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5. Remedies for Unfair Practices
As is noted in s.1, the CPA's remedial provisions for unfair practices are distinct from those available for responding to non-compliance with general CPA rights [see Ch.7: "General Civil Remedies"] [CPA 91].
That said, the unfair practices remedies discussed in this section are quite similar to those general remedies. Both sets of remedies are premised on rescission of the consumer contract 'ab initio' (ie. cancellation as though it had never been made) and, where possible, restitution between the parties to achieve that goal. However there are other differences, and those are all explained in this chapter.
Note that while the "unfair practices" sections of the CPA (Part III, ss.14-19) use the term "rescission" for this, the rest of the CPA uses the term "cancel" for essentially the same meaning. I have studied the different uses of these two terms and can't find a difference in meaning, something which - if correct - would be a breach of the rule of statutory interpretation that 'different words mean different things'.
(b) Rescission and Restitution, Where Possible
The CPA provides that [CPA s.18(1)]:
CPA 18(1) There are several noteworthy points regarding this unfair provision provision, as follows.
Any agreement, whether written, oral or implied, entered into by a consumer after or while a person has engaged in an unfair practice may be rescinded by the consumer and the consumer is entitled to any remedy that is available in law, including damages.
. All Collateral Agreements Also Rescinded
It is common for consumer agreements to involve collateral agreements or other arrangements, commonly related to financing or security. The CPA dictates that these are also rescinded when the main agreement is rescinded. For clarity's sake, these collateral agreements include [CPA s.18(14)]:
related agreements; . No Causality Requirements
guarantees for payment;
security given by the consumer or a guarantor for payment;
credit agreements (explained in the sector-specific chapter entitled "Loans and Credit Regulation under the CPA"), and other payment instruments. This includes promissory notes that are:
- extended, arranged or facilitated by the person with whom the consumer reached the agreement, or
- otherwise related to the agreement.
In order to claim rescission under this provision, there is no requirement that the 'unfair practice' (again, almost always a 'representation'), caused the consumer to enter into the agreement, or even caused them injury of any fashion for that matter. Put another way, the unfair practice need not be 'material' to the creation of the consumer agreement in the sense of causing any damages.
All that is required is that the consumer agreement was "entered into by a consumer after or while a person has engaged in an unfair practice" [CPA 18(1)]. This may be a fine distinction in many cases, but all that this phrasing requires is that the commission of the unfair practice precedes or coincides in time with the consumer entering into the consumer agreement.
This is a position quite at odds with normal tort or contract law where a wrongdoing must have been causally-implicated in the harm that is to be compensated. This reflects an added corrective purpose in the CPA legislation - rather than just the traditional 'compensatory' purpose of the common law. However this 'new' purpose has received a doubtful reception from some judges, who are trained from law school forward to require some element of 'causation' (and causation of damages) of injury or prejudice before granting a legal remedy [see the relevant CPA 93(2) cases in Ch.7, s.3].
In CPA 18(1) (which has two parts: the 'rescission/restitution' part, and a second 'damage' part) one can see the role of causality at work. For restitution no causation is required, as restitution is all about 'putting the parties back to the beginning', that is before the transaction commenced. On the other hand, 'damages' actually intrinsically requires causation, else otherwise a judge has no basis on which to calculate damage quantum. Integral to the determination of the quantum of damages under the common law is the inquiry of what injury the wrong-doing caused. A judge or adjudicator is simply left with no guidance in this necessary task in the absence of causation.
. Are Restitutary Duties Mutual?
The restitution remedy set out for unfair practices in CPA s.18(1) (quoted above) is oddly limited: ie. "the consumer is entitled to any remedy that is available in law, including damages". But as is discussed in Ch.7 ["Civil Remedies"] at length, the natural remedy of restitution is normally a two-way street (typically advanced initially by the plaintiff, and then completed on the defendant's part by means of counterclaims and set-off).
That is, at common law restitution 'ab initio' (back to the beginning) involves both parties putting each other back in the position they were before the contract was entered into. However, CPA s.18(1) states only that the 'consumer' has the remedial entitlement - not the party that has engaged in the unfair practice. Taken literally, that suggests that the consumer can seek to have their money returned, and to keep any goods or the value of any services rendered to them - leaving the supplier to fend for themselves. That is a consequence that many judges would find unpalatable and would want to 'read around' if they possibly could, as judges instinctually oppose 'windfalls' (and a 'windfall' can be defined quite aptly as 'un-caused compensation', which may explain the judicial hesitancy).
