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Medical Professionals (RHPA) - Doctors Cases (2). King v. Gannage
In King v. Gannage (Div Ct, 2020) the Divisional Court reviewed Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 Code complaint procedure [s.25(1)], which - oddly I find - allow for third party complaints. I find the case is interesting as the complaint is not patient-specific, yet it still got the amount of legal attention that it did. It was essentially a specific therapy complaint (chelation therapy for autism) advanced by an advocate, separate from any patient complaints. The case was not dismissed on standing grounds, but on what was essentially lack of evidence and the limited investigative function of the ICRC ['Incidents, Complaints and Reports Committee' under the RHP Act] [paras 39-44]. If the evidence case was stronger it may have allowed for a broad-based challenge on any specific therapeutic approach:The Legislative Framework
[16] In order to deal with the merits of this application, it is useful to describe the complaint process under the Regulated Health Professions Procedural Code, being Schedule 2 to the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18 (the “Code”).
[17] The College is the regulatory body for the medical profession in Ontario. Its mandate is to serve and protect the public interest by governing the medical profession (Code, s. 3(2)). One of its key functions is the investigation of its members for professional misconduct or incompetence.
[18] Investigations of members can occur either after the receipt of a complaint filed with the Registrar regarding the conduct or actions of a member (Code, s. 25), or through the appointment of an investigator by the Registrar, if she believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, that a member has committed an act of professional misconduct and the ICRC has approved the appointment of investigators (Code, s. 75(1)(a)).
[19] In either case, the ICRC [SS: 'Incidents, Complaints and Reports Committee'] must form a panel to investigate the complaint or to consider the investigator’s report (Code, s. 25(1)). When a patient complains about the conduct of a physician, he or she is taken to have given implicit consent to the physician’s disclosure of information about the patient in order that the physician can respond to the complaint (Code, s. 25.2). The patient may also be asked to sign a written consent for the release of records from other record-holders.
[20] In the case of a third-party complaint, such as the one in this proceeding, there is no implicit patient consent to the disclosure of personal medical information. If the ICRC determines that patient information is required, it may request the Registrar to appoint an investigator pursuant to s. 75(1)(c) of the Code. Such an investigator would have the same powers as an investigator appointed under s. 75(1)(a), allowing him or her to exercise powers under the Public Inquiries Act, such as the power to enter the physician’s place of practice and examine or remove anything relevant to the investigation.
[21] The ICRC plays an important role in screening complaints and reports and deciding whether further action is necessary. Subsection 26(1) of the Code sets out the powers of the ICRC panel. After investigating a complaint or considering a report, the panel must consider the member’s submissions and make “reasonable efforts to consider all records and documents it considers relevant to the complaint or the report”. It then has a broad discretion to decide whether to refer a specified allegation of a member’s professional misconduct to the Discipline Committee; take some other remedial action, such as a caution or the member’s attendance at a remedial program; or take any action it considers is not inconsistent with the health professions Act, the Code, the regulations or by-laws.
[22] The ICRC described its role in its reasons in the present case as follows (Reasons, p. 2):The Committee’s role, broadly, is to protect the public by determining whether remedial action is necessary and, if so, what action would best enhance the quality of medical care of the particular physician, and the general quality of medical care in Ontario, by reinforcing the standards of practice.
...
