veterinarians of Ontario v. Verijlenberg (October 11, 2017, unreported), College of Veterinarians of Ontario v. Kim (July 6, 2017, unreported). Others were from the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons: Ontario (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario) v. Baranick, 2017 ONCPSD 35 and Ontario (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario) v. Zadra, 2017 ONCPSD 24. Some of the cases only involved findings related to inadequate record keeping, which resulted in short suspensions. Other cases involved more serious allegations of misconduct beyond the inadequate record keeping, which resulted in longer suspensions. Taken as a whole, the cases relied on by the College demonstrate that a suspension is within the range of penalties imposed in other comparable cases.

[17] We are also satisfied that a suspension is a fit penalty given the Discipline Committee’s findings in relation to the aggravating and mitigating factors in Dr. Van Arem’s case.

[18] The Discipline Committee made findings that Dr. Van Arem’s misconduct was serious. The Discipline Committee found that Dr. Van Arem’s medical records were “woefully deficient.”

[19] The Discipline Committee considered the fact that Dr. Van Arem admitted that he engaged in professional misconduct. He did not, however, admit the facts underlying the allegation of misconduct. And the Discipline Committee found that Dr. Van Arem did not grasp the signifance of his misconduct.The Committee was “deeply troubled” by Dr. Van Arem’s testimony. The Committee found that Dr. Van Arem tried to minimize the seriousness of his misconduct and tried to deflect blame for the deficiencies in his records. For example, the Committee rejected Dr. Van Arem’s argument that rules related to record keeping are less important and more difficult to follow in a busy equine practice at a racetrack. The Committee noted that the failure to keep proper records in any setting “puts the animals at risk and makes it significantly more challengeing to justify a treatment or procedure after the fact.” Those findings were open to the Committee to make.

[20] The Discipline Committee also rejected Dr. Van Arem’s evidence that his records were deficient because of problems with the record-keeping software. The Discipline Committee found that Dr. Van Arem’s records were missing key information that was required “to ensure continuity of care and the utmost safety for the horses.”

[21] In the end, the Discipline Committee found that “it was appropriate to impose a sanction that would make clear to the Members that their conduct was not appropriate, it should not be minimized, and that it could have had negative consequences for the animals in their care.”

[22] The Discipline Committee concluded that a brief suspension (coupled with the other remedial terms) was necessary to deter Dr. Van Arem and other members of the College from engaging in similar misconduct in the future. That finding was open to the Discipline Committee and the penalty imposed was fit.

. Covant v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario

In Covant v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered (with leave) a further appeal from a s.35 Veterinarians Act Divisional Court appeal, which was in turn an appeal from a College of Veterinarians of Ontario (CVO) Discipline Committee's order that the appellant had "engaged in professional misconduct by re-selling large quantities of veterinary drugs to human pharmacies, contrary to a newly amended regulation".

Here, the court reviewed the standard of review for professional disciplinary penalties:

[26] The standard of review for the penalty imposed by the Committee is that of being clearly unreasonable, demonstrably unfit, or representing a substantial and marked departure: see College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420, 143 O.R. (3d) 596, at paras. 56-57; Mitelman v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2020 ONSC 6171 (Div. Ct.), at para. 41.