As well, given the practical reality that most CPA lawsuits are advanced in Small Claims Court [maximum limit at August 2022 being $35k], and given the highly tolerant pleadings requirements of that court [936464 Ontario Limited cob as Plumbhouse Plumbing & Heating v Mungo Bear Limited (Ont Div Ct, 2003]], deputy-judges will naturally set-off damages against any potential consumer windfalls - even absent a defendant's set-off counter-claim.
The CPA argument lies that, if the consumer has no statutory duty to return goods to the supplier (contrary to the normal common law which credits their value to the supplier), should the supplier still be allowed regardless to set-off the value of those withheld goods against their duty of financial restitution? Or is the provision intentionally punitive against the supplier, consistent with the more serious nature of 'unfair practices'? The few court cases that have grappled with the CPA have not resolved this issue.
That said, it may be that these concerns are the result of awkward legislative drafting, and that the restitution duties are meant to be mutual all along. Section 18(2) [considered in (c) below] goes on to trigger the operation of alternative, modified restitutionary remedies which do allow for the supplier to 'set off' the value of their goods or services where "the return or restitution of the goods or services is no longer possible". If that is the case where return is no longer possible, why shouldn't there be a duty to return or compensate when it is possible?
(c) Alternative Remedy Where Return of Goods and Services to Supplier Not Possible
As noted above, in a common law sale of goods transaction rescission and restitution will normally involve return of the subject goods to the supplier by the consumer. However such return will not always be physically possible (for example of the goods have been consumed or are perishable). Further, while 'services' of course can't be returned, the consumer's contractual right to them (and to goods as well) can be assigned or otherwise transferred to a third party, complicating matters. Section 18(2) anticipates both of these situations.
Where goods cannot be returned, or where return would "would deprive a third party of a right in the subject-matter of the agreement that the third party has acquired in good faith and for value", normal restitution is not possible and an alternative, modified restitutionary remedy must apply. In such cases the consumer is entitled to return of their payments minus "the value that the goods or services have to the consumer" [CPA 18(2)] (call this 'use-value').
(d) Damages in Any Event
In either of the cases in (b) or (c) above (ie. restitution, or the alternative remedy where restitution is not possible), both ss.18(1) and (2) establish an additional (not an alternative) 'damages' remedy for the consumer. However, as above, a damages remedy inherently requires 'causation' of harm.
Normal civil damage rules are discussed in more depth at this Isthatlegal.ca link: Small Claims Court (Ontario) Legal Guide [see s.2(n): "Pleadings: Principles of Pleading: Pleading Damages"].
(e) Exemplary and Punitive Damages
Consistent with the normally more serious nature of 'unfair practice' violations - exemplary and punitive damages may be also ordered by a court "in addition" to the above [CPA 18(1-2)] awards [CPA 18(11)]. That is, such damages award can supplement another award, but cannot be made on its own (at least not under these CPA provisions, purely common law claims may be different).
The common law of punitive damages (the term 'exemplary' means the same) generally requires seriously egregious conduct on the part of a defendant, and they are awarded far less often than most people think (and most freshly-aggrieved plaintiffs hope). The common law punitive damages test is discussed at more length in this Isthatlegal.ca link: Damages [scroll down for the punitive damages link]
However it may be that the common law punitive damages test is not the only one to apply here, or even the correct one to apply. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the Saskatchewan case of Prebushewski v Dodge City Auto (1984) Ltd (SCC, 2005), considered whether exemplary damages should have been awarded under a statutory consumer protection exemplary damages provision that was triggered on 'wilful' breach of the Act (there one of a statutory warranty). The court held that the statutory exemplary damages provision did not adopt the common law punitive damages test, but rather was one specifically intended for the statutory consumer protection context - and as such did not require a finding of bad faith, only 'wilfulness' as the statute required. Unwilling to interfere with the fact finding of wilfulness by the trial court, the SCC upheld the trial ruling awarding exemplary damages.
