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Torts - SLAPP - Harm-Expression Balancing (5). Teneycke v. McVety
In Teneycke v. McVety (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this from a dismissed defendents' anti-SLAPP CJA s.137.1(3,4) motion.
Here the court considers the harm/expression balancing element of the anti-SLAPP test:(i) The required weighing of competing interests under s. 137.1(4)(b) and the error in the motion judge’s analysis
[69] Section 137.1(4)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act required the respondents to satisfy the motion judge that, due to the harm they have suffered as a result of the appellants’ expressions, the public interest in allowing the action to continue outweighs the action’s “deleterious effects on expression and public participation”: Pointes, at para. 82; see also Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14, 481 D.L.R. (4th) 218, at para. 59.
[70] In Pointes, at paras. 81-82, Côté J. explained that this weighing exercise is the “crux or core” of the analysis under s. 137.1. At this point, the court must consider “what is really going on”:[T]he open-ended nature of s. 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on in the particular case before them: s. 137.1(4)(b) effectively allows motion judges to assess how allowing individuals or organizations to vindicate their rights through a lawsuit — a fundamental value in its own right in a democracy — affects, in turn, freedom of expression and its corresponding influence on public discourse and participation in a pluralistic democracy. [71] Accordingly, s. 137.1(4)(b) requires: a) consideration of the harm suffered, b) consideration of the public interest in protecting the expression in issue and c) a weighing of these interests, having regard to what is really going on in a particular case.
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(ii) The public interest in allowing the action to continue – harm suffered by the respondents
[74] As indicated above, the first part of the balancing analysis is to assess the public interest in “allowing an aggrieved party who has established a prima facie case that its legal rights have been infringed to vindicate those rights”: 40 Days, at para. 65. As part of this analysis, the court is to assess on a preliminary basis the nature and extent of the harm suffered.
[75] This court has reviewed the general principles governing the harm inquiry on several occasions, including in Marcellin, at para. 89:. Section 137.1(4)(b) requires both: (i) the existence of harm, and (ii) causation, that is, the harm was suffered as a result of the moving party’s expression;
. Either monetary or non-monetary harm will suffice. The harm need not be monetized or quantified, although there must be evidence that the harm is of a magnitude sufficient to outweigh the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions;
. Reputational harm is also relevant to the harm inquiry even if at this stage it is not quantifiable. Reputation is one of the most valuable assets a person or a business can possess;
. General damages are presumed in defamation actions. This alone is sufficient to constitute harm, although it is not sufficient to establish that the harm is serious;
. A fully developed damages brief is not required; and
. A responding party need not prove harm or causation but must simply provide evidence from which an inference of the likelihood of harm and causation may be drawn. This inquiry is undertaken by the motion judge on a case-by-case basis.
See also: Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., 2023 ONCA 129, 165 O.R. (3d) 753, at para. 46. ....
[80] In my view, it was not an error for the motion judge to consider that, given that Mr. McVety’s statements were directed at Mr. Teneycke’s professional reputation, including suggestions of criminal conduct and corruption, damage would be presumed. Certainly, in the context of anti-SLAPP motions, the Supreme Court and this court have taken a similar approach. In Hamer, at para. 113, Roberts J.A. summarized the relevance of reputational damages in the weighing stage of the analysis under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act:In Bent, at para. 146, Côté J. emphasized that “reputational harm is eminently relevant to the harm inquiry under s. 137.1(4)(b)” and that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence “has repeatedly emphasized the weighty importance that reputation ought to be given”, because “reputation is one of the most valuable assets a person or a business can possess”: see also Pointes, at para. 69. Moreover, she noted in Bent, at para. 147, that the “import of reputation is only amplified when one considers professional reputation” (emphasis in original). As a result, she concluded, the harm analysis requires the consideration of not only the pleaded monetary harm, but also the harm to a plaintiff's reputation, “even if it is not quantifiable at this stage”, noting that “the damaging effects that a defamatory remark may have on a plaintiff’s ‘position and standing’ in the professional community exacerbate the harm suffered as a result”: Bent, at para. 148; Pointes, at para. 71; Thorman, at para. 24. ....
