Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Statutory Interpretation - Interpreting Across Statutes

. R. v. Arapakota

In R. v. Arapakota (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a Crown criminal appeal, here from an acquittal from a prosecution under "s. 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34 (CFPOA), which criminalizes the offering or making of loan, reward, advantage or benefit to a foreign public official or for the benefit of an official, “in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business”, and “as consideration for” an act or omission by that official in connection with the performance of the official’s duties or functions".

Here the court considers the statutory interpretation that related statutes "are presumed to be drafted with one another in mind":

[68] A related principle is that, if the text of a penal statute contains real ambiguities, they should be resolved in favour of the person subject to prosecution. “If one is to be incarcerated, one should at least know that some Act of Parliament requires it in express terms, and not, at most, by implication”: Marcotte v. Deputy Attorney General (Canada), 1974 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 108, at p. 115; see also R. v. Paré, 1987 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 618, at pp. 629-30; R. v. D.L.W., 2016 SCC 22, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 402, at para. 55.

[69] Third, Parliament is assumed to legislate coherently. “Statutes enacted by a legislature that deal with the same subject are presumed to be drafted with one another in mind, so as to offer a coherent and consistent treatment of the subject”: Ruth Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2022), at § 13.04. Lamer C.J.C. referred to the presumption of coherence in Pointe-Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court), 1997 CanLII 390 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, at para. 61, stating: “There is no doubt that the principle that statutes dealing with similar subjects must be presumed to be coherent means that interpretations favouring harmony among those statutes should prevail over discordant ones”.

[70] Accordingly, when interpreting provisions in penal statutes, “[r]eference to the language of other provisions which create closely related criminal offences can provide interpretative assistance”: R. v. Greenwood (1991), 1991 CanLII 2730 (ON CA), 5 O.R. (3d) 71 (C.A.), at p. 89, citing R. v. Buzzanga (1979), 1979 CanLII 1927 (ON CA), 25 O.R. (2d) 705, at pp. 715-21. A court may also consider other domestic laws on the same subject, particularly if they contain similar language, and weigh how this language has been interpreted.[4]

. Kosicki v. Toronto (City) [role of Land Titles Act]

In Kosicki v. Toronto (City) (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a homeowner's appeal, this from an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling that upheld the dismissal of an adverse possession application at the Superior Court, which "sought an order for possessory title to the disputed land".

Here the court considers the statutory interpretation principle of 'harmony across related statutes', here in relation to adverse possession, the Land Titles Act and other statutes:

[53] The adoption of a Torrens-based land title system under the LTA, the successor of the land registry system under the Registry Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.20, achieves a simplified way of certifying title that “provide[s] the public with security of title and facility of transfer” (Durrani v. Augier (2000), 2000 CanLII 22410 (ON SC), 50 O.R. (3d) 353 (S.C.J.), at para. 41; Lawrence v. Maple Trust Co., 2007 ONCA 74, 84 O.R. (3d) 94, at para. 30). The Torrens land title system guarantees that the person named in the register has indefeasible title: the parcel register should be a perfect mirror image of the state of title; no searches behind title should be required; and the accuracy of the register is guaranteed by the state (M. Neave, “Indefeasibility of title in the Canadian context” (1976), 26 U.T.L.J. 173, at p. 174; Kaplinsky, Lavoie and Thomson, at pp. 546-47). Indefeasibility has been described as “immunity from attack by adverse claim to the land or interest in respect of which he is registered, which a registered proprietor enjoys” (Frazer v. Walker, [1967] 1 A.C. 569 (P.C.), at p. 580).

[54] The acquisition of possessory title by trespassers undermines the indefeasibility of title, and as a result, s. 51(1) of the LTA eliminates this possibility with respect to land registered under the land titles system, despite the RPLA. Under the heading “No title by adverse possession, etc.”, s. 51(1) provides:

Despite any provision of this Act, the Real Property Limitations Act or any other Act, no title to and no right or interest in land registered under this Act that is adverse to or in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired hereafter or be deemed to have been acquired heretofore by any length of possession or by prescription.