Similar to the situation in Prebushewski, the Ontario punitive damages provision under consideration [CPA 18(11)|, has an express statutory trigger, in this case a finding that the defendant has committed any form of CPA 'unfair practice'. In light of Prebushewski, it seems unnecessary for a plaintiff who has proven the commission of an 'unfair practice', to also have to satisfy the common law punitive damages test. 'Unfair practice' alone should entitle the court to exercise its discretion to award punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Canada made this point clear when in explaining itself it cited and endorsed the same principle for interpreting a Saskatchewan CPA 'unfair practice' provision that similarly allowed exemplary damages:
[para 30] One can find additional support for the view that s. 65(1) represents a departure from the common law test for exemplary damages from the way such damages are referred to in s.16, contained in Part II of the Act. Part II addresses unfair marketplace practices. Section 16(1)(b) provides that when a court finds that a supplier has committed an unfair practice, it may award the consumer damages in the amount of any loss suffered because of the unfair practice, including punitive or exemplary damages; (f) Notice Requirements
[para 31] Section 16(1)(b), by referring to punitive or exemplary damages without any limiting modifiers, can be seen as alluding to a different test for exemplary damages than the one set out in s. 65(1). The use of different language in s.16 and s.65 must be presumed to be meaningful.
As is the case with the 'general' CPA non-compliance remedies discussed in Ch.7 ["General Civil Remedies"], remedies for unfair practices are ultimately enforceable in the civil courts (typically the Small Claims Court due to their quantum). These court remedies are discussed in (g) following.
However, before court proceedings can be commenced, and no later than one year after "entering into the agreement' in relation to which the unfair practice was engaged in, the consumer must issue proper notice to the party against whom they intend to claim any of the above remedies [CPA 18(3,4)]: ie. as per (b)-(e) above: restitution, alternative remedy and/or damages.
Note: . Notice Requirements
On the wording of CPA 18(2,3 and 11), 'punitive' damages, discussed briefly in (e) above, seem to be exempt from having to be claimed in such a Notice. This is probably grounded in the idea that the Notice is a form of pre-litigation 'demand' which the respondent can satisfy by paying out the 'regular' or non-punitive aspects of the claim. This allocates punitive damages to their status as a subsequent, punitive and solely court-ordered remedy, which seems fitting given their nature in the CPA regime.
There is no particular form required for such notice (ie. it may be oral or written or otherwise) - but it must "indicates the intention of the consumer to rescind the agreement [as per (b) and (d) above] or to seek recovery where rescission is not possible [as per (c) and (d) above] and the reasons for so doing" [CPA s.18(4)]. Of course, in order to more firmly establish in evidence that proper and timely notice has been given, it should be done in writing, keeping a copy.
'Reasons' logically should include an allegation that the party engaged in an unfair practice and basic details (dates, events, representations) about it. The goal in similar pre-litigation notices is to ensure that the facts underlying the claim are made clear to the notified party.
While CPA 18(4) provides for the possibility of further notice requirements being promulgated by Regulation, that this has not yet been done, so no additional notice content requirements exist.
. Service of Notice
Delivery of the notice may be effected "by any means" [CPA 18(5)] (eg. mail, personal services, fax, courier, etc) although, it is prudent for evidence purposes that it be in writing (copy kept), and delivered in a manner that provides proof of delivery - such as fax with a confirmation print-out, or courier receipt. Notice is deemed effective when sent, or in the case of personal service, performed [CPA 18(6)].
Notice may be sent to "the person with whom the consumer contracted" at any of the following addresses [CPA 18(7)]:
Note that while service of the Notice is only required on the supplier ("the person with whom the consumer contracted"), this does not prevent the consumer from later claiming against others in a civil action. The topic of who may engage in, and whom may be sued for, engaging in unfair practices is discussed in s.6 below ["Parties to an Unfair Practice"]. It may be prudent, though not necessary, for a consumer to serve Notice on all whom they intend to hold liable for an unfair practice.
- if a written copy of the agreement has been received by the consumer, the address set out in the agreement;
- if no written copy of the agreement has been received by the consumer or it was but had no address in it, to either:
- any address of the person on record with the Government of Ontario or the Government of Canada; or
- an address of the person known by the consumer.