(iii) The public interest in protecting the expression – the value of the appellants’ expression
[85] When considering the public interest in protecting the impugned expression under s. 137.1(4)(b), the court is to consider the quality of the expression and its motivation: “not just any matter of public interest will be relevant. Instead, the quality of the expression, and the motivation behind it, are relevant here”: Pointes, at para. 74 (emphasis in original). As van Rensburg J.A. explained in Marcellin, at para. 102, citing Hansman, “not all expression is created equal, and the level of protection to be afforded to any particular expression can vary according to the quality of the expression, its subject matter, the motivation behind it and the form through which it was expressed”.
[86] In addition, malice is relevant to assessing the value of the expression at issue: Pointes, at para. 75; Marcellin, at para. 107; and Hamer, at paras. 117-19. Indeed, “a statement that contains deliberate falsehoods [or] gratuitous personal attacks … may still be an expression that relates to a matter of public interest. However, the public interest in protecting that speech will be less than would have been the case had the same message been delivered without the lies [or] vitriol”: Pointes, at para. 75, citing 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, 142 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 93.
[87] In this case, the appellants urge the court to focus on Mr. McVety’s statements that Mr. Teneycke was in a conflict of interest. They argue that these statements are clearly a matter of public interest. However, this emphasis on the subject of the statements is misplaced based on what is required at this stage of the analysis. When conducting the weighing under s. 137.1(4)(b), the court is not just concerned with the topic of Mr. McVety’s expression, but with the quality of his expression and his motivation: Pointes, at para. 74; Thorman v. McGraw, 2022 ONCA 851, 476 D.L.R. (4th) 577, at paras. 15, 27.
[88] Mr. McVety was not just speaking on a matter of public interest; the evidence suggests that he was engaged in a campaign to impugn Mr. Teneycke’s reputation. As reviewed above, Mr. McVety did not just raise a concern that Mr. Teneycke was in a conflict of interest. Rather, the language he used was meant to impugn Mr. Teneycke’s professionalism and character, and to suggest that he was corrupt and acting illegally. There is no evidence that Mr. McVety took any steps to verify the accuracy of any of his allegations. As the motion judge found, Mr. McVety appears to have had an ulterior motive, and to have acted with malice.
[89] In the circumstances, there is a relatively low public interest in protecting the appellants’ expression.
(iv) Overall weighing
[90] The motion judge did not engage in the requisite overall weighing exercise. It therefore falls to this court to do so.
[91] The weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b) is open-ended and requires the court to scrutinize “what is really going on” in the case: Pointes, at para. 81. When weighing the respondents’ interest in pursuing the underlying defamation action against the public interest in protecting the appellants’ expression, the court can consider some of the classic hallmarks of a SLAPP suit. These include whether the plaintiff has a history of using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics, a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff, a punitive or retributory purpose animating the action, and minimal or nominal damages suffered by the plaintiff: Pointes, at paras. 78-79; Marcellin, at para. 111. In addition, the court can consider the importance of the expression, broader or collateral effects on other expressions on matters of public interest, and the potential chilling effect on future expression either by a party or by others: Pointes, at para. 80; Marcellin, at para. 111.
[92] In this case, there is no evidence that the respondents have a history of using litigation to threaten or silence critics. On the contrary, Mr. McVety is not the only person who has raised concerns about a potential conflict of interest, and yet, the respondents have only pursued a claim against the appellants. There is also no evidence of a financial or power imbalance between the parties, or that the respondents brought their claim for punitive or retributory purposes. Instead, the evidence suggests that Mr. McVety made the impugned statements against the respondents as a form of retribution for Mr. Teneycke’s alleged role in the College not being accredited as a university, and that Mr. Teneycke’s objective in bringing the claim is to protect his reputation.
[93] In the circumstances of this case, while the evidence of the seriousness of the harm is limited, it still outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. What is really going on here is not a strategic lawsuit brought to prevent Mr. McVety from expressing himself on a matter of public importance, but rather a legitimate claim in defamation brought to protect the respondents’ reputations. The respondents may not ultimately succeed at trial, but they should be allowed to pursue the action. . Burjoski v. Waterloo Region District School Board
In Burjoski v. Waterloo Region District School Board (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the denial of a SLAPP motion, here where a school board defendant was sued for defamation in the context of disputes over transgendered-issued books in school libraries.
