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Review - Administrative. Cascade Aerospace Inc. v. Unifor [IMPORTANT]
In Cascade Aerospace Inc. v. Unifor (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal noted the reduced (simplified) reasons for decision required for administrative decisions, but that a reviewing court (either by JR or appeal) "is entitled to consider the evidence and submissions that were before the decision-maker as well as its past decisions (Vavilov at para. 94). In other words, the reviewing court must look beyond the four corners of the administrative decision.":[7] Although the Board’s reasons are succinct and could have been more elaborate, we are all of the opinion that these reasons withstand scrutiny on reasonableness review. Vavilov instructs reviewing courts to examine the reasons provided by administrative decision-makers with "“respectful attention”" (Vavilov at para. 84), taking into account the "“institutional context in which the decision was made”" (Vavilov at para. 91). This entails varying levels of justification or explanation. It instructs reviewing courts as well to be "“acutely aware”" that administrative justice "“will not always look like “judicial justice””" (Vavilov at para. 92). When it comes to statutory interpretation, administrative decision-makers are not expected to engage in a formalistic interpretation exercise in every case. Their task is rather to come up with an interpretation that is consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision at issue (Vavilov at paras. 119-121). In so doing, they are not required "“to explicitly address all possible shades of meaning of a given provision”" and may find it "“unnecessary to dwell on each and every signal of statutory intent in their reasons”" (Vavilov at para. 122).
[8] Hence, the fact that a decision does not include all the arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing judge would have preferred, is not, in and of itself, a basis to set it aside (Vavilov at para. 91). Quite the opposite, in seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision-maker, the reviewing court is entitled to consider the evidence and submissions that were before the decision-maker as well as its past decisions (Vavilov at para. 94). In other words, the reviewing court must look beyond the four corners of the administrative decision.
[9] With that in mind, we all agree that the Board provided responsive reasons when they are read in light of the record, of the Board’s past decisions, of section 38 legislative history and of the Board’s own particular institutional context. Here, this context is that of a highly specialized tribunal tasked with making decisions in a area where delays can hamper the realization of the Code’s objectives (Maritime Employers Association v. Syndicat des débardeurs (Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 375), 2023 FCA 93 at para. 86). It is clear to us that the Board was alive to the central issue of the scope of section 38 and that it meaningfully grappled with it by resorting to the proper legal analytical framework, including the one applicable to the interpretation of bilingual enactments. Although, again, the Board’s reasons could have been more elaborate, they exhibit a rational chain of analysis. As for the outcome of the decision that section 38 only applies to certification applications, it is reasonable in our view when one looks at the discrepancies between the French and English versions of the provision, which the Board was well aware of. It is consistent as well with prior decisions of the Board holding that the amendments brought to section 38 in 2001, which at the time unambiguously only applied to certification applications as conceded by counsel for the applicant, were not substantive.
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