[55] By virtue of this provision, all land registered in the land titles system, including municipal parkland, receives protection against possessory claims. Through s. 32(1) of the LTA, which enables a land registrar to register any land registered under the Registry Act in the land titles system, Ontario has converted virtually all land title in the province to electronic land titles (J. R. Wood, “Understanding Electronic Registration: Rights of Way and Property Rights Generally” (2014), 38 R.P.R. (5th) 4, at p. 72). As of 2013, less than 0.1 percent of titles in Ontario were still governed by the Registry Act (p. 4, fn. 1).

[56] I note that the municipal land in the present case was converted to the land titles system on October 22, 2001 (A.R., vol. I, at p. 155), at which point Étienne Brûlé Park became protected from all future claims of adverse possession by virtue of s. 51(1) of the LTA. In light of the protection against adverse possession conferred by s. 51(1) of the LTA, there is no evidence to support the City’s contention that it would require extensive resources and efforts to protect parkland from possessory claims (R.F., at paras. 10 and 95).

[57] Under the LTA, however, the legislature has subordinated the accuracy of the land titles system to competing priorities, notably the preservation of acquired possessory title. Section 51(2) of the LTA provides that possessory claims that have matured prior to the registration of the property are preserved and possessory title may be obtained (Barbour v. Bailey, 2016 ONCA 98, 66 R.P.R. (5th) 173, at para. 31; Sipsas v. 1299781 Ontario Inc., 2017 ONCA 265, 85 R.P.R. (5th) 24, at para. 18; Pepper v. Brooker, 2017 ONCA 532, 139 O.R. (3d) 67, at para. 42). Matured possessory title to land may be lost if the adverse possessor does not contest the registration of the land under the land titles system to the paper title holder after receiving notice of the registration (Aragon (Wellesley) Development (Ontario) Corp. v. Piller Investments Ltd., 2018 ONSC 4607, 94 R.P.R. (5th) 236, at para. 125).

[58] The legislative policy choice to preserve matured possessory claims is reaffirmed by s. 44(1) of the LTA, which provides that upon first registration, the registered land remains subject to certain liabilities, rights and interests, regardless of whether they are registered on title. This includes possessory title acquired by an adjoining land owner (s. 44(1) 3). In the present case, the disputed land’s parcel register explicitly states that the registration is subject to rights to the land acquired by “adverse possession” (A.R., vol. II, at p. 78).

[59] More recently, the legislature again turned its mind to the RPLA, notably in amending statutes dealing with public lands in Ontario, namely, provincial parkland, conservation reserves, and other public lands. In 2021, the legislature amended both the PLA (s. 17.1) and the PPCRA (s. 14.5) to exempt certain categories of public lands from the application of the RPLA, but preserved matured possessory claims (Supporting People and Businesses Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 34).

[60] The PLA protects “public lands” from the acquisition of possessory title under the RPLA (PLA, s. 17.1). Public lands are defined as including “lands heretofore designated as Crown lands, school lands and clergy lands” (PLA, s. 1). Section 17.1(2) of the PLA further clarifies that for the purpose of the exemption from possessory claims, public lands include “lands acquired by the Crown in right of Ontario at any time for the purposes of a past or current program of the Ministry”. For its part, the PPCRA exempts from the application of the RPLA: (1) public lands that are within a provincial park or conservation reserve; and (2) public lands acquired for the purposes of the PPCRA that are not in a provincial park or conservation reserve (PPCRA, s. 14.5(1)). Provincial parks and conservation reserves are designated by regulation (PPCRA, s. 54(1)). The PPCRA also expressly deems any land that is part of a municipality, but which has been designated as a provincial park or conservation reserve, as separated from that municipality, for as long as it is designated as such (s. 31(1)).

[61] These recent amendments undermine the City’s suggestion that the legislature has not turned its mind to s. 16 of the RPLA for over a century (R.F., at para. 69). Although these new “immunities” do not appear in the text of s. 16, in effect they statutorily expand the categories of land exempt from the application of the RPLA. They do not include municipal land, unless such land is designated under the PPCRA (see Designation and Classification of Provincial Parks, O. Reg. 316/07).