Here the court considered the 'harm/expression balancing' element of the SLAPP test, both wrt the weighing process and the weighing itself:(3) The motion judge erred in the weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b)
[71] As the relevant paragraphs from the motion judge’s reasons set out earlier in these reasons indicated, the motion judge recited the proper factors to be weighed under s. 137.1(4)(b). He said that he was weighing “the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue” against “the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression.” However, the motion judge considered only one side of the equation, namely, the reputational harm caused to the respondent by the Board Chair’s speech, along with the respondent’s rights under s. 2(b) of the Charter. He did not consider the countervailing public interest that could attach to the Board Chair’s speech. As a result, the weighing process was skewed. Having considered only those interests that favoured the respondent — her experience of harm and right to speak — it was inevitable that the weighing would resolve in the respondent’s favour.
[72] As it related to the appellants, the motion judge focused on the decision to shut down the respondent’s presentation. This raises two difficulties. First, as discussed above, the motion judge’s criticism of the Board’s decision to shut down the respondent’s presentation is called into question by the subsequent Divisional Court decision upholding the validity of the Board’s decision. Second, and more importantly, the shutdown of the presentation was not the factor to be weighed against the alleged harm to the respondent. It was, rather, the Board Chair’s speech in the aftermath of the meeting, including the public statements made during media interviews, that had to be weighed in the balance. The motion judge focused on the Board’s curtailment of the respondent’s speech but failed to consider the public interest attaching to the speech of the Board and the Board Chair’s speech — the speech that was the very subject matter of the litigation.
[73] Each of these problems will be addressed in turn below.
(a) The Divisional Court decision
[74] The motion judge’s weighing analysis hinged on the underlying premise that it was wrong for the Board Chair to stop the presentation and curtail the respondent’s remarks. The motion judge characterized the shutdown of the presentation as “embarrassingly erroneous and arbitrary” and, in fact, undemocratic.
[75] The motion judge did not have the benefit of the Divisional Court’s decision upholding the decision to halt the respondent’s presentation. Nonetheless, it follows from the Divisional Court decision that the motion judge erred in finding that the Board had no authority to intervene. The motion judge’s criticism of the Board for halting the meeting figured prominently in his analysis, including his weighing of interests under s.137.1(4)(b). However, as will be discussed below, it was not the halting of the meeting that was at issue in this case. It was, rather, the public interest in the Board Chair’s speech following the shutdown that was to serve as the counterweight to the respondent’s alleged harm.
(b) The shutdown was not the issue
[76] In Hansman, the Supreme Court found that the British Columbia Court of Appeal erred in focusing on the need to protect the legitimate speech of the plaintiff, rather than the public interest in the defendant’s speech, offered in response to the plaintiff. As the court put it, at para. 7:I agree with the chambers judge. Mr. Neufeld argued in the courts below and in this Court that he only criticized a policy; he never expressed hatred towards the transgender community, nor did his words create an unsafe school environment for transgender students. But his submissions miss the mark. Mr. Neufeld’s right to criticize a government initiative is not in dispute. Rather, the central issue is whether Mr. Hansman had a right to respond to Mr. Neufeld in the way he chose without the threat of civil liability. [77] The same can be said in this case. The issue was not the respondent’s right to comment on books in the school library. Nor was it the propriety of the Board’s decision to curtail those comments. Rather, the issue was whether the Board Chair had a right to respond to the respondent, in the way that he chose, without the threat of civil liability. As in Hansman, at para. 90, the speech of the plaintiff in this case serves as context for evaluating the defendant’s expression. But it was the public interest in the Board Chair’s expression, not that of the respondent, that was to be weighed.
[78] While a motion judge’s determination on a s. 137.1 motion is entitled to deference on appeal absent an error in law, or a palpable and overriding error of fact or mixed fact and law, in the face of such an error the usual standard of deference is suspended, and it is open to the appellate court to consider the matter, including the weighing analysis, afresh.
[79] In this case, the record is sufficiently robust that this court can independently weigh the alleged harm to the respondent against the public interest in the Board Chair’s speech: see Mondal, at para. 67. We will do so in the paragraphs that follow.
