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Torts - Rule in Rylands v Fletcher. Price v. Smith & Wesson Corporation
In Price v. Smith & Wesson Corporation (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed strict liability as in Rylands v Fletcher as a here-novel cause of action, this in a class action certification appeal:[76] ... It is plain and obvious that the rule of strict liability developed in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (U.K.H.L.), does not extend to this case. That rule imposes liability on a defendant’s “non-natural use” of land: Rylands, at p. 339; see also Tock v. St. John’s (City) Metropolitan Area Board, 1989 CanLII 15 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1181, at p. 1189. The claim at issue in this case has nothing to do with the defendant’s use of land. The plaintiffs argue that the rule in Rylands could evolve to apply to include non-land-based claims, but that would represent a significant, rather than incremental, departure from the existing jurisprudence, which treats products liability as a matter of negligence, not strict liability. In Smith v. Inco Limited, 2011 ONCA 628, 107 O.R. (3d) 321, at para. 93, this court declined to take a similarly “bold step” of extending Rylands’ reach to impose strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities, noting that those who engage in dangerous activities are subject to negligence actions.
[77] There are sound reasons not to impose strict liability on manufacturers. They cannot guarantee that all items are incapable of harming people, particularly when they are not used in accordance with instructions. A manufacturer who produces a product does not insure someone who suffers injury while using it: Daishowa-Marubeni International Ltd. v. Toshiba International Corporation, 2010 ABQB 627, 501 A.R. 178, at para. 40.
[78] These facts provide no basis to extend the law of strict liability to product manufacturers, particularly when the damages are caused by a third party in the course of committing a crime. The motion judge was correct to strike the strict liability claim. . R v Henderson
In Rv Henderson (Div Ct, 2008) the Divisional Court considered the rule in Rylands v Fletcher:The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
[10] The trial judge held that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher did not apply because “the management of the Trent-Severn Waterway is a general benefit for the community within the boundaries of the watershed” and as such did not constitute a non-natural use of the land, which is a requisite element for the operation of the rule. That is a correct statement of and application of the law: Tock v. St. John’s Metropolitan Area Board, 1989 CanLII 15 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1181 at 1189; Allen M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1997) at 482. Mr. Henderson argues that this exception does not apply because the management of the Trent-Severn Waterway did not provide a benefit to him or to others in his community along the Gull River. Even if this could be said to be true, which is debatable, it is not necessary that the benefit be to a specific landowner. It is indisputable that the management of the waterway is a benefit to the greater community with respect to protecting habitats of fish and waterfowl, maintaining a potable water supply for nearby communities, allowing for the production of hydro-electric power and providing a navigable waterway. Whether or not Mr. Henderson received a direct benefit is irrelevant.
[11] Accordingly, there is no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion that there is no cause of action based on the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
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