[62] Consistent with the LTA, the legislature also preserved possessory claims that matured prior to the coming into force of the Supporting People and Businesses Act, 2021. Both s. 17.1(1) of the PLA and s. 14.5(1) of the PPCRA state in identical language that “no person may acquire a right, title or interest . . . by or through the use, possession or occupation of the lands or by prescription on or after the day the Supporting People and Businesses Act, 2021 receives Royal Assent”. Although the legislature has removed the possibility of acquiring possessory title to the public lands described above, it has decided to do so on a prospective basis.

[63] At the second reading of the Supporting People and Businesses Act, 2021, the responsible Minister identified the objective of the amendments as “prevent[ing] people from unlawfully claiming ownership of public lands for the benefit of Ontarians” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 10A, 2nd Sess., 42nd Parl., October 26, 2021, at p. 396 (Hon. Nina Tangri)). Although statements of purpose may be vague or imprecise, “providing information and explanations of proposed legislation is an important ministerial responsibility, and courts rightly look to it in determining the purpose of a challenged provision” (R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 180, at para. 36). From the responsible Minister’s statement of purpose, it is fair to conclude that the legislature turned its mind to the need to protect certain additional categories of public land from possessory claims for the benefit of the public. At the time of these amendments, the public benefit test had already been the subject of many lower court decisions (see, e.g., Prescott & Russell (United Counties) v. Waugh (2004), 15 M.P.L.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. S.C.J.); Woychyshyn v. Ottawa (City) (2009), 88 R.P.R. (4th) 155 (Ont. S.C.J.); Oro-Medonte; Richard v. Niagara Falls, 2018 ONSC 7389, 4 R.P.R. (6th) 238).

[64] Notably, there is no mention of exempting municipal parkland from adverse possession in other relevant statutory enactments (see, e.g., Municipal Act, 2001; City of Toronto Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 11, Sch. A). I note that Alberta has expressly created immunity from possessory claims for municipal land (see, e.g., Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, s. 609).

[65] In Ontario, the legislature has made a policy choice to confer special legislative treatment to a limited class of public lands and preserve matured possessory title. Considering the recent statutory enactments specifically dealing with the availability of adverse possession for public lands, I am of the view that recognizing a common law protection against such claims for municipal parkland would run contrary to legislative intent.

. BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District

In BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal [under the Canada Transportation Act, s.41(1)], here from a CTA decision that "found the rerouting works suitable and authorized the District to construct and maintain them at the District’s cost".

Here the court noted that the statutory interpretation of related statutes should be harmonious:

[81] Importantly, when interpreting a statute, it is appropriate to consider statutes enacted by the same legislature that deal with the same subject matter—here, railways. This is "“in keeping with the ‘principle of [statutory] interpretation that presumes a harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes dealing with the same subject matter’”": Schmidt v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 55 at para. 16, citing R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 at para. 52, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38179 (4 April 2019); see also Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 37 at para. 83; Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 68 at paras. 34, 37-38.

[82] Here, both the Railway Safety Act and the Canada Transportation Act confer authority over railways on the Minister of Transport and the Agency. The two statutes are thus clearly interrelated, particularly in the context of crossings.

. Tataryn v. Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP

In Tataryn v. Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a class action-related appeal, here involving the 'dismissal for delay' provisions of CPA s.29.1(1).

Here the court comments on the 'related statutes' cross-over aspect of statutory interpretation:

(a) Principles of Statutory Interpretation

[25] As is oft stated, the words of an Act are to be “read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at p. 41.

[26] There is a presumption of statutory interpretation that the provisions of a statute are meant to work together and form an internally consistent framework: Heritage Capital Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 2016 SCC 19, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 306, at para. 28. When analyzing the scheme of the statute, the court seeks to determine how the provisions or parts of the statute work together to give effect to a plausible and coherent plan. It then considers how the provision to be interpreted can be understood in terms of that plan: Ruth Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), at § 13.02[4].