(4) Did the harm to the respondent outweigh the value of the appellants’ speech?
(a) What is really going on here?
[80] In assessing “what is really going on”, the court may consider whether the case contains the hallmarks or indicia contemplated by the anti-SLAPP regime. While not determinative, the presence or absence of these hallmarks informs the public interest weighing analysis under s. 137.1(4)(b).
[81] This case does not fall within the paradigm of SLAPP litigation. This is not a case in which a powerful plaintiff is seeking to silence criticism by those less powerful. In this case, it is the appellants, representing a public institution, who are arguably the more powerful party. This case does not have the traditional hallmarks of abusive or strategic litigation aimed at curtailing undesirable speech. Rather, this is a case of a private citizen (employed by the Board) who claims reputational harm as a result of public statements made by a representative of the Board. The power imbalance does not favour the respondent. If anything, it points in the opposite direction. Although not dispositive of the analysis under s. 137.1, this does bear on the weighing of interests, and the question of what is really going on in the context of this proceeding.
(b) Harm to the respondent
[82] We are satisfied, as was the motion judge, that the respondent has met the burden of showing harm as required at this preliminary screening stage. The statements at issue were broadly disseminated and it can be reasonably inferred that they have had a deleterious impact on the respondent’s reputation. In Pointes, at para. 71, Côté J. emphasized that harm and causation are determined at an early stage in the proceedings and cannot be judged on an exacting standard:I would not go so far as to require a fully developed damages brief, nor would I require that the harm be monetized, as the question here relates to the existence of harm, not its quantification. The statutory language employed in s. 137.1(4)(b) is “harm likely to”, which modifies both “be” and “have been”; this indicates that the plaintiff need not prove harm or causation but must simply provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of the harm and the relevant causal link. [Emphasis in original.] [83] In her affidavit the respondent described suffering serious emotional distress following the Board Chair’s statements about her and the ensuing media storm. This culminated in a panic attack, mental breakdown and hospitalization on January 22, 2022. Since then, she has required anxiety medication and therapy. In addition to employment sanctions imposed the day after the Board meeting, the respondent deposed that following the Board Chair’s media statements she lost the opportunity to work during her retirement as an occasional teacher, the income of which had been part of her retirement plan.
[84] The appellants argue that the motion judge erred by failing to (1) inquire whether the respondent actually suffered the harm she alleged and (2) consider whether the impugned statements actually caused the alleged harm, as other individuals also criticized the respondent’s comments at the Board meeting.
[85] We do not accept these submissions. At this stage of the proceedings, the motion judge was entitled to infer from the respondent’s affidavit evidence and the wide media coverage of the Board Chair’s statements a likelihood of serious harm and a causal link to the impugned statements. In any event, based on the record in this motion, we are satisfied that the respondent has established a likelihood of significant harm caused by the Board Chair’s statements. There is therefore a strong public interest in allowing her action to proceed. . Hamer v. Jane Doe
In Hamer v. Jane Doe (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from a successful SLAPP CJA s.137.1 motion.
Here the court considers the harm-expression balancing [under CJA s.137.1(4)(b)]:(c) Subsection 137.1(4)(b): the weighing exercise
(i) Correct Analysis
[93] Section 137.1(4)(b) is the public interest weighing stage, which is the “crux of the analysis”, where the focus is on “what is really going on” in this case: Pointes, at paras. 18, 30 and 81. The final weighing exercise requires the “structured evaluation” of the competing values of the public interest in allowing a legitimate action to continue to redress harm caused by the moving party’s actions against the public interest in the moving party’s expression.: 40 Days for Life, at para. 93. As this court noted in Mondal, at para. 72:It seems uncontroversial to say that an interest that has little or no weight - a "technically valid" cause of action that causes "insignificant harm" - is outweighed by an interest in freedom of expression that is presumed to be very important. That is so because the price to be paid for protecting expression in these circumstances is minimal. In most cases, however, the weighing judgments that must be made under s. 137.1(4)(b) are more difficult and contentious, involving arguable claims of defamation with potentially significant, if undetermined, damages and contestable claims about the importance of the impugned expression. [94] The burden on the responding party with respect to the alleged harm was recently described by this court in Marcellin, at para. 11: “The responding party need not prove harm or causation but must simply provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of harm and the relevant causal link” (emphasis in original). In Thorman, at paras. 11, 12, this court further explained that “[h]arm need not be ‘monetized’” and that a “'definitive determination of harm or causation’ is not required.” Instead, in order to succeed on the weighing exercise, the [responding party] “must provide evidence that enables the judge ‘to draw an inference of likelihood’ of harm of a magnitude sufficient to outweigh the public interest in protecting the [moving party’s] expression”: Hansman, at para. 67. Neither reputational harm nor monetary harm is more important than the other. Nor is harm synonymous with the damages alleged: Subway Franchise Systems of Canada, Inc., at para. 85.