In a small number of cases, the Committee may refer a specified allegation of professional misconduct or incompetence to the College’s Discipline Committee. The Committee will do this where it believes that referral to the Discipline Committee is in the public interest, and that the available information has a reasonable chance of supporting a successful prosecution. [23] Subsection 29(2) of the Code permits the complainant or the member who is the subject of a complaint to request a review of the ICRC decision by the Board, unless the decision is a reference to the Discipline Committee or a reference pursuant to s. 59 for incapacity proceedings. Pursuant to s. 33(1), there are two grounds that may be raised on review before the Board:(a) the adequacy of the investigation conducted; and/or
(b) the reasonableness of the decision. [28] The problem with her approach is that she ignores the role of the ICRC. It is a screening body, not a factfinding body. It has the responsibility to consider a member’s practice to determine whether there are grounds to take disciplinary or remedial action, given the apparent failure to meet the standards of professional conduct. As stated by the Divisional Court in McKee v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2009 CanLII 55293 (at para. 13):The nature of the powers conferred upon the Complaints Committee is indicative of its role in the statutory scheme: it has no power to make determinations or findings of fact concerning incompetence, incapacity, failure to meet standards or professional misconduct. Rather, its role is to screen complaints and to stream them. By reason of its composition and the ambit of its jurisdiction, the Complaints Committee is a specialized body having particular sensitivity and experience with issues that arise in complaints concerning members of the College. As well, it is apparent from the powers conferred by the legislation that the Complaints Committee is vested with the discretion as to where and how to allocate the College’s resources in dealing with complaints it receives. . Dr. Luchkiw v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario
In Dr. Luchkiw v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considered a JR of a disciplinary finding of the 'Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee' (ICRC) of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO), here regarding issuing COVID vaccination exemptions and related COVID matters. This quote sets out the statutory framework of the findings: The Statutory Framework
[5] The College’s power to regulate the medical profession is set out in the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18 (the Act) and the Health Professional Procedural Code (the Code). The Registrar of the College may commence an investigation with an appointment of investigators under s. 75(1)(a) of the Code if the Registrar believes on reasonable and probable grounds that a member of the profession has committed an act of professional misconduct or is incompetent. Pursuant to s. 76 (3.1) of the Code, the physician under investigation is under a duty to fully co-operate with the investigator.
[6] If the ICRC forms the opinion that the conduct of the physician may expose patients to harm, the ICRC may make an interim order pursuant to s. 25.4 of the Code directing the Registrar to suspend the member or impose terms, conditions or limitations on the member’s certificate of registration. The interim order remains in place until varied by the ICRC or after the matter is resolved by the ICRC or the Discipline Tribunal. . Wilder v. Ng
In Wilder v. Ng (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court comments on the 'test' for referring a matter to the Discipline Committee under the HPPC (in turn under the RHPA):[78] The test for referral to discipline is not a simple assessment of the seriousness of any allegations made by a complainant. As the court held in Schilthuis v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2005 CanLII 1083:The College is charged with supervision and regulation of veterinarians in Ontario, with particular emphasis on the protection of the public. The Executive Committee exercises considerable discretion in determining which cases should proceed to a hearing before the Discipline Committee. This is a classic gatekeeper type role, which is heavily laden with policy related issues and therefore subject to a high level of deference by the court. The College is uniquely positioned to determine which cases are sufficiently serious that a formal hearing is required into alleged misconduct, and has far more expertise than a court in making such a determination. [79] This observation applies similarly to the ICRC in the exercise of its regulatory function in the public interest in considering complaints that come before it.
[80] In that same regard, the HPARB properly recognized that, when assessing a complaint, the task for the Committee is to determine whether a referral to the Discipline Committee is appropriate in the circumstances of a particular complaint (see: A.M. v, H.A.A.E.R., 2018 CanLII 2598). The ICRC is not required to refer every allegation of professional misconduct to discipline. This is made evident by the considerable array of outcomes available to the ICRC provided by the regulatory regime and under the legislation which gives it the authority to take such action as it considers appropriate.
[81] In this same context, the HPARB accurately recognized that the ICRC is a specialized panel whose members are in a position to assess the appropriate degree of remediation required.
[82] A requirement that a member attend at the CPSO to be cautioned, the details of which are recorded and publicly available, is a serious outcome (see: M.M. v. L.E.H., 2015 CanLII 6688). In this case, in the absence of any prior complaint or disciplinary history, and in light of the review of Dr. Ng’s practice which concluded that she has provided good quality care to her patients, I consider that the decision of the ICRC was eminently reasonable. For the same reasons, I would view the decision of the HPARB to decline to interfere with it in any way or require that any further investigation or steps be taken as being likewise equally reasonable.
[83] For the same reasons, I would view the decision of the HPARB to decline to interfere with it in any way or to require that any further investigation or steps be taken as being likewise equally reasonable. . Taliano v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario
In Taliano v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court set out some basics of the Health Professions Procedural Code:[39] Section 70(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code, being Schedule 2 to the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, provides that a party to a proceeding before a panel of the Discipline Committee has a statutory right of appeal to the Divisional Court.