[27] Where applicable, a statutory provision is presumed to be coherent with related statutes: Point-Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court), 1997 CanLII 390 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, at p. 1054. When statutes deal with the same subject, it is presumed that their language is consistent throughout. Identical phrases and expressions are presumed to have the same meaning: see e.g. Notaries Public of British Columbia v. Law Society of British Columbia, 2017 BCCA 448, 6 B.C.L.R. (6th) 271, at paras. 28-29; Sullivan, at § 13.04[4]. In addition, the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, expressly apply to proceedings under the CPA. Accordingly, those Rules, including their definition of “timetable”, should be considered when interpreting the CPA.

. Melville v. McLaren

In Melville v. McLaren (Div Court, 2024) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here relating to a restrictive covenant on a property which converted from the Registry Act system to the Land Titles system during the running of the covenant's currency.

Here the court statutorily interprets provisions across multiple statutes in a related real property context:

[16] When engaging in an exercise of statutory construction, this Court must read the words of the act “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21. The modern rule of statutory interpretation requires me to consider the plain language of the provision(s), the broader context of the legislation, the objective of the legislation and the Legislature’s intention.

[17] If the provision in question is in an Act that is part of a larger statutory scheme, the court should favour an interpretation that promotes “harmony, coherence and consistency” between statutes dealing with the same subject matter: Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867; Stoddard v. Watson, 1993 CanLII 59 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1069.

. Mulmer Services Ltd. v. LIUNA, Local 183

In Mulmer Services Ltd. v. LIUNA, Local 183 (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered (but disregarded) what an applicant characterized as the 'harmonization' principle of statutory interpretation:

[69] On this point, I agree with the argument of LIUNA, which I adopt as my own:

That unionized employers are subject to the [LRA] and non-unionized employers are not is trite. That there are “different obligations for an organization under each piece of legislation”, “based only” on whether an employer is unionized, is the universal case in all matters of labour and employment quite irrespective of the Decision. That an incoming employer who ousts a unionized employer might find itself subject to the successorship provisions of the Act (and a collective agreement as a result), even if it would otherwise not be required to pay severance under the ESA, is not “inconsistency” on any interpretation that is reasonable or otherwise intended by the legislature. Preservation of bargaining rights and continuity of employment is the point of section 69.1. It is not in any way contingent on – let alone determined by – whether an incoming employer would have to pay severance if the outgoing employer were not unionized.

There are a myriad of fundamental and substantive differences between the Act and the ESA. The Board’s recognition of that difference is reflected in the Decision here and is consistent with the Board’s findings in the first case to consider the application of the reinstituted section 69.1, in [Imperial Parking].[67]

[70] The Board’s Decision implicitly recognizes that the two statutory schemes serve different objectives. The Decision is consistent with previous OLRB jurisprudence. In my view, the Decision cannot be said to be unreasonable on this point. Therefore, this ground must also fail.

. Canada (Attorney General) v. Bacile

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bacile (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal considered statutory interpretation when interpreting across related statutes:

[12] The Court presumes harmony, coherence and consistency in the interpretation of provisions within a statutory scheme and between statutes dealing with the same subject matter: R. v. Uybel Enterprises, 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867 at para 52; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 27. ....

. International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency

In International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency (Fed CA, 2022) the Federal Court of Appeal cites the principle that different statutes are to be interpreted in accordance with the "presumption of legislative coherence" - wherever this is possible:

[75] The appellants also submit that the scope of the Agency’s regulation-making authority under section 86.11 of the CTA is further constrained by the presumption of legislative coherence. Pursuant to that well established presumption, overlapping provisions from different statutes must be interpreted so as to avoid conflict wherever this is possible: Thibodeau at paras. 89, 93 and 99; Barreau du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2017 SCC 56, 404 D.L.R. (4th) 201 at para. 73; Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1992 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at p. 38 [Oldman River]; P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2011), at p. 365. What is true of statutes is also true of delegated legislation: regulations can neither conflict with their enabling legislation nor with any other act of the legislature: Oldman River, at p. 38; D.J.M. Brown & J.M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2022), at § 15:61. Since the Montreal Convention has the force of law in Canada as its provisions have been incorporated into Canadian law by subsection 2(2.2) of the CAA, the appellants argue that Parliament must be presumed not to have authorized the adoption of delegated legislation pursuant to section 86.11 that would be inconsistent with the Montreal Convention.