[95] While no definitive determination of harm or causation is required, it is insufficient to rely on “[p]resumed general damages” or “bare assertions of harm”: Hansman, at para. 67. That said, “there is no threshold requirement for the harm to be sufficiently worthy of consideration…the magnitude of the harm simply adds weight to one side of the weighing exercise”: Pointes, at para. 70.
[96] Unlike the threshold analysis, where the question was simply whether the expression was related to a matter of public interest, at this stage, it is necessary to evaluate the expression's quality and the motivation behind it: Pointes, at para. 74. As this court explained in Thorman, at para. 14:The weighing analysis looks to the fundamental values underlying freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, such as “the search for truth, participation in political decision making, and diversity informs of self-fulfillment and human flourishing, because ‘[t]he closer the expression is to any of these core values, the greater the public interest in protecting it’”. [97] To the extent the expression moves away from any of these core values, the public interest in protecting it diminishes. Defamatory statements and personal attacks are only “tenuously related to the core values which underlie s. 2(b) of the Charter” and therefore “there will be less of a public interest in protecting a statement that contains ‘gratuitous personal attacks’ and the ‘motivation behind’ the expression will be relevant to the inquiry”: Buttar, at para. 87, Bent, at para. 163, Pointes, at paras. 74, 75; Thorman, at para. 15.
[98] In 40 Days for Life, at para. 82, this court reiterated the correct approach in evaluating the quality of the expression:The Supreme Court cautioned in Pointes that "judges should be wary of the inquiry descending into a moralistic taste test", and instead instructed that the evaluation of the expression under s. 137.1(4)(b) should be guided by principles at the core of freedom of expression and other principles that underlie a free and democratic society: at paras. 76-77. This instruction should not be read as presupposing that moral evaluation is either unreasoned or lacking objectivity. Rather, it should be taken as an admonition to judges not to be quick to enter the fray on matters of moral controversy, and instead, for the purposes of this analysis, judges should disvalue only those expressions that would undermine or corrupt the core principles underlying the freedom of expression. [99] In weighing the public interest in allowing a proceeding to continue, certain factors may be relevant, including a history of attempts to silence critics, financial power imbalance, punitive purpose, and minimal damages suffered. The potential chilling effect on future expression and the defendant's history of advocacy in the public interest may also be relevant: Pointes, at paras. 79, 80.
[100] In discussing factors that may bear on the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b), at para. 79 of Pointes, Côté J. instructed that:[T]he only factors that might be relevant in guiding that weighing exercise are those tethered to the text of s. 137.1(4)(b), which calls for a consideration of: the harm suffered or potentially suffered by the plaintiff, the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue, and the public interest in protecting the underlying expression. [101] While providing guidance on some of the relevant factors that may inform the analysis, Côté J. reminded that the "open-ended nature of s. 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on" and that s. 137.1(4)(b) "effectively allows motion judges to assess how allowing individuals or organizations to vindicate their rights through a lawsuit - a fundamental value in its own right in a democracy - affects, in turn, freedom of expression and its corresponding influence on public discourse and participation in a pluralistic democracy": Pointes, at para. 81.
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[104] As already noted, the appellants’ burden under s. 137.1(4)(b) is not “to establish harm caused by the expression”; rather, it is to “provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of harm and the relevant causal link”: Marcellin, at para. 11. The question is whether the appellants have met their onus to establish that the harm likely to be or that has been suffered by them as a result of the respondents’ expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression: Levant, at para. 71.
