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Reasons - When a Duty?. Sharif v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
In Sharif v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a deportation-related appeal, here brought against the dismissal of a JR, that in turn challenging the Minister's [of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness] refusal to grant a UNHCR's request that "asked Canada to hold Mr. Sharif’s removal in abeyance while his communication [SS: regarding an complaint] to the UNHRC was under consideration".
Here the court considers whether the Minister's decision, made without formal 'reasons for decision', was 'reasonable' (the latter use in the JR SOR meaning of the term) - this starting out with a Baker 'fairness' analysis:a. The Reasonableness Standard
[103] The more important a decision is to the lives of those it affects, the more stringent the procedural protections will be to ensure that the consequences of a decision are justified in light of the facts and law: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 135.
[104] The standard of review is reasonableness: Vavilov, at para. 16. The purpose of reasonableness review is to uphold “the rule of law, while according deference to the statutory delegate’s decision”: Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 900, at para. 29.
[105] Where reasons are not provided, a reviewing court must look to the record, from which the court will often uncover a clear rationale for the decision: Baker, at para. 44. Where no reasons have been provided and neither the record nor the larger context sheds light on the basis for the decision, the reviewing court must examine the constraints on the decision maker to determine whether the decision is reasonable. The analysis will focus more on the outcome than the reasoning process: Vavilov, at paras. 137-38.
[106] The burden is on Mr. Sharif to establish that the decision was unreasonable. Reasonableness is “a robust form of review” which depends on sensitivity to legal and factual constraints and requires an appreciation for institutional context and background: Vavilov, at paras. 13, 99-100.
b. Whether Reasons were Required
[107] Mr. Sharif submits that the principle of responsive justification required the Minister to explain and justify the decision given its particularly harsh consequences to him.
[108] The Minister submits that there is no right to reasons in this context and that, as a matter of custom, reasons are not provided for IMRs. Moreover, the Minister argues that the principle of responsive justification does not apply, as the decision was issued in response to a request from the UNHRC. Article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol requires Canada to respond to the UNHRC, and not to Mr. Sharif.
[109] The application judge accepted the Minister’s position that Mr. Sharif was not entitled to the Minister’s reasons for deciding not to accede to the IMR:This is because Canada’s obligations under the Protocol and international law are not owed to Mr. Sharif personally because Parliament has not incorporated into domestic legislation either the Covenant or the Protocol. Mr. Sharif’s assertion of an enforceable right with obligations stemming from international instruments, in the Minister’s submission, “usurps parliamentary sovereignty as Parliament has never incorporated these into domestic legislation”.
In the Court’s view, the Minister’s position that reasons are not required for the decision to not accede to the UN Committee’s IMR request in this case, is consistent with and supported by the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ahani. As noted above, Laskin J.A., observed that by signing the Optional Protocol Canada reserved the right to reject the UN Committee’s views and “reserved the right to enforce its own laws before the Committee gave its views”. The Court ruled an IMR request is not binding on Canada, is not a part of domestic law and Canada is free not to accede to an Interim Measures Request.
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The existence of a Crown prerogative arising from the Minister’s interaction with an international body such as the UN Commission, combined with an absence of domestic statutory constraints, make it reasonable for the Minister to adopt a practice of not providing reasons for either acceding or not acceding to an Interim Measures Request from the UN Committee. [110] While reasons are generally required when a decision has a significant impact on a party, I agree with the application judge that the Minister was not required to provide reasons for his decision. My reasons are as follows.
[111] First, Mr. Sharif was not a party to this request. The request was made by an international organization to Canada and Canada’s response was to the international organization. Cases in which written reasons tend to be required include those in which the decision-making process gives the parties participatory rights: Vavilov, at para. 77. Rule 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee indicates that the Committee is to consider the submissions of the state party and the complainant and communicate its views to the individual and the state party concerned. However, there is nothing in the ICCPR, the Optional Protocol, or r. 94 of the UNHRC’s Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee that requires the state party to give reasons for refusing to accede to an IMR.
[112] Second, in any case, there is no statutory right to reasons because IMRs issued by the UNHRC are not binding in Canadian law. Although the Optional Protocol has been ratified, Parliament has not incorporated the Optional Protocol into domestic legislation such that it does not have domestic effect absent a Charter claim. Canada therefore remains free to decline such requests from an interested third party, such as Mr. Sharif, without providing explanations to the individual concerned.
[113] Third, the common law duty of procedural fairness does not require reasons, and the Minister advises that its custom is not to provide reasons for declining an IMR request. Consequently, there is no legitimate expectation that reasons will be provided: Baker, at para. 26.
[114] For these reasons, while the issue is understandably of great concern to Mr. Sharif, I see no error in the application judge’s determination that reasons were not required.
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iii. Analysis of the Issue of Reasonableness
[125] Where no reasons are given, the reasonableness of the decision must be determined from the record before the court using the surrounding documents and circumstances including any admissible information the applicant for judicial review has been able to obtain: Vavilov, at paras. 137-38; and Portnov v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 171, [2021] 4 F.C.R. 501, at para. 54. . Jennings-Clyde (Vivatas, Inc.) v. Canada (Attorney General) [decisions/notice]
In Jennings-Clyde (Vivatas, Inc.) v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, this brought against a dismissed Federal Court JR, this in turn brought against "the refusal of the Canada Revenue Agency to let the appellant file tax returns late: see subsection 220(3) [SS: 'Administration and Enforcement - Extensions for returns'] of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (the provision allowing for the exercise of discretion to allow late filings) and subsection 164(1) of the Act [SS: 'Refunds'] (the provision requiring the appellant to file its return within three years of the end of the relevant taxation year to get a refund)."