[40] As a statutory appeal, this matter is to be decided on the appellate standards of review, i.e. correctness on questions of law and palpable and overriding error on questions of fact and on findings of mixed fact and law (absent an extricable question of law): Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, 441 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 37.
[41] A penalty imposed by a regulatory tribunal cannot be overturned unless the tribunal has made an error in principle or the penalty is “clearly unfit.” A “clearly unfit” penalty falls outside the range of reasonableness. A reasonable penalty will be guided by proportionality and an assessment of the range of appropriate penalties according to the facts of the case and the penalties imposed in other cases: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy, 2018 ONCA 420, 143 O.R. (3d) 596, at paras. 56- 57. . Thirlwell v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario
In Thirlwell v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Div Ct, 2022) the Divisional Court considered, and dismissed, a judicial review of interim requirements placed on a psychiatrist by the College when issuing COVID vaccination exemptions.
. College of Psychologists of Ontario v. Ontario (Health Professions Appeal and Review Board)
In College of Psychologists of Ontario v. Ontario (Health Professions Appeal and Review Board) (Div Ct, 2022) the Divisional Court reviewed basics of the Psychology Act, as governed by the RHPA and the HPP Code:Statutory framework
[9] The issues in this case are governed by the statutory scheme set out in the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18 (the “RHPA”), including the Health Professions Procedural Code (the “Code”), and the Psychology Act, 1991, S. O. 1991, c. 38 (the “Psychology Act”) and its Registration regulation, O. Reg 74/15 (the “Regulation”).
[10] Section 3 of the Code sets out the College’s statutory objectives, including the objectives to regulate the practice of the profession, to develop, establish and maintain programs and standards of qualification, to develop, establish, and maintain standards of knowledge and skill and programs to promote continuing competence among the members, and the overarching duty, in s. 3(2), to serve and protect the public interest. In its submissions about the importance of these objectives, the College underscores that, as set out in s. 4 of the Psychology Act, members of the College are authorized to communicate diagnoses of psychological disorders to members of the public and to treat them by means of psychotherapeutic techniques.
[11] Pursuant to s. 95(1)(c) of the Code, it is the College that has statutory authority to make regulations prescribing the standards and qualifications for the issue of certificates of registration as a member of the College. Those requirements are set out in the Regulation.
[12] The Psychology Act and the Regulation provide for two classes of registration: “psychologist” and “psychological associate”. A psychologist must complete a PhD program that meets the accreditation criteria of the Canadian Psychological Association or another accreditation body that has been approved by the College. For registration as a psychologist associate, the class at issue here, the applicant must compete a master’s program, preceded by a full course of undergraduate studies in psychology, and must meet prescribed criteria.
[13] Registration as a “psychological associate” may be sought for either autonomous practice, interim autonomous practice, or, as in this case, supervised practice.
[14] Subsection 23(1) of the Regulation provides that an applicant for registration as a psychological associate with a supervised practice must meet the requirements of s. 16(1) 1 and 2 of the Regulation and provide a signed undertaking from two supervisors. Those supervisors must undertake to train, supervise, and evaluate the proposed member’s practice, and report to the College.
[15] Subsection 16(1)1 of the Regulation sets out the requirements applicable to the applicant’s master’s degree program:• Subsection 16(1)1 i focuses on the degree-granting institution and is not at issue here.
• Subsection 16(1)1 ii requires, as a prerequisite for admission to the program, that the applicant have taken a minimum of 576 hours of undergraduate instruction in psychology. This requirement is no longer at issue.
• Subsection 16(1)1 iii sets out the content and training required in the master’s program and is at issue. Subsection 16(1)1 iii (C) requires that an applicant complete “at least one academic year of full-time resident graduate study and training” or the equivalent in part-time resident graduate study and training. [16] The phrase “resident graduate study and training” is not defined in the Regulation or the Code. According to a College guideline, “resident study and training consists of in-person participation in courses, seminars, practica and internships with face-to-face contact with faculty and other students”.
