Restitution - The Test. Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock [general - test]
In Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock (SCC, 2020) the Supreme Court of Canada applies current unjust enrichment law:
 The plaintiffs also rely on the principled unjust enrichment framework (or what the Court of Appeal referred to as “unjust enrichment simpliciter”). This claim requires establishing that ALC was enriched, that the plaintiffs suffered a corresponding deprivation, and that the enrichment and corresponding deprivation occurred in the absence of any juristic reason therefor (Moore, at para. 37). The appellants argue that this claim is bound to fail because, even if ALC has been enriched at the plaintiff’s expense, there is a juristic reason for the exchange.. Welton v. United Lands Corporation Limited
 The juristic reason element of the unjust enrichment analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s enrichment cannot be justified by any of the established categories of juristic reason. If none of the established categories of juristic reason are present, the plaintiff has a prima facie case for unjust enrichment. At the second stage, the defendant can rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case by showing that there is a residual reason to deny recovery (Moore, at paras. 57-58).
 Here, I do not have to go beyond the first stage of the analysis. The plaintiffs’ own pleadings allege that there was a contract between ALC and the plaintiffs under which the plaintiffs paid to play VLTs. A defendant that acquires a benefit pursuant to a valid contract is justified in retaining that benefit (Moore, at para. 57). Nothing in the pleadings, apart from perhaps the allegations of criminal conduct that I have determined are bound to fail, could serve to vitiate the alleged contract between the plaintiffs and ALC. It follows that I agree with the appellants that the plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim has no reasonable chance of success.
In Welton v. United Lands Corporation Limited (Ont CA, 2020) the Court of Appeal considers an unjust enrichment issue in accordance with the leading case of Moore v Sweet:
 The trial judge analyzed this claim under the rubric of unjust enrichment and applied the correct test: Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC 52,  3 S.C.R. 303. He concluded that the first two elements of unjust enrichment were established: “the defendant received Darlene’s services and Darlene was not paid for her Tarion Warranty services”: at para. 552. However, he found that the claim did not survive on the third element: whether there was a reason in law or justice for Stonebrook’s retention of the benefit conferred by the appellant.. Reiter v. Hollub
 The third element of the unjust enrichment analysis consists of two stages. First, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that the defendant’s retention of the benefit … cannot be justified on the basis of any of the ‘established’ categories of juristic reasons: a contract, a disposition of law, a donative intent, and other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations” (internal citations omitted): Moore, at para. 57.
 At the second stage, the defendant bears the onus of “rebut[ting] the plaintiff’s prima facie case by showing that there is some residual reason to deny recovery” (internal citations omitted): Moore, at para. 58. Here, the court considers two factors: the parties’ reasonable expectations and public policy considerations: Moore, at para. 58.
In Reiter v. Hollub (Ont CA, 2017) the court considered the basic restitution test:
(1) Applicable principles. Montor Business Corporation v. Goldfinger [I]
 In Kerr v. Baranow, at para. 31, Cromwell J. recognized that “[a]t the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment lies the notion of restoring a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain”. Since the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Pettkus v. Becker, 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 834, unjust enrichment principles have been available to support claims made by domestic partners upon the breakdown of their relationship.
 The test for unjust enrichment is well-settled. To establish unjust enrichment, the person advancing the claim must prove three things:
1. An enrichment of or benefit to the defendant;
2. A corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff; and
3. The absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.
 There are two steps to identifying whether there is a juristic reason for the responding party to retain the benefit incurred. First, the court must consider whether the case falls within a pre-existing category of juristic reason, including a contract, a disposition of law, donative intent, and other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations: Kerr, at para. 43. If a case falls outside one of these established categories, the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy considerations become relevant in assessing whether recovery should be denied: Kerr, at para. 44.
In Montor Business Corporation v. Goldfinger [I] (Ont CA, 2016) the Court of Appeal sets out the three stages of unjust enrichment:
 As Iacobucci J. noted in Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25,  1 S.C.R. 629, at para. 30, the test for unjust enrichment requires that a claimant establish the following three elements:
a) an enrichment of the defendant; As noted in Garland, at para. 31, the first two elements are determined by applying a “straightforward economic approach”. Iacobucci J. explained, at para. 36: “Where money is transferred from plaintiff to defendant, there is an enrichment.”
b) a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff; and
c) an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment.
 The analysis in respect of the third element proceeds in two steps.
 At the first stage, the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that “no juristic reason from an established category exists to deny recovery.” The established categories include a contract, a disposition of law, a donative intent, and other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations: see Garland, at para. 44.
 If the claimant can show that there is no established juristic reason, then, at the second stage, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that there is another reason to deny recovery. When determining if there is a reason to deny recovery at this stage, courts are required to consider the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy considerations: see Garland, at paras. 45-46.
 As this court noted in Campbell v. Campbell (1999), 1999 CanLII 2294 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 783, at pp. 794-95, and Simonin Estate v. Simonin, 2010 ONCA 900, 329 D.L.R. (4th) 513, at para. 24: [W]hat is at the heart of the third requirement is the reasonable expectation of the parties, and whether it would be just and fair to the parties considering all of the relevant circumstances, to permit the recipient of the benefit to retain it without compensation to those who provided it.