Here the court (Stratas JA) comments on a general administrative duty to provide reasons for decision:[3] As a general principle, we do not allow an administrative decision-maker like the Agency to decide a matter affecting someone’s rights or practical interests unless it gives an adequate explanation for its decision, or the explanation is otherwise evident or discernable. See, generally, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653.
[4] This is no small thing. Through their decisions, administrative decision-makers like the Agency have the power to affect people’s lives, sometimes significantly. In our democratic governance, there is a quid pro quo for that: public administrative decision-makers must explain their decisions. "“""L’État, c’est moi”" and "“trust us, we got it right”" have no place in public administrative decision-making: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tennant, 2018 FCA 132 at para. 23.
[5] And there are good practical reasons why we insist on seeing adequate explanations for administrative decisions:Adequate explanations lead often to more thinking, better thinking, and, thus, better decision-making. This is because administrative decision-makers, while they write up adequate explanations for their decisions, often discover gaps or flaws in their reasoning or the need for more submissions.
Adequate explanations tell affected persons that the administrative decision-maker took on board their key arguments and rejected them for certain reasons: this vindicates the interests served by procedural fairness.
Adequate explanations further the transparency, legitimacy and accountability of administrative decision-makers to the parties before them, other regulatees, reviewing courts, and the wider public—something needed more than ever in these days of widespread skepticism, cynicism, and mistrust of government. (See generally Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2025 FCA 184 at para. 46 and cases cited therein.) . Lovell v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry)
In Lovell v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry) (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court, in a judicial review, considered the absense of reasons for the issuance of a work MNRF permit, not as an aspect of SOR reasonableness but as an administrative 'fairness' issue (here the court considers it as a Baker issue):1. The nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it
[79] This was a building permit application. It was not heard by an adjudicative body. No formal reasons were required. While the Applicants fault MNRF for the failure to provide reasons for granting a permit application, such reasons were not necessary in the circumstances. The issue of whether reasons should have been granted speaks to both reasonableness and procedural fairness. In Vavilov, at para. 77, the majority of the Supreme Court stated:
It is well established that, as a matter of procedural fairness, reasons are not required for all administrative decisions. The duty of procedural fairness in administrative law is "eminently variable", inherently flexible and context-specific…
[80] Further, and to repeat, at para. 136 of Vavilov, where the Applicants cited Lafontaine, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada stated:In many cases, however, neither the duty of procedural fairness nor the statutory scheme will require that formal reasons be given at all... . Morrison v. Canada
In Morrison v. Canada (Fed CA, 2021) the Federal Court of Appeal made the following comment on their duty to issue reasons for decision:[16] Again, I disagree. It is well-settled law that a judge has no general duty to provide reasons for decision "“when the finding is otherwise supportable on the evidence or where the basis of the finding is apparent from the circumstances”" (R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para. 4, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, citing R. v. Barrett, 1995 CanLII 129 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 752 at p. 753, 21 O.R. (3d) 736). Given the state of the evidentiary record before the Tax Court, the basis of the Court’s decision is plain and obvious. . R v Sliwka
In the criminal case of R v Sliwka (Ont CA, 2017) the Court of Appeal sets out the purpose of Reasons for Judgment in trials:[24] Trial judges must give reasons for their verdicts. Reasons that explain to the parties and the public the result arrived at by the trial judge are crucial to maintaining the proper level of transparency and accountability essential to the maintenance of the integrity of the trial process and public confidence in that process. Reasons for judgment allow the parties to know that their claims have been heard, understood and adjudicated upon in an objective and reasonable fashion that accords with the applicable legal principles: see R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 15, 22, 24.
[25] On an appeal based on the trial judge’s failure to give reasons, the appellate court measures the adequacy of the reasons against the requirement that the reasons permit meaningful appellate review of the trial decision. If the reasons serve that function, any shortcomings from a due administration of justice perspective, do not justify appellate intervention. However, reasons that frustrate meaningful appellate review constitute an error in law. That error requires the quashing of the verdict unless the trial record as a whole permits effective appellate review of the verdict: see Sheppard, at paras. 25-33, 46. . R. v. Aiken
In R. v. Aiken (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal sets out principles applicable to the issue of inadequate reasons for judgment in a criminal case:[40] Trial judges are duty-bound to provide adequate reasons for their judgments: R. v. Walker, 2008 SCC 34, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245, at para. 19. The failure to do so can constitute an error of law: R. v. Trachy, 2019 ONCA 622, 379 C.C.C. (3d) 51, at para. 68, leave to appeal discontinued, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 277.
[41] Reasons for judgment allow for a “proper level of transparency and accountability [that is] essential to the maintenance of the integrity of the trial process and public confidence in that process”: R. v. Sliwka, 2017 ONCA 426, 138 O.R. (3d) 473, at para. 24. Without proper reasons, the parties are left wondering whether their claims have been heard, understood, and adjudicated upon in accordance with the legal principles applicable in the circumstances of the case: Sliwka, at para. 24; R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 15, 24.
[42] To be sure, reasons for judgment do not need to be perfect. This ground of appeal does not provide an appellate court with the opportunity to intervene “simply because it thinks the trial court did a poor job of expressing itself”: Sheppard, at para. 26. At the same time, the reasons for judgment must provide the parties and appellate courts with an opportunity for meaningful appellate review: Sheppard, at paras. 25, 55; R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 25.
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