[17] The requirements of s. 16(1)1, including that of s. 16(1)1 iii (C), are non-exemptible, subject to ss. 16(2) to (8). The exemption at issue here is in s. 16(3) of the Regulation, which allows a master’s program that meets the requirements in ss. 16(1)1 i and ii, but not iii, to be deemed to have met the requirements of iii if the following criteria are met:(a) the program is considered by a panel of the Registration Committee to be substantially similar, but not equivalent, to a program that meets the requirements; and
(b) the applicant successfully completes the additional education or training, if any, that is specified by a panel of the Registration Committee. [Emphasis added.] [18] On receipt of an application for registration, the College Registrar will either register the applicant or refer the application to the College’s Registration Committee. Where the application is referred to the Registration Committee, the applicant receives notice and has the right to make written submissions, as set out in ss. 15(3) and 18(1) of the Code.
[19] After considering the application and submissions, the panel of the Registration Committee may direct the Registrar to take certain steps. Subsection 18(2) of the Code provides for a number of different directions, as follows:After considering the application and the submissions, the panel may make an order doing any one or more of the following:
1. Directing the Registrar to issue a certificate of registration.
2. Directing the Registrar to issue a certificate of registration if the applicant successfully completes examinations set or approved by the panel.
3. Directing the Registrar to issue a certificate of registration if the applicant successfully completes additional training specified by the panel.
4. Directing the Registrar to impose specified terms, conditions and limitations on a certificate of registration of the applicant and specifying a limitation on the applicant’s right to apply under subsection 19 (1).
5. Directing the Registrar to refuse to issue a certificate of registration. [20] If registration is refused, the applicant may seek a review by the Board. Subsection 21(1) of the Code gives the applicant a choice between a review of the application and supporting documents, or a hearing.
[21] As set out in s. 22(6) of the Code, the Board shall, after the review or hearing, make an order doing any one or more of the following:1. Confirming the order made by the panel.
2. Requiring the Registration Committee to make an order directing the Registrar to issue a certificate of registration to the applicant if the applicant successfully completes any examinations or training the Registration Committee may specify.
3. Requiring the Registration Committee to make an order directing the Registrar to issue a certificate of registration to the applicant and to impose any terms, conditions and limitations the Board considers appropriate.
4. Referring the matter back to the Registration Committee for further consideration by a panel, together with any reasons and recommendations the Board considers appropriate. [22] Subsection 22(7) constrains the above powers of the Board. The Board cannot require the Registration Committee to direct the Registrar to issue a certificate of registration under paragraph 3 unless the applicant “substantially qualifies” for registration and the panel “exercised its powers improperly.” In this case, the Board purported to proceed under s. 22(7) on its second review of Ms. Manley’s application. . M.J.S. v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board
In M.J.S. v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court set out some basics of the Health Professions Procedural Code:The Legislative Framework
[5] The College is the regulatory body for the medical profession in Ontario. Its mandate is to serve and protect the public interest by governing the medical profession.[1] One of the College’s key functions is the investigation of its members for professional misconduct or incompetence.
[6] The ICRC must form a panel to investigate a complaint filed with the Registrar regarding the conduct or actions of a member.[2]
[7] The powers of the ICRC panel under s. 26(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code were discussed by Swinton J. in King v. Gannage:[3]The ICRC plays an important role in screening complaints and reports and deciding whether further action is necessary. Subsection 26(1) of the Code sets out the powers of the ICRC panel. After investigating a complaint or considering a report, the panel must consider the member’s submissions and make “reasonable efforts to consider all records and documents it considers relevant to the complaint or the report”. It then has a broad discretion to decide whether to refer a specified allegation of a member’s professional misconduct to the Discipline Committee; take some other remedial action, such as a caution or the member’s attendance at a remedial program; or take any action it considers is not inconsistent with the health professions Act, the Code, the regulations or by-laws. [8] Cautions and educational directions are remedial in nature and are not sanctions or penalties. They are intended to improve a member’s practice and to benefit the public by avoiding future concerns.[4]
[9] At the outset of its reasons, the ICRC described its role as follows:In the College’s complaints process, the Committee, with the assistance of staff, conducts an investigation, then meets to review the written record of investigation and to reach a decision.
