Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Representation - Paralegal and Lay Representatives - POA

. R. v. Van Ravenswaay

In R. v. Van Ravenswaay (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal considered representation at a POA offences appeal by a non-lawyer/non-paralegal:

[6] We do not accept that the application judge and the appeal judge applied the wrong test. The application judge correctly framed his review of the appeal judge’s reasons for disallowing Mr. McHale to act as the appellant’s agent by reference to the governing principles articulated by this court in R. v. Romanowicz (1999), 1999 CanLII 1315 (ON CA), 178 D.L.R. (4th) 466 (Ont. C.A.), as interpreted and applied in R. v. Allahyar, 2017 ONCA 345, 348 C.C.C. (3d) 206.

[7] Romanowicz involved the competence of unlicensed paralegals to represent accused persons in summary conviction matters and was decided prior to the licensing of paralegals by the Law Society of Ontario. The court reiterated an accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and to competent representation by legally trained counsel, and recognized that accused persons have the right to choose their mode of representation as part of their constitutional right to control their own defence, namely, whether to be represented by a lawyer, an agent, or to represent themselves.

[8] However, the court did not conclude that accused persons have a constitutional right to representation by the non-lawyer of their choice. On the contrary, the court highlighted a court’s authority, by statute or pursuant to its inherent power to control its own processes, to bar any person from appearing as an agent who is not a barrister and solicitor if the court finds that the person is not competent to properly represent or advise the person for whom he or she appears as agent, does not understand and comply with the duties and responsibilities of an agent, or if competent, on whom the court cannot rely for their “integrity, honesty, or forthrightness” or ability “to conduct a trial ethically and honourably”: Romanowicz, at para. 74.

[9] Indeed, the court in Romanowicz described a court’s power to deny audience to an agent “whose participation in proceedings would either damage the fairness of those proceedings, impair the ability of the tribunal to perform its function or otherwise undermine the integrity of the process”, as part of the court’s obligation “to protect the integrity of the proceedings, including the accused’s right to a fair trial and the accused’s right, within the limits of the law, to choose a representative”: at paras. 61 and 64.

[10] This court in Allahyar concluded, at para. 28, that the principles articulated in Romanowicz “are of broader application” and apply in the context of the representation of accused persons by unlicensed representatives in provincial offences matters. Citing R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331, at paras. 18-19, the court confirmed, at para. 11, that “[t]he right of a representative to appear is subject to the court’s authority to control its own process”.

[11] Also in Allahyar, this court detailed the procedure set out in Romanowicz to be followed when a party attends with an unlicensed representative. This includes determining whether the party has made an informed choice to be represented by the agent, followed by an inquiry into the propriety of the representation. This fact-specific inquiry involves the kinds of concerns suggested in Romanowicz, namely “questions of competence, discreditable conduct, conflict of interest and a demonstrated intention not to be bound by the rules and procedures governing criminal trials”: Allahyar, at para. 17. The court confirmed that disqualification of an accused’s chosen representative is a serious matter and is justified only where it is necessary to protect the proper administration of justice.

. R v Allahyar

In R. v. Allahyar (Ont CA, 2017) the Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a decision of an Ontario Court of Justice judge to refuse a person (the defendant's brother-in-law) not licensed by the Law Society of Upper Canada (ie. neither a lawyer nor a paralegal) to represent a person appealing the judgment of a justice of the peace respecting a charge under the Highway Traffic Act. The court usefully canvasses the issue expressly in the context of the fact that the brother-in-law was not a LSUC licensee, and the principles are extendable to other situations, such as non-licensee representation before administrative tribunals, where the competency or propriety of similar representation is an issue:

(1) The Relevant Principles

[11] As a general rule, a representative is permitted to represent a defendant in certain proceedings in the OCJ. Section 50 of the POA provides for a defendant to appear and act personally or by representative at trial in provincial offences matters, while s. 118 provides for an appellant or respondent in appeals of Part III matters to appear and act personally or by representative. A “representative” is defined in s. 1(1) as “a person authorized under the Law Society Act to represent a person in that proceeding”.

