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Statutory Interpretation - Federal. Waterhen Lake First Nation v. Canada
In Waterhen Lake First Nation v. Canada (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a JR, here challenging the striking of a Specific Claims Tribunal claim dealing with 'traditional harvesting'.
In the context of interpreting SCTA s.14-15, the court considered basic federal principles of statutory interpretation:[96] In interpreting the words of a statute, courts and tribunals should place upon them "“the meaning that best fits the object of the statute, provided that the words themselves can reasonably bear that construction”": R. v. Z. (D.A.), 1992 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1025 at 1042, 140 N.R. 327. While they must give an enactment such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects, this does not give them "“license to ignore the words of the Act…”": University of British Columbia v. Berg, 1993 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 at 371, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 665. As recently observed by the Supreme Court of Canada, the text of a statute "“remains the anchor of the interpretive exercise”":The text specifies, among other things, the means chosen by the legislature to achieve its purposes. These means “may disclose qualifications to primary purposes, and this is why the text remains the focus of interpretation” (M. Mancini, “The Purpose Error in the Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation” (2022), 59 Alta. L. Rev. 919, at p. 927; see also pp. 930‑31). In other words, they may “tell an interpreter just how far a legislature wanted to go in achieving some more abstract goal” (p. 927).
[Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43 at para. 24.] [97] As the Decision makes plain, the Tribunal was of the view that the language of the statutory provisions that defined its jurisdiction were clear and unambiguous: Decision at paras. 5, 7 and 14. Where the words used in the statute are precise and unequivocal, "“their ordinary meaning will usually play a more significant role in the interpretive exercise”": Vavilov at para. 120, citing Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54 at para. 10, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601. The Tribunal was of the view that in light of the text, context and scheme of the legislation, paragraph 15(1)(g) did not lend itself to the interpretation proposed by the Applicant and purportedly supported by the Minister’s remarks. Even if the Applicant was correct that its harvesting rights were no longer ongoing, the Claim was still based on treaty rights of a certain character—those related to activities capable of being exercised in an ongoing and variable manner. The Applicant has not convinced me that the Tribunal’s conclusion on this question was unreasonable. . Bank of Nova Scotia v. Canada
In Bank of Nova Scotia v. Canada (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a tax appeal, here from "a decision of the Tax Court of Canada which confirmed a reassessment imposing interest for late payment of tax".
Here the court sets out principles of statutory interpretation, here from a federal court which tends to rely on their own cases:[25] As for the applicable principles of statutory interpretation, these were concisely described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 [Canada Trustco]:10 It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 639 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para. 50. The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole.
[Emphasis added.] [26] Canada Trustco also clarified that "“[e]ven where the meaning of particular provisions may not appear to be ambiguous at first glance, statutory context and purpose may reveal or resolve latent ambiguities”" (at para. 47). As a result, a textual, contextual and purposive analysis is usually required. . Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Canada
In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Canada (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal quoted from a leading federal statutory interpretation case:[19] The Supreme Court of Canada, in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. The Queen, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, set out the approach to be adopted in interpreting statutory provisions:[10] It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 639 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para. 50. The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole. [20] As noted by the Supreme Court, "“[w]hen the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process”". The importance of considering the words chosen by Parliament and the dominant role that "“precise and unequivocal”" language plays in the interpretation of the provisions of the ITA was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Canada v. Loblaw Financial Holdings Inc., 2021 SCC 51, at paragraph 41. . Canada (Attorney General) v. Burke
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Burke (Fed CA, 2022) the Federal Court of Appeal cites the preferred leading case on statutory interpretation in the federal court system, Canada Trustco:[32] In Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the words of a statute "“are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”": at para. 10, citing 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 639 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804 at para. 50.
[33] While language in a statutory provision is not to be interpreted independently of its context and legislative purpose, the Court nevertheless went on in Canada Trustco to observe that where the words of a statutory provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words will play a dominant role in the interpretive process: above at para. 10. Where, however, the words are capable of supporting more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words will play a lesser role. Although the relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary from case to case, courts must seek to read the provisions as a harmonious whole in every case: Canada Trustco, above at para. 10.
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