The Committee has a number of outcomes available to it and will consider the seriousness and context of the concerns raised, the physician’s insight into his or her practice, capacity for remediation, and relevant College history when making a decision. The Committee seeks to protect the public and, where possible, to enhance the quality of physicians’ care or conduct through education and remediation. [10] Pursuant to s. 23(2)7 of the Code, a notation of every caution a member has received from a panel of the ICRC, together with any specified continuing education or remedial programs required by the panel, will be included on the College’s public register.
[11] A member of the College who is the subject of a complaint may request a review of an ICRC decision under s. 29(2) of the Code unless the decision was to refer the allegation to a disciplinary hearing or to refer the member for incapacity proceedings. Pursuant to s. 33(1) of the Code, there are two grounds that may be raised on a review before the Board:(i) the adequacy of the investigation conducted; and/or
(ii) the reasonableness of the decision. [12] Pursuant to s. 35(1) of the Code, after conducting a review, the Board may:(i) confirm all or part of the decision;
(ii) make recommendations the Board considers appropriate to the ICRC; and/or
require the ICRC to do anything the ICRC or a panel may do under the health profession Act and the Code except to request the Registrar to conduct an investigation. . K.K. v. M.M.
In K.K. v. M.M. (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal considered an evidence exclusing provision of the Regulated Health Professions Act:(3) Does s. 36(3) of the RHPA prohibit the admission of the CPSO materials?
[45] Section 36(3) of the RHPA provides the following:No record of a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act, no report, document or thing prepared for or statement given at such a proceeding and no order or decision made in such a proceeding is admissible in a civil proceeding other than a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act. [46] As the trial judge correctly stated, these words must be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislature: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26.
[47] On a plain reading, this section creates a blanket prohibition against admitting in a civil proceeding any records, reports or documents directly related to a proceeding under the RHPA. The text of the provision leaves no room for exception or discretion in relation to the specific items mentioned: a record of a proceeding, a report, a document or thing prepared for or statement given at such a proceeding, or an order or decision made in such a proceeding.
[48] That said, anything not specifically mentioned is fair game. As mentioned, the trial judge noted that the statutory prohibition did not preclude admissibility of evidence of the fact that a complaint was made and did not capture the website information referring to the undertakings given by Dr. Goldstein. We agree. The law is clear that the fact that a complaint was launched, an investigation held, and a decision rendered by the IRC are not covered by s. 36(3) of the RHPA and may be otherwise provable in court, without reference to a prohibited document: F. (M.) v. Sutherland (2000), 2000 CanLII 5761 (ON CA), 188 D.L.R. (4th) 296 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 45, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 531; Pouget v. Saint Elizabeth Health Care, 2012 ONCA 461, 294 O.A.C. 293, at para. 25; Ontario v. Lipsitz, 2011 ONCA 466, 281 O.A.C. 67, at para. 114, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 407; Armitage v. Brantford General Hospital (2004), 2004 CanLII 32184 (ON SC), 71 O.R. (3d) 44 (S.C.), at para. 29.
[49] As well, Dr. Goldstein’s undertakings, while they may have been made in response to a decision or order covered by s. 36(3), are also not themselves either a decision or order captured by s. 36(3). The undertakings were generated by Dr. Goldstein himself, not by the board, and presumably were also generated after the board had completed its process and released its decision. The rationale that applies to keeping the other items listed in s. 36(3) confidential does not apply to them. Public undertakings are not meant to be confidential, they provide the public with notice, and their admission in civil proceedings where a trial judge deems them relevant does not undermine the purpose of s. 36(3), discussed below. We therefore agree with the trial judge that the undertakings themselves were admissible.
[50] However, we respectfully disagree with the trial judge’s conclusion that all proceedings involving the best interests of the child are not civil proceedings and entirely evade the reach of s. 36(3) of the RHPA. In our view, an exemption for all family law cases goes too far.
[51] First, private family law disputes, while distinct from other civil litigation in many respects, are “civil” proceedings in the ordinary sense of the word: they concern private relations between members of the community in contrast to criminal or child protection proceedings, which both involve state action. If the legislature had intended to exempt family law litigation from the reach of s. 36(3), it would have said so.
