Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Statutory Interpretation - Interpreting Across Statutes

. BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District

In BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal [under the Canada Transportation Act, s.41(1)], here from a CTA decision that "found the rerouting works suitable and authorized the District to construct and maintain them at the District’s cost".

Here the court noted that the statutory interpretation of related statutes should be harmonious:

[81] Importantly, when interpreting a statute, it is appropriate to consider statutes enacted by the same legislature that deal with the same subject matter—here, railways. This is "“in keeping with the ‘principle of [statutory] interpretation that presumes a harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes dealing with the same subject matter’”": Schmidt v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 55 at para. 16, citing R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 at para. 52, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38179 (4 April 2019); see also Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 37 at para. 83; Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 68 at paras. 34, 37-38.

[82] Here, both the Railway Safety Act and the Canada Transportation Act confer authority over railways on the Minister of Transport and the Agency. The two statutes are thus clearly interrelated, particularly in the context of crossings.

. Tataryn v. Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP

In Tataryn v. Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a class action-related appeal, here involving the 'dismissal for delay' provisions of CPA s.29.1(1).

Here the court comments on the 'related statutes' cross-over aspect of statutory interpretation:

(a) Principles of Statutory Interpretation

[25] As is oft stated, the words of an Act are to be “read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at p. 41.

[26] There is a presumption of statutory interpretation that the provisions of a statute are meant to work together and form an internally consistent framework: Heritage Capital Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 2016 SCC 19, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 306, at para. 28. When analyzing the scheme of the statute, the court seeks to determine how the provisions or parts of the statute work together to give effect to a plausible and coherent plan. It then considers how the provision to be interpreted can be understood in terms of that plan: Ruth Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), at § 13.02[4].

[27] Where applicable, a statutory provision is presumed to be coherent with related statutes: Point-Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court), 1997 CanLII 390 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, at p. 1054. When statutes deal with the same subject, it is presumed that their language is consistent throughout. Identical phrases and expressions are presumed to have the same meaning: see e.g. Notaries Public of British Columbia v. Law Society of British Columbia, 2017 BCCA 448, 6 B.C.L.R. (6th) 271, at paras. 28-29; Sullivan, at § 13.04[4]. In addition, the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, expressly apply to proceedings under the CPA. Accordingly, those Rules, including their definition of “timetable”, should be considered when interpreting the CPA.

. Melville v. McLaren

In Melville v. McLaren (Div Court, 2024) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here relating to a restrictive covenant on a property which converted from the Registry Act system to the Land Titles system during the running of the covenant's currency.

Here the court statutorily interprets provisions across multiple statutes in a related real property context:

[16] When engaging in an exercise of statutory construction, this Court must read the words of the act “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21. The modern rule of statutory interpretation requires me to consider the plain language of the provision(s), the broader context of the legislation, the objective of the legislation and the Legislature’s intention.

[17] If the provision in question is in an Act that is part of a larger statutory scheme, the court should favour an interpretation that promotes “harmony, coherence and consistency” between statutes dealing with the same subject matter: Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867; Stoddard v. Watson, 1993 CanLII 59 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1069.

. Mulmer Services Ltd. v. LIUNA, Local 183

In Mulmer Services Ltd. v. LIUNA, Local 183 (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered (but disregarded) what an applicant characterized as the 'harmonization' principle of statutory interpretation:

[69] On this point, I agree with the argument of LIUNA, which I adopt as my own:

That unionized employers are subject to the [LRA] and non-unionized employers are not is trite. That there are “different obligations for an organization under each piece of legislation”, “based only” on whether an employer is unionized, is the universal case in all matters of labour and employment quite irrespective of the Decision. That an incoming employer who ousts a unionized employer might find itself subject to the successorship provisions of the Act (and a collective agreement as a result), even if it would otherwise not be required to pay severance under the ESA, is not “inconsistency” on any interpretation that is reasonable or otherwise intended by the legislature. Preservation of bargaining rights and continuity of employment is the point of section 69.1. It is not in any way contingent on – let alone determined by – whether an incoming employer would have to pay severance if the outgoing employer were not unionized.

There are a myriad of fundamental and substantive differences between the Act and the ESA. The Board’s recognition of that difference is reflected in the Decision here and is consistent with the Board’s findings in the first case to consider the application of the reinstituted section 69.1, in [Imperial Parking].[67]

[70] The Board’s Decision implicitly recognizes that the two statutory schemes serve different objectives. The Decision is consistent with previous OLRB jurisprudence. In my view, the Decision cannot be said to be unreasonable on this point. Therefore, this ground must also fail.

. Canada (Attorney General) v. Bacile

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bacile (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal considered statutory interpretation when interpreting across related statutes:

[12] The Court presumes harmony, coherence and consistency in the interpretation of provisions within a statutory scheme and between statutes dealing with the same subject matter: R. v. Uybel Enterprises, 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867 at para 52; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 27. ....

. International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency

In International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency (Fed CA, 2022) the Federal Court of Appeal cites the principle that different statutes are to be interpreted in accordance with the "presumption of legislative coherence" - wherever this is possible:

[75] The appellants also submit that the scope of the Agency’s regulation-making authority under section 86.11 of the CTA is further constrained by the presumption of legislative coherence. Pursuant to that well established presumption, overlapping provisions from different statutes must be interpreted so as to avoid conflict wherever this is possible: Thibodeau at paras. 89, 93 and 99; Barreau du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2017 SCC 56, 404 D.L.R. (4th) 201 at para. 73; Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1992 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at p. 38 [Oldman River]; P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2011), at p. 365. What is true of statutes is also true of delegated legislation: regulations can neither conflict with their enabling legislation nor with any other act of the legislature: Oldman River, at p. 38; D.J.M. Brown & J.M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2022), at § 15:61. Since the Montreal Convention has the force of law in Canada as its provisions have been incorporated into Canadian law by subsection 2(2.2) of the CAA, the appellants argue that Parliament must be presumed not to have authorized the adoption of delegated legislation pursuant to section 86.11 that would be inconsistent with the Montreal Convention.