False Arrest/Imprisonment. Kolosov v. Lowe’s Companies Inc.
In Kolosov v. Lowe’s Companies Inc. (Ont CA, 2016) the Court of Appeal commented as follows on when a limitation period commences tolling in respect of the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment:
Second Ground – The Claims were Statute-Barred. Collis v. Toronto Police Services Board
 The law in relation to the commencement of the limitation period for the intentional torts of false arrest and false imprisonment, and associated Charter breaches, is well settled. As Chiappetta J. noted in Fournier-McGarry (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario, 2013 ONSC 2581 (CanLII), at para. 16:
A claim for the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment and breach of Charter rights arising there-from crystallizes on the date of arrest (see, Nicely v. Waterloo Regional Police Force, 1991 CanLII 7338 (ON SC),  O.J. No. 460 (Ont. Div. Ct.), para. 14; Fern v. Root, 2007 ONCA 79 (CanLII),  O.J. No. 397 (Ont. C.A.), para. 102). The appellants offer no authority for their submission that their causes of action did not arise, and the limitation period did not begin to run, until they had received full police disclosure. Not having commenced this action until after the two-year period from the time of arrest had expired, their claims in this respect are statute-barred.
In Collis v. Toronto Police Services Board (Div Ct, 2007) the Divisional Court stated:
The Law of False Arrest and False Imprisonment
 False arrest is a tort resulting from the intentional and total confinement of a person against his or her will and without lawful justification. False imprisonment is a tort that similarly flows from the unlawful total deprivation of a person’s liberty. The onus is on the plaintiff to prove that he or she was arrested or detained, and that the defendant caused the arrest or detention. The onus then shifts to the defendant to justify his or her actions (Frazier v. Purdy (1991), 1991 CanLII 7194 (ON SC), 6 O.R. (3d) 429 (Gen. Div.) at 435).
 The authority to arrest the respondent lay in s. 524(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It reads, in part:
Notwithstanding anything in this Act, a peace officer who believes on reasonable grounds that an accusedAfter such an arrest, the accused will appear before a justice under s. 524(3). If the justice finds that the accused has contravened his or her form of release, the justice shall cancel the recognizance and order that the accused be detained, unless the accused shows cause why his or her detention in custody is not justified pursuant to s. 524(8).
(a) has contravened or is about to contravene any … recognizance that was issued or given to him, …
may arrest the accused without warrant.
 A police officer must have reasonable grounds for arrest. In determining that issue, courts have applied the test for reasonable and probable grounds for arrest articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Storrey, 1990 CanLII 125 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 241 at 250-51, despite the change in the wording of the Code to “reasonable grounds”. The test is twofold: the officer must subjectively believe there are reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the grounds must be justifiable from an objective point of view, in the sense that “a reasonable person placed in the position of the officer must be able to conclude that there were indeed reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest”.
 The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Chartier v. Quebec (Attorney General), 1979 CanLII 17 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 474 stated that a police officer must take into account all the information available to him (p. 19 (Quicklaw)). However, as Doherty J.A. observed in R. v. Golub (1997), 1997 CanLII 6316 (ON CA), 34 O.R. (3d) 743 (C.A.) at 749,
Judicial reflection is not a luxury the officer can afford. The officer must make his or her decision based on available information which is often less than exact or complete.He went on to say,
In deciding whether reasonable grounds exist, the officer must conduct the inquiry which the circumstances reasonably permit. The officer must take into account all information available to him and is entitled to disregard only information which he has good reason to believe is unreliable…” The police officer need not establish a prima facie case for conviction. Rather, as Polowin J. stated in P.H.E. v. Ottawa-Carleton (Region) Police Service,  O.J. No. 3512 (S.C.J.) at para. 54:
It is clear, if one views the tests to be applied at the various stages of the criminal process (those being, for arrest – reasonable and probable grounds, for prosecution – a reasonable prospect of conviction, at a preliminary hearing – evidence that, if believed, could lead to conviction, at trial – proof beyond a reasonable doubt) that a police officer exercises his or her discretion at the very lowest end of this continuum.