[52] As this court explained in Sutherland, at para. 29,The purpose of s. 36(3) is to encourage the reporting of complaints of professional misconduct against members of a health profession, and to ensure that those complaints are fully investigated and fairly decided without any participant in the proceedings – a health professional, a patient, a complainant, a witness or a College employee – fearing that a document prepared for College proceedings can be used in a civil action. [53] The “broad objective” of the provision “is to keep College proceedings and civil proceedings separate”: Sutherland, at para. 31; see also Lipsitz, at paras. 101-3.
[54] A global exemption to s. 36(3) for all family law cases would significantly erode the reach and purpose of s. 36(3). This is because unfortunately, family law disputes involving the best interests of children are fairly common. It would not be unusual for one of the many participants in an RHPA proceeding to at some point become involved in a family law proceeding involving the best interests of children.
[55] Fortunately, it is possible to preserve the integrity and purpose of s. 36(3) of the RHPA while also giving effect to the purpose of Part III of the CLRA, which includes ensuring, “that applications to the courts respecting decision-making responsibility, parenting time, contact and guardianship with respect to children will be determined on the basis of the best interests of the children” and to s. 30 of the CLRA, under which Dr. Goldstein’s report was prepared, the purpose of which is to “report to the court on the needs of the child and the ability and willingness of the parties or any of them to satisfy the needs of the child.”
[56] The trial judge was aware of the need to avoid absurdity in the context of these two distinct legislative schemes. Specifically, the trial judge was appropriately concerned that in the circumstances of this case, where a motion judge had relied on Dr. Goldstein’s opinions in finding parental alienation by the mother, which in turn resulted in a reversal of custody and a temporary order that lasted for more than six years, the court should not be deprived of highly probative evidence regarding the validity of those opinions and recommendations.
[57] However, absurdity is avoided and the ordinary meaning of s. 36(3) preserved in two ways. First, although it is indisputable that increased efficiency could be achieved by allowing for the admissibility in family law proceedings of “orders or decisions made” at a proceeding governed by the RHPA, or “a report, document or thing prepared for or statement given at [an RHPA governed] proceeding”, s. 36(3) does not create an evidentiary privilege relating to the information or evidence used to prepare such orders, decisions, reports, documents, things or statements. There is nothing to prevent the parties from selecting and presenting such background evidence or information so that a trial judge is not deprived of highly probative evidence regarding the validity of relevant opinions and recommendations. Second, and as already explained, s. 36(3) does not apply to the fact that the complaint was made, the fact that an investigation was conducted, and the fact that a board decision was rendered and undertakings given. As this case demonstrates, depending on the circumstances those “facts” may be relevant when determining the probative value to give to opinions and recommendations. When these limitations on the reach of s. 36(3) are considered, “harmony [can be achieved] between the various statutes enacted by the same government”: Therrien (Re), 2001 SCC 35, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 121; Shaver-Kudell Manufacturing Inc. v. Knight Manufacturing Inc., 2021 ONCA 925, at para. 28. . Matheson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario
In Matheson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court summarized Health Professions Procedural Code procedures relating to suspension of registration in a professional College:[4] Section 3(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18 (the “Code”), sets out the College’s objectives, which include regulating the profession and governing members of the profession. Section 3(2) provides that, in carrying out its duties, the College has a duty to “protect the public interest”.
[5] Under the Code, the Committee investigates complaints made to the College about its members.
[6] After conducting an investigation, section 26(1) of the Code gives the Committee the power to do a number of things, including referring the complaint to the Discipline Committee for a hearing.
[7] In addition, section 25.4(1) of the Code gives the Committee the power to make various interim orders, including an order suspending a member’s registration on an interim basis if the member’s conduct “exposes or is likely to expose the member’s patients to harm or injury”.
[8] Section 25.4(3) provides that, if an order is made suspending a member’s registration, “the matter shall be investigated and prosecuted expeditiously”.
[9] In addition, section 25.4(6) provides that the Committee cannot make an order for an interim suspicion unless specified notice requirements are met:(6) No order shall be made under subsection (1) unless the member has been given,
(a) notice of the intention to make the order;
(b) at least 14 days to make written submissions to the Committee; and
(c) a copy of the provisions of this section.
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