The POA does not stipulate who may appear or act on behalf of an appellant in an appeal of a proceeding commenced (as here) under Part I of the POA. However, the combined effect of ss. 1 and 26.1 of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 62; and ss. 6 and 30 of By-Law 4 of the By-Laws of the Law Society of Upper Canada, is that, in addition to a lawyer or paralegal holding a Class P1 license, a non-licensed family member or friend who does not expect or receive compensation for the provision of legal services, is authorized to represent a defendant in any proceedings under the POA before the OCJ.[1]

The right of a representative to appear is subject to the court’s authority to control its own process.[2] The leading case is R. v. Romanowicz (1999), 1999 CanLII 1315 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (3d) 506 (C.A.). In Romanowicz, an accused was represented in summary conviction proceedings by an agent who was alleged to have provided ineffective assistance. The court considered whether and on what basis the court could preclude an agent who was not a lawyer from representing an accused person in a summary conviction proceeding.[3]

[12] In concluding that a trial judge has the authority to refuse to permit an agent who is not a lawyer to represent an accused person in summary conviction proceedings, the court in Romanowicz explained that “[s]everal provincial statutes that provide for representation by agents before various tribunals recognize the tribunal’s power to exclude agents” (at para. 54). As an example, this court referred to s. 50(3) of the POA, which, at the time, stated:

[13] 50(3) The court may bar any person from appearing as an agent who is not a barrister and solicitor entitled to practise in Ontario if the court finds that the person is not competent properly to represent or advise the person for whom he or she appears as agent or does not understand and comply with the duties and responsibilities of an agent.

[14] Section 50(3) continues to apply to proceedings commenced under the POA in the trial context. However, in 2006, with the coming into force of Bill 14, the Access to Justice Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. C (which provided for, among other things, the licensing of paralegals by the Law Society), the section was amended to read:

[15] 50(3) The court may bar any person, other than a person who is licensed under the Law Society Act, from appearing as a representative if the court finds that the person is not competent properly to represent or advise the person for whom he or she appears, or does not understand and comply with the duties and responsibilities of a representative.

[16] In Romanowicz, this court held that, although the Criminal Code does not expressly give the trial judge power to prohibit a specific agent (which it defined at para. 24 as meaning a “representative”) from appearing in a particular case, the court was “satisfied that the power to do so along the lines found in the provincial legislation exists by virtue of the court’s power to control its own process in order to maintain the integrity of that process” (at paras. 53, 58).

[17] The court set out the procedure to be followed when a party attends with an agent as representative. The court should first determine whether the defendant has made an informed choice to be represented by the agent (at paras. 41-44). In appropriate cases, the court may also inquire into the propriety of the representation. After providing examples of circumstances that could result in an order disqualifying an agent (questions of competence, discreditable conduct, conflict of interest and a demonstrated intention not to be bound by the rules and procedures governing criminal trials), the court stated at para. 76:

[D]isqualification is justified only where representation would clearly be inconsistent with the proper administration of justice. It is not enough that the trial judge believes that the accused would be better off with other representation or that the process would operate more smoothly and effectively if the accused were represented by someone else. Disqualification of an accused’s chosen representative is a serious matter and is warranted only where it is necessary to protect the proper administration of justice. [Emphasis added.]

[18] The court cautioned against adopting an arbitrary rule and emphasized the need to review the particular circumstances of the case, stating at para. 77:

The power to disqualify agents, like any other facet of the court’s power to control its processes, must be exercised judicially on the basis of the circumstances present in a given case. Those circumstances may include the seriousness of the charge and the complexity of the issues raised in a particular case. A presumption, however, that all agents are incompetent to represent accused persons charged with certain summary conviction offences is not a proper basis on which to exercise that discretion.

[19] In Romanowicz, the agent in question was a paralegal who provided legal services at a time before paralegals could be licensed in Ontario. Questions respecting the standard of competence required of licensed paralegals have been addressed in recent cases such as R. v. Khan, 2015 ONCJ 221 (CanLII), [2015] O.J. No. 2096 and R. v. Bilinski, 2013 ONSC 2824 (CanLII), [2013] O.J. No. 2984. Nothing in this decision is intended to address representation by licensed paralegals in provincial offence matters. The test in Romanowicz, however, is clearly applicable in cases where a person seeks to be represented in such matters by an unpaid family member or friend.