|
Statutory Interpretation - Marginal Notes and Headings. R. v. King
In R. v. King (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a Crown criminal appeal, this brought against an "acquittal on the count of intimidation contrary to s. 423(1)(g) of the Criminal Code".
Here the court considers the interpretive role of statutory headings:[59] Relatedly, the trial judge erred by finding that the specific intent requirement necessitates proof of intention to intimidate individuals. The requisite specific intention is spelled out in the chapeau to s. 423(1), and nowhere does it refer to the need for an intention to intimidate. This is no doubt because it was unnecessary for Parliament to include such an element. Each of the modes of commission enumerated in s. 423 involve inherently intimidating conduct, such that the intention to do any of the enumerated acts in ss. 423(1)(a) to 423(1)(g) inherently includes the intention to intimidate.[4] As Slatter J.A. commented in Pawlowski, at para. 107, “[B]lockading a highway is an inherently aggressive and potentially violent form of conduct, designed to intimidate and impede the movement of third parties.”
[60] If the trial judge was influenced in adopting the interpretation he did by the fact that the offence appears under the heading “Intimidation” in the Criminal Code, he should not have been. While headings may be relevant in the interpretation of federal legislation, they “will never be determinative of legislative intention” and cannot “operate to change the clear and unambiguous meaning” of a particular provision: R. v. Davis, 1999 CanLII 638 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 759, at paras. 53-54. Here, all required elements of the offence of intimidation are spelled out in the text of s. 423(1)(g) itself. It is clear and unambiguous that neither a subjective intention to intimidate individuals, nor threats or acts of violence are essential elements of s. 423(1)(g). . Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers
In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal of a JR, here where the successful JR applicant argued that immigration inadmissibility [under IRPA, s.34(1)(a) and (f) - 'Inadmissibility - Security'] required that the applicant was a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in espionage "contrary to Canada’s interests", and that such espionage have a Canadian nexus.
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation role of 'marginal notes and headings' within legislation:[95] As noted earlier, the heading for section 34 states that the section relates to inadmissibility for "“Security”" reasons [my emphasis]. This suggests that the Canadian interests at stake in paragraph 34(1)(a) are Canada’s national security or security interests.
[96] I recognize that in accordance with section 14 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21, marginal notes and headings do not form part of a statute, and are inserted only for ease of reference. That said, it is nevertheless permissible to consider them as part of the interpretative process, although they may be accorded lesser weight than other interpretive aids: Corbett v. Canada, 1996 CanLII 3849 (FCA), [1997] 1 F.C. 386 (F.C.A.), [1997] 1 C.T.C. 2 at para. 13.
|
