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Reasons - None Given. Sloat v. Grand Erie District School Board
In Sloat v. Grand Erie District School Board (Div Court, 2024) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a JR initiated by a school trustee, here against "four decisions [SS: of the school board] that determined that she breached the respondent’s Trustee Code of Conduct (“the Code”)".
Here the court considers the adequacy of the reasons for the school board's administrative decisions:The Board’s Decisions Are Not Reasonable
[72] In each of the Four Decisions, the only reasons the applicant was provided with gave the applicant notice of the sections of the Code she was found to have breached and the sanctions imposed. The applicant submits that there is no way to know which allegations led to the result. The applicant submits that the failure to provide sufficient reasons results in a breach of the duty of procedural fairness and makes the Decisions unreasonable.
[73] The court in Ramsay, supra in the case of a school trustee accepted that the school board’s reasons which provided the applicant with written notice of the result and the sanctions imposed were sufficient and there is no duty to give formal reasons.[2] The Supreme Court has held that there is no duty to give formal reasons in a context where the decision was made by elected representatives pursuant to a democratic process. It submits that a school board’s reasoning may be deduced from the debate, deliberations and the statements of policy (see: Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293; Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5). The Education Act does not require the provision of reasons in writing for a decision. The only statutory requirement it imposes is to provide written notice of the result and applicable sanctions. This was done.
[74] In a situation where no reasons have been provided, and the record does not shed light on the basis for the decision, however, the reviewing court must still examine the decision in light of the relevant constraints on the decision maker in order to determine whether the decision is reasonable. Without reasons, the analysis will then focus on the outcome rather than on the decision maker’s reasoning process. This does not mean that reasonableness review is less robust in such circumstances, only that it takes a different shape.[3]
[75] A reviewing court must develop an understanding of the decision maker’s reasoning process in order to determine whether the decision as a whole is reasonable. To make this determination, the reviewing court asks whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency, and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision.[4]
[76] A decision will also be unreasonable where the conclusion reached cannot follow from the analysis undertaken or if the reasons read in conjunction with the record do not make it possible to understand the decision maker’s reasoning on a critical point.[5] . PUC Services Inc. v. Power Workers’ Union
In PUC Services Inc. v. Power Workers’ Union (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismissed a labour JR brought by the employer, here respecting a one-day suspension from employment of a union representative for "unprofessional and disrespectful conduct".
Here the court considers an administrative adjournment decision, and whether reasons should be given for it:[34] I am not satisfied the Arbitrator’s decision to deny the adjournment request was unfair. The Arbitrator had the authority to deny an adjournment. Labour arbitrators are experts and are sensitive to the dynamics at play in labour relations disputes: Toronto (City) Board of Education v. OSSTF, District 15, 1997 CanLII 378 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487, at para. 35. It is not realistic to require labour arbitrators, in the context of a collective agreement that contemplates multiple hearings a day, to give reasons for routine procedural decisions. While the Arbitrator denied PUC an adjournment, he allowed PUC to adduce the reply evidence it had available. . Kaplan-Myrth v. Ottawa Carlton District School Board
In Kaplan-Myrth v. Ottawa Carlton District School Board (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismissed a school board trustee's JR against a school board.
Here the court cites a tribunal (from a separate case) to the effect that there is no duty to give 'reasons for decision' on a JR where a political body is involved, and that the reasons may be inferred from the tribunal record:[62] The issue of sufficiency of reasons was addressed in Ramsay, starting at paragraph 54, as follows:54 The WRDSB argues that the reasons provided were sufficient. The Supreme Court has held that there is no duty to give formal reasons in a context where the decision was made by elected representatives pursuant to a democratic process. It submits that a school board's reasoning may be deduced from the debate, deliberations and the statements of policy (see: Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293; Catalyst Paper Corp v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R.5) The Act does not require the provision of reasons in writing for a decision. The only statutory requirement it imposes is to provide written notice of the result and applicable sanctions. This was done.
55 The context within which the decision was made was an administrative one, where the WRDSB was enforcing its Code of Conduct as part of the discretion granted to it by statute to manage its own affairs. The trustees had ample opportunity to review and consider the factual findings contained in the Integrity Commissioner's report, as well as the submissions made by Ramsay. They were well positioned to balance statutory and policy objectives in coming to a decision. The notice of the decision references the findings of the Integrity Commissioner's report which implicitly accepts the findings of fact made by the Integrity Commissioner. [63] The same facts are present in this case. As set out above, the Board had the IC report, as well as the Applicant’s lengthy submissions in advance of the meetings. On December 19, 2023, the Board held a meeting in which the findings and recommendations were debated and voted on. On January 16, 2023, a special meeting was held during which the Applicant’s appeal was debated and voted on.
[64] At paragraph 84 of Vavilov the SCC emphasizes that “the particular context of a decision constrains what will be reasonable for an administrative decision maker to decide in a given case. This is what it means to say that "[r]easonableness is a single standard that takes its colour from the context”.
