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Statutory Interpretation - Bilingualism. R. v. Wolfe
In R. v. Wolfe (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a criminal appeal, here where the issue was 'discretionary driving prohibitions' added onto sentencing for convictions for certain CCC offences. This case corrected statutory interpretation confusion that had arisen over the years regarding 'which' convictions this system applied to.
Here the court holds that both French and English are "equally authoritative" from a statutory interpretation perspective:[58] The English and French versions of s. 320.24(4) are equally authoritative and both must be considered (see R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 53; Sullivan, at §§ 5.02[3]-[5]). .... . Poonian v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)
In Poonian v. British Columbia (Securities Commission) (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal against a tribunal order that held "disgorgement orders and the administrative penalties" exempt from bankruptcy discharge, here under BIA s.178(1)(e) ['fraud'].
Here the court cites doctrine on the statutory interpretation of bilingual text:[37] The English and French versions of s. 178(1)(a) are slightly different. Importantly, the words “in respect of an offence” in the English version are absent from the French version. “The shared meaning rule for the interpretation of bilingual legislation dictates that the common meaning between the English and French legislative texts should be accepted” (Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 23, at para. 203, citing R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 99 et seq., and M. Bastarache et al., The Law of Bilingual Interpretation (2008), at pp. 32 et seq.). The shared meaning rule points to a broader reading of s. 178(1)(a) that encompasses any fine, penalty, restitution order or other order that is imposed by a court. Under this interpretation, there is no indication that such an order needs to be imposed in a criminal or quasi‑criminal context. . London (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 101
In London (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 101 (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court considers a labour JR where the applicant City challenges an arbitrator's finding regarding paid holiday.
Here the court considered whether "the Arbitrator failed to accurately state and apply the established test for interpretation of bilingual statutory instruments to the Proclamation issued 13 September 2022?":[17] The Arbitrator found that the parties, in a clear and unambiguous way, delegated to the Government of Canada the power to add holidays to the Collective Agreement by incorporating a reference to s. 42(a)(iii) of the BEA. Further, the Arbitrator was satisfied that the Proclamation of 19 September 2022 was a day of general mourning throughout Canada within s. 42(a)(iii) of the BEA. To support this conclusion, the Arbitrator relied on the French text of the Proclamation, which he found was “narrower or more specific”. While the English version of the Order in Council and Proclamation lacked the word ‘mourning’, the French language version of both contained the word “deuil” which is also found in the French version of s. 42(a)(iii) of the BEA.
....
[41] The City submits that the Arbitrator provided no analysis of his interpretation of the meaning of the applicable words in Article 11.1, in the Proclamation, or in s. 42(a)(iii) of the BEA [SS: the federal 'Bills of Exchange Act'].
[42] The City relies on the two-step process for statutory interpretation of bi-lingual statutes set out in R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217, at paras. 27-30:
1) Determine whether there is an irreconcilable difference between the two versions off the statue. If there is, then:
2) Determine whether the common or dominant meaning is, according to the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, consistent with Parliament’s intent.
[43] In determining whether there is discordance for the first part of the Daoust test, the court must use a purposive and contextual approach, the steps for which are:1) If one version is ambiguous, but the other is not, the meaning that is common to both versions is the version that is plain and unambiguous.
2) If neither version is ambiguous, or they both are, then the common meaning is normally the narrower versions. ....
[48] This is not a case where one version of the Proclamations was ambiguous and the other, not. Rather, both versions were clear. The Arbitrator held that the French and the English versions of the Proclamation and s. 42(a)(iii), while clear, differed from each other and could not be reconciled. Therefore, the more narrow version had to be adopted. Because the French version of the Proclamation and s. 42(a)(iii) included the word “deuil” (meaning “mourning”, in English) but the English version did not include the word “mourning”, the French version was the narrower version of the Proclamation and s. 42(a)(iii) therefore applied.
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