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[111] Specifically, with respect to the question of the psychological and concomitant physical harm described by Ms. Hamer in her affidavit, we note that the Supreme Court in Bent did not require as part of the analytical framework that medical or other corroborating evidence be produced at the preliminary assessment stage for this kind of alleged harm but instructed, at para. 149, that these “intangible and subjective elements” should “factor into the assessment of the harm suffered by a plaintiff” and confirmed that “’injured feelings or the psychological impact’ of defamation are relevant to the assessment of damages”, with the reminder that “for the purposes of s. 137.1(4)(b), harm need not be monetized, as both ‘monetary harm or non-monetary harm can be relevant to demonstrating’ the existence of harm”, citing to Pointes, at paras. 68-71.
[112] .... A consideration of the state of the appellants’ reputation was a necessary step in order to conduct a proper weighing under s. 137.1(4)(b): Levant, at para. 52; Subway Franchise Systems of Canada, Inc., at para. 96.
[113] In Bent, at para. 146, Côté J. emphasized that "reputational harm is eminently relevant to the harm inquiry under s. 137.1(4)(b)" and that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence "has repeatedly emphasized the weighty importance that reputation ought to be given", because "reputation is one of the most valuable assets a person or a business can possess": see also Pointes, at para. 69. Moreover, she noted in Bent, at para. 147, that the "import of reputation is only amplified when one considers professional reputation” (emphasis in original). As a result, she concluded, the harm analysis requires the consideration of not only the pleaded monetary harm, but also the harm to a plaintiff's reputation, "even if it is not quantifiable at this stage", noting that "the damaging effects that a defamatory remark may have on a plaintiff's ‘position and standing’ in the professional community exacerbate the harm suffered as a result": Bent, at para. 148; Pointes, at para. 71; Thorman, at para. 24.
[114] The harm analysis did not require the appellants to definitively quantify or prove their actual damages on this threshold motion, particularly because this case involves alleged reputational damages caused by very serious allegations of animal cruelty and disreputable dealings. The motion judge failed to acknowledge that general damages for defamation do not have to be proven. Importantly, as a result of her mischaracterization of the sting of the defamation, the motion judge failed to consider that the respondents’ very serious allegations against the appellants were potentially very harmful to the appellants' professional reputations. See: Thorman, at para. 23.
[115] The weighing exercise also requires an examination of the quality of the impugned statements. Rather than analyzing, as the motion judge was required to do, how close the impugned statements were to core Charter values, she focussed instead on the engagement of the respondents in animal welfare volunteer work and their participation in online activities related to animal welfare and rescue. Her observations concerning the validity of the respondents’ activities may have been relevant for her consideration of the defence of responsible communication, but they do not reflect on the quality of the impugned statements. Without this assessment, she could not determine whether the public interest in the protection of the impugned statements outweighed the harm to the appellants.
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[118] I am not persuaded by the respondents’ submission that when the few inflammatory portions of Ms. Melo’s posts are considered in the broader context of animal welfare concerns, the public interest in the expression outweighs the harm to the appellants.
[119] The broader context is undoubtedly important for understanding the meaning of an expression; however, whatever good one ultimately hopes to achieve cannot be used to justify an expression that is untrue, not fair comment and could support a finding of malice, nor can it elevate the value of the expression: 40 Days for Life, at para. 76.
[120] Further, the sting of the impugned expression was unnecessary to convey the animal welfare message. Ms. Melo and the respondents could have expressed their concerns about the appellants’ activities without resort to the extreme and defamatory language that was used in the impugned statements. There is a significant difference between, on the one hand, providing others with a descriptive account of the animal welfare concerns with the appellants’ activities, and on the other hand, calling Ms. Hamer a mentally unstable cat hoarder who harms or kills cats in the appellants’ care: See: Thorman, at para. 30. Ms. Melo’s posts subsequent to the March 19 post were unnecessary and gratuitous: she indicated that the police had been contacted to investigate her allegations. At that point, the utility of and public interest in allowing the further posts is questionable.
[121] Accordingly, I conclude that when considered as a whole, the impugned statements are worthy of little protection as an expression of animal welfare concerns.
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