[65] At paragraph 94, the Court carried on to state that:The reviewing court must also read the decision maker's reasons in light of the history and context of the proceedings in which they were rendered. For example, the reviewing court might consider the evidence before the decision maker, the submissions of the parties, publicly available policies or guidelines that informed the decision maker's work, and past decisions of the relevant administrative body. This may explain an aspect of the decision maker's reasoning process that is not apparent from the reasons themselves, or may reveal that an apparent shortcoming in the reasons is not, in fact, a failure of justification, intelligibility or transparency. Opposing parties may have made concessions that had obviated the need for the decision maker to adjudicate on a particular issue; the decision maker may have followed a well-established line of administrative case law that no party had challenged during the proceedings; or an individual decision maker may have adopted an interpretation set out in a public interpretive policy of the administrative body of which he or she is a member. [66] Considering the context in which the decisions were made and the content of the IC report and the Applicant’s submissions, I find that the decision is reasonable, and the reasons are adequate. . Mann-Bentley v. North Kent Mutual Insurance Co.
In Mann-Bentley v. North Kent Mutual Insurance Co. (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismisses a JR by the insured against an Insurance Act (IA) s.128 umpire appraisal award, here regarding a fire claim.
Here the court considered the JR approach where few or no 'reasons for decision' are provided, here by the s.128 umpire:[14] In Laporte (Div. Ct.), at para. 28, D. Edwards J. cited the Supreme Court’s guidance on how to approach on appeal where no reasons are required or given:There will nonetheless be situations in which no reasons have been provided and neither the record nor the larger context sheds light on the basis for the decision. In such a case, the reviewing court must still examine the decision in light of the relevant constraints on the decision maker in order to determine whether the decision is reasonable. But it is perhaps inevitable that without reasons, the analysis will then focus on the outcome rather than on the decision maker’s reasoning process. This does not mean that reasonableness review is less robust in such circumstances, only that it takes a different shape: Vavilov, at para. 138. [15] Accordingly, appraisal awards should generally be afforded significant deference.
THE APPRAISAL AWARD
[16] The umpire’s award is very short. He clearly preferred the insurer’s appraiser’s opinion on the size of the cottage but did not provide any reasons stating why.
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PRELIMINARY EVIDENTIARY ISSUE
[20] Where an umpire does not give reasons, it is appropriate to re-create the record of what was before the umpire, as the parties did here. The applicant, however, argued that the Court should ignore appraiser Valeriote’s 10 April 2024 affidavit. Alternately, she argues that we should ignore paragraphs 6-13, 15-22, and 25-31 of that affidavit. She gives two bases for this submission: 1) it was late filed, and 2) it contains evidence that is not properly before the Court, namely, information Mr. Valeriote received from others, but which Mr. Valeriote does not say he believes is true. Further, that evidence is not on non-controversial matters and violates r. 39.01(5).
[21] We accept the 10 April Affidavit as it contains necessary information such as emails and Mr. Valeriote’s memory, which clarifies evidence arising out of the affidavits filed before 10 April, and to understand what transpired at the appraisal hearing. The applicant does not argue that this information in it is not true nor did she seek an adjournment to consider and respond to it. To exclude that affidavit in its entirety would allow form to triumph over substance.
[22] We accept the applicant’s position, however, that those portions of the 10 April affidavit which are on information and belief are improper as those portions of the affidavit do not deal with non-controversial matters. We have ignored them. Even had we excluded the affidavit in its entirety, the outcome of this application would have remained the same. . Mammarella v. Ontario College of Teachers
In Mammarella v. Ontario College of Teachers (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered a JR of a tribunal 'rule change' (not of a specific case decision), here of the 'Rules of Procedure of the Discipline and Fitness to Practise Committee' of the Ontario College of Teachers relating to third party evidence disclosure.
Here the court addresses an 'inadequate reasons' JR argument against the Rule change:[11] ... The applicant relies on the absence of reasons for the Committees’ decision to change the rule. The applicant further challenges the memorandum put forward to the Committees in support of the then proposed change.
[12] As noted in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 136, formal reasons are not necessarily required. The applicant has not shown that they were required in this instance. Where formal reasons have not been provided, the reviewing court looks at the record as a whole to understand the decision: Vavilov, at para. 137. The memorandum put forward in support of the proposed change is relevant context. It noted that the prior rules were sparse, that the R. v. O’Connor test had been applied, discussed the test in R. v. Mills, noted that it was intended to counter improper stereotypes about sexual assault victims, and noted that the Regulated Health Professions Act had already codified the R. v. Mills regime and other regulators had also done so. . Freeman’s Service Centre Ltd. v. Modern Auto Parts Limited
In Freeman’s Service Centre Ltd. v. Modern Auto Parts Limited (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal dismissed an inadequate 'reasons for decision' appeal, even though the motion judge (in an unopposed motion) issued no reasons at all (apparently not even oral reasons):[4] The Cedarholme Defendants seek to set aside the Order primarily on the basis that the motion judge failed to give any reasons for his decision. While the motion judge did not give any reasons for the Order made on an unopposed basket motion, the record clearly discloses the basis upon which it was made: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 37 and 46; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, 459 D.L.R. (4th) 375, at paras. 70-71.
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[6] In our view, the record clearly discloses the reason why Broad J. struck out the Cedarholme Defendants’ pleading: notwithstanding the multiple opportunities they were given to answer undertakings, they failed to file any materials in response to Freeman’s motion to strike and failed to provide answers to the remaining undertakings. The Cedarholme Defendants were treated fairly during this process but failed to avail themselves of the opportunities given to them by the court to satisfy their undertaking obligations and to respond to Freeman’s motion. Striking out the Cedarholme Defendants’ pleading for their default was a remedy available to the motion judge in the circumstances.
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