. When Right to Sue Accrues
If the consumer does not receive a "satisfactory response" (ie. explanation, settlement, etc) within 30 days after service of the above notice, then they may commence civil action to enforce their rights [CPA 18(8); CP Reg 22]. Initially it is up to the consumer to decide what constitutes a 'satisfactory' response, but proceeding with a lawsuit after substantial compensation had already been paid out by the respondent will be risky, and could invite negative cost sanctions by the court.
. Court Waiver of Notice
The court dealing with a CPA unfair practice civil claim may waive (ie. disregard) a consumer's failure to serve, or properly serve, this Notice "if it is in the interest of justice to do so" [CPA s.18(15)].
Typical reasons for this would be avoidance of service by the supplier by making themselves hard to reach or locate. When facing such difficulties a consumer should undertake and record details of their several efforts to serve notice, so that they can later show the court that they honestly tried.
(g) Civil Court Proceedings
As noted above, failure of the recipient of the Notice to respond "satisfactorily" within 30 days allows the consumer to commence civil proceedings in the Superior Court (the Small Claims Court is a branch of the Superior Court) [CPA s.18(8,9)].
While there are some CPA-specific rules governing such actions (covered below), the general procedure for such actions are set out in the Isthatlegal.ca Small Claims Court (Ontario) Legal Guide.
Note that the Small Claims Court has, in addition to it's monetary jurisdiction of $35,000 [as at August 2022], jurisdiction to order the recovery of possession of property up to that value. This may be useful to consumers attempting to recover possession of goods given in trade-in towards a new goods purchase.
. Parole Evidence Rule Excepted
There is a standard civil evidence rule called the 'parole evidence rule', which holds that 'oral evidence to vary a written contract' (which is called 'parole evidence') is not normally admissible. The rule, even when applied, is subject to numerous exceptions and is largely an anachronism in today's courts.
While the Small Claims Court already has broad discretion to waive the rule if it wants [see the Small Claims Court Legal Guide: Ch.15, s.3: Evidence: Small Claims Evidence Rules], the rule has essentially been abolished for actions to enforce against unfair practices [CPA 18(10)]:
CPA s.18(10) This is to acknowledge that in the typical consumer transaction what the supplier-drafted contract says regarding terms, and reality, infrequently coincide.
In the trial of an issue under this section, oral evidence respecting an unfair practice is admissible despite the existence of a written agreement and despite the fact that the evidence pertains to a representation in respect of a term, condition or undertaking that is or is not provided for in the agreement.
. Liability Amongst Multiple Parties
The parties that may be sued for engaging in unfair practices are discussed below in s.6. When multiple parties are found to be liable for unfair practices, their liability will be 'joint and several' with each other [CPA s.18(12)].
This means that when one judgment is made against them all, it may be collected against any one or more of them, in whole or part as is most convenient to the successful plaintiff. Of course, only the total amount of the judgment may be collected (ie. no excess recovery in terms of quantum is allowed).
If one defendant is collected against disproportionately, then they have an action 'in contribution' against the other defendants to balance out their sharing of liability.
That said, the liability of someone who has taken an assignment (transfer or sale) of rights under the agreement under dispute (this often happens with third party financing of consumer agreements), is limited to the total amount that the consumer has paid to the assignee to date [CPA s.18(13)]. That is, assignees cannot be held liable for more than they have received from the consumer under the assignment, a form of limited liability protection.
6. Parties to an Unfair Practice
"Parties" is a legal term used to identify those who are involved in a lawsuit. For instance, the involved plaintiff consumer and defendant corporate supplier will be parties to almost all CPA-related lawsuits.
But what about the directors of the corporation, its agents, the employee who directly 'committed' the unfair practice, the partners if it is a partnership, the advertiser who broadcast the prohibited representation? All of these have potential liability under an 'unfair practice'-based lawsuit because the CPA prohibits "persons" from engaging in unfair practices [CPA 17(1)]. While the rules against unfair practices could have been directed only against 'suppliers' (ie. the one with whom the consumer contracts: CPA 1), this broader "persons" category is appropriate since unfair practices rules are concerned with more than just consumer agreements. They are concerned with all dealings surrounding a consumer agreement (the "consumer transaction": CPA 1) as well (indeed, an unfair practice can be committed even if there is no consumer agreement at all).
So while the most frequent defendant in any 'unfair practice'-based litigation will be the supplier, others can be defendant 'parties' as well. Also discussed here are the various forms in which business organizations can manifest themselves: ie. corporations, parnterships and sole proprietors, and the implications of these different forms on their liability under these unfair practice rules. These business forms are discussed in greater length in this Isthatlegal.ca Legal Guide: Small Claims Court (Ontario), Ch.4 - "Parties" [scroll down to s.3: "Identifying and Naming Business Organizations"].
In many cases involving defendants additional to the supplier, it will be common for them and the supplier to be held 'jointly and severally' liability to the plaintiff. This concept is explained in s.5(g) above ["Remedies for Unfair Practices: Civil Court Proceedings: Liability Among Multiple Parties"].
'Suppliers' are defined in the CPA as follows [CPA 1]:
CPA 1 "supplier" means a person who is in the business of selling, leasing or trading in goods or services or is otherwise in the business of supplying goods or services, and includes an agent of the supplier and a person who holds themself out to be a supplier or an agent of the supplier;A "consumer agreement" is defined as a contract between a consumer and a supplier [CPA 1]. As such, suppliers are the primary actor in any consumer situation other than the consumer themselves and they are certainly liable to the consumer for any unfair practice that they have committed or condoned to be done in their behalf.
Note that this 'supplier' definition is broader than one would expect, when one thinks of the parties to a contract alone. This 'supplier' definition doesn't require that the supplier enter into a contract with the 'consumer', which is consistent with the fact that most unfair practices relate to pre-contractual behaviour. This is also why the CPA identifies the much broader class of "persons" as those who can be liable for committing unfair practices [CPA 17].
'Agents', at common law, are persons authorized to act or speak for their 'principal', who in the case of consumer transactions is usually the supplier. They can be considered distinct from employees (though an employee can be an agent), and non-employee agents are sometimes described as dependent or independent contractors. The distinction between an employee and a contractor turns primarily on how much control the principal has over how their duties are performed.
The CPA expressly defines the term "supplier" to includes agents [CPA 1]. As such, these agents are directly liable as suppliers to being sued for unfair practices, even though they have no intention of contracting directly with the consumer. Normally if an agent is found liable in a civil claim their principal will be as well, and together they will be held to be 'jointly and severally' liable.
Most businesses conduct their activities through employees. Employees have two potential legal roles in relation to unfair practices liability: as agents and directly. The role of employee-agents is set out in (c) above, as they are included in the definition of 'suppliers' itself [CPA 1].
The 'direct' liability that an employee can have turns on the concept of their 'legitimate authority'. While employees practically may perform a similar or even identical functional role for their employer supplier, employees will not normally be held to be personally liable for their acts as long as they are acting within the legitimate authority granted them by the supplier.
Once they extend beyond this authority they risk personal liability. Drawing the line between what has and has not been authorized by the employer is often a very difficult task. It should not focus on whether the employer authorized 'illegal' acts, but rather whether the employer knew of and approved (or at least tolerated) the impugned activities, or whether they were negligent in not adequately policing their employees' behaviour.
The term "person", as it is used in Ontario law [and in CPA 17], includes both "natural persons" (ie. real, flesh and blood human beings) and corporations [Legislation Act, s.87]. Therefore corporations can commit unfair practices, be it as a supplier or even an agent (corporations cannot be employees).
The fact that corporations act mostly through employees, gives rise to the concept of vicarious liability, which had been recently defined as below [Dagenais v. Pellerin (Ont CA, 2022)]:
 These findings were made in the context of the test for vicarious liability known as the Salmond test, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley v. Curry, 1999 CanLII 692 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 534, at para. 10:.The potential liability of officers and directors of corporations is addressed at (g) below.
[T]he Salmond test … posits that employers are vicariously liable for (1) employee acts authorized by the employer; or (2) unauthorized acts so connected with authorized acts that they may be regarded as modes (albeit improper modes) of doing an authorized act.
Note that the CPA provides a separate penalty for corporations convicted of CPA regulatory offfences [see Ch.9, s.17: "CPA Prosecutions: Penalties"].
(f) Sole Proprietorships and Partnerships
Besides corporations, the other two primary business organization forms are sole proprietorships and partnerships, both of which are unincorporated. For liability purposes they are really just one or more natural persons together carrying on a business. When these business forms are 'created', there can be some attendent legal activity such as a business name registration or a partnership agreement, but such things generally have little or no impact on them being subject to regulation such as here under the CPA. They differ from corporations primarily in that they lack the 'limited liability' that protect corporate owners (ie. shareholders) from personal liability (although there are limited liability partnerships, although they do not gnerally protect them from CPA liability).
When they are sued, proprietorships and partnerships have no separate legal existence from the natural persons that make them up. In such cases it is those natural persons who are sued by name, usually with the addition of something like "o/a Acme Movers" ('operating as') added after their names to clarify the business name or form being used.
As such, the natural persons 'behind' sole proprietorships and partnerships can commit unfair practices.
(g) Corporate Directors and Officers
Generally, the civil liability situation of directors and other officers of a corporation is different from that of the natural persons behind a sole proprietorship or a general partnership. The corporate form offers their directors, officers and shareholders what is called 'limited liability', which means that a plaintiff must normally limit themselves to the attacking the assets of the corporation itself when suing. The personal assets of directors and officers are 'out of bounds'.
That said, the common law will allow directors and officers to be personally held liable for activities related to a corporation if they are implicated in behaviour so egregiously wrong or illegal that protecting them is morally repugnant (eg. fraud). There are numerous tests for this 'piercing of the corporate veil' (as it is called), but that is as good a description of the standard as any.
While the CPA in some specific circumstances will allow corporate directors and officers to be held personally civilly liable for CPA non-compliance (ie. in relation to credit repairers and loan brokers: CPA s.1 "officer", 52), these are specific exceptions and otherwise directors and officers will not be held civilly liable except under the 'piercing the corporate veil' standard just mentioned.
(h) Mistake and Fraud
The consumer economic sector does not lack for out-and-out fraudulent activity. These of course are not usually situations of slick or even abusive treatment of a consumer by an otherwise legitimate supplier, but are rather activities purporting to be legitimate that are simply fronts designed to bilk money out of unsuspecting consumers.
It hardly seems necessary to mention that in such cases the fraudsters, and not any 'legitimate' suppliers whose names and identities they may have misappropriated, may be held civilly liable for unfair practices. However, to make the matter clear, the definition of "supplier" includes "a person who holds themself out to be a supplier or an agent of the supplier' [CPA 1].
This definition would also capture situations of innocent mistake, where a person mistakenly thought they had authority to act on behalf of a supplier, but these situations would be few.
While the common law allows tort lawsuits for fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation, the inclusion of fraudsters - and those operating under mistaken authority - within the definition of 'supplier' brings them under the civil liability provisions of the CPA.
(i) Advertising Logistical Support Excepted
The CPA excepts advertising logistical activities from the definition of 'unfair practices'. Thus:
CPA 17(3) It is not an unfair practice for a person, on behalf of another person, to print, publish, distribute, broadcast or telecast a representation that the person accepted in good faith for printing, publishing, distributing, broadcasting or telecasting in the ordinary course of business. (j) Manufacturers
Much of the litigation relating to the Consumer Protection Act has been in class action lawsuits against manufacturers. In such cases CPA non-compliance or commission of an 'unfair practice' is just one of many common law and statutory grounds for the claims - all of which can usually be summarized as false advertising or product liability (ie. harm caused by the product).
Lawyers for class action plaintffs, no doubt encouraged by the broad application of the CPA's 'unfair practice' provisions to "persons" [CPA 17(1)], have attempted to use the law against manufacturers - who are usually an attractive 'one-stop' deep-pocket defendant.
Given the small-dollar quantum of most consumer transactions, and the commensurate poor development of consumer case law, class actions are one of the few bright lights in consumer advocacy - which is a sad comment as these laws are designed for individual consumer-advocacy.
7. Administrative Orders and Unfair Practices
Chapter 10 ["Administrative Enforcement"] discusses several administrative orders that the Director of the Consumer Protection Branch can make. These include:
While all of these provisions can be invoked in the case of an 'unfair practice', note that the "Unfair Practice Stop Orders" are specifically tailored for use against 'false, misleading or deceptive' representations (the main class of 'unfair practices' addressed in s.2 above), while the other Orders are of more general CPA application.
- Proposed Compliance Orders [CPA 111(1); s.6]
- Immediate Compliance Orders [CPA 112(1); s.7], and
- Unfair Practice Stop Orders [CPA 109; s.8]
- Freeze Orders [